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Fishermen’s Profits Maximization: Case of Generalized Nash Equilibrium of a Non-symmetrical Game

Fishermen’s Profits Maximization: Case of Generalized Nash Equilibrium of a Non-symmetrical Game In the present paper, we consider a bio-economic equilibrium model which describes the dynamics of a fish population fished by several fishermen seeking to maximize their profits. Each fisherman tries to find the fishing effort which maximizes his profit at biological equilibrium without any consultation with others, but all of them have to respect two constraints: (1) the sustainable management of the resources ; and (2) the preservation of the biodiversity. With all these considerations, our problem leads to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem. The objective is to show that even when a fisherman $$i$$ i provides a fishing effort equal to twice the fishing effort of a fisherman $$j$$ j , then the profit of fisherman $$i$$ i is not necessarily double that of fisherman $$j$$ j . http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Acta Biotheoretica Springer Journals

Fishermen’s Profits Maximization: Case of Generalized Nash Equilibrium of a Non-symmetrical Game

Acta Biotheoretica , Volume 62 (3) – May 25, 2014

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References (16)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy of Biology; Evolutionary Biology
ISSN
0001-5342
eISSN
1572-8358
DOI
10.1007/s10441-014-9223-y
pmid
24859979
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In the present paper, we consider a bio-economic equilibrium model which describes the dynamics of a fish population fished by several fishermen seeking to maximize their profits. Each fisherman tries to find the fishing effort which maximizes his profit at biological equilibrium without any consultation with others, but all of them have to respect two constraints: (1) the sustainable management of the resources ; and (2) the preservation of the biodiversity. With all these considerations, our problem leads to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem. The objective is to show that even when a fisherman $$i$$ i provides a fishing effort equal to twice the fishing effort of a fisherman $$j$$ j , then the profit of fisherman $$i$$ i is not necessarily double that of fisherman $$j$$ j .

Journal

Acta BiotheoreticaSpringer Journals

Published: May 25, 2014

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