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In the present paper, we consider a bio-economic equilibrium model which describes the dynamics of a fish population fished by several fishermen seeking to maximize their profits. Each fisherman tries to find the fishing effort which maximizes his profit at biological equilibrium without any consultation with others, but all of them have to respect two constraints: (1) the sustainable management of the resources ; and (2) the preservation of the biodiversity. With all these considerations, our problem leads to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem. The objective is to show that even when a fisherman $$i$$ i provides a fishing effort equal to twice the fishing effort of a fisherman $$j$$ j , then the profit of fisherman $$i$$ i is not necessarily double that of fisherman $$j$$ j .
Acta Biotheoretica – Springer Journals
Published: May 25, 2014
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