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378 BOOK REVIEW Here is where Institutional Legal Facts enters the picture, because it is mainly devoted to an analysis of acts in the law and their results, institutional legal facts. In my discussion of this book, I will focus on those aspects which are relevant for the AI and Law cornmunity. Speech Acts and Acts in the Law In an introductory chapter Ruiter describes the recursive structure of legal sys- tems, where legal rules empower agents to make new legal rules, which empower agents . . . etc. The author continues in Chapter 2 with an extensive analysis of kinds of speech acts. He takes his starting point in the work of Searle and Van- derveken (Searle 1969, 1979; Searle and Vanderveken 1985; Vanderveken 1990) and elaborates and modifies the distinctions made by these authors. A speech act can be divided into an illocutionary act and a propositional content. For instance, the sentence ‘It’s raining’ will normally be an act of asserting (have the illocutionary force of making an assertion), and it has the propositional content that it is raining. The sentence ‘Please, put your coat on’, addressed to my daughter, has the illocutionary force of requesting and
Artificial Intelligence and Law – Springer Journals
Published: Sep 30, 2004
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