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Crime prototypes, which have been linked to jurors' story constructions and verdicts, were elaborated through narratives, yielding 600 detailed stories, across seven different cases, in two experiments. These stories were manipulated under conditions that explored the prototypicality of the case, she verdict outcome, and whether it was a rightful or wrongful decision; the latter two manipulations, when combined, allowed for a comparison of actual outcomes versus true outcomes, and a measure of true culpability. Three or four prototypes, rather than one, emerged for all crimes, and though extraordinary rather than typical, they were far from simplistic. While the subjective element of motive dominated the culpability determination in Experiment I, objectivity prevailed in most cases in Experiment II. A commonsense and complex balancing of objective and subjective factors is the rule, while simplism was the rare exception.
Law and Human Behavior – Springer Journals
Published: Sep 24, 2004
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