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(1990)
Logical analysis of epistemic modality : an explication of the Bolding – Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength
(1973)
Om det fortfarande behovet av källkritik (On the continual need for source-criticism)
(1992)
Towards a logical theory of legal evidence : semantic analysis of the Bolding – Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength
L. Åqvist (2005)
Combinations of tense and deontic modality: On the Rt approach to temporal logic with historical necessity and conditional obligationJ. Appl. Log., 3
PO Ekelöf (1983)
Evidentiary value: philosophical, judicial and psychological aspects of a theory (= Festschrift to S. Halldén. Library of Theoria No. 15)
(1989)
Går det att bevisa? (Can You Prove It?)
L Åqvist (1990)
Rätt och Sanning (Law and truth. A symposium on legal proof-theory in Uppsala May 1989)
(1990)
Logical analysis of epistemic modality: an explication of the Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength. In: Klami HT (ed) Rätt och Sanning (Law and Truth
O. Bolding (1960)
Aspects of the burden of proof
PO Bolding (1988)
Osannolikhet eller ovisshet? En fråga om behandling av alternativhypoteser vid bevisvärderingen (Improbability or Uncertainty? A question about the treatment of alternative hypotheses in the evaluation of legal evidence)Svensk Juristtidning (The Swedish Law Rev), 73
S. Shimony, E. Nissan (2001)
Kappa calculus and evidential strength: A note on Åqvist's logical theory of legal evidenceArtificial Intelligence and Law, 9
Fr Gorphe (1947)
L’appréciation des preuves en justice (The assessment of proofs in the law)
P. Suppes (1958)
Introduction To Logic
P. Suppes (2008)
Finite Equal-Interval Measurement StructuresTheoria, 38
(1951)
Bevisbördan och den juridiska tekniken (Burden of proof and legal technique)
PO Ekelöf (1963)
Rättegång (Judicial procedure)
R. Susskind (1987)
Expert systems in law
(1971)
En del elementaere logiske emner (Some elementary logical topics)
The purpose of this paper is to improve on the logical and measure-theoretic foundations for the notion of probability in the law of evidence, which were given in my contributions Åqvist [ (1990) Logical analysis of epistemic modality: an explication of the Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength. In: Klami HT (ed) Rätt och Sanning (Law and Truth. A symposium on legal proof-theory in Uppsala May 1989). Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, pp 43–54; (1992) Towards a logical theory of legal evidence: semantic analysis of the Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength. In: Martino AA (ed) Expert systems in law. Elsevier Science Publishers BV, Amsterdam, North-Holland, pp 67–86]. The present approach agrees with the one adopted in those contributions in taking its main task to be that of providing a semantic analysis, or explication, of the so called Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength (“proof-strength”) as applied to the establishment of matters of fact in law-courts. However, it differs from the one advocated in our earlier work on the subject in explicitly appealing to what is known as “Pro-et-Contra Argumentation”, after the famous Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. It tries to bring out the logical form of that interesting kind of reasoning, at least in the context of the law of evidence. The formal techniques used here will be seen to be largely inspired by the important work done by Patrick Suppes, notably Suppes [(1957) Introduction to logic. van Nostrand, Princeton and (1972) Finite equal-interval measurement structures. Theoria 38:45–63].
Artificial Intelligence and Law – Springer Journals
Published: May 16, 2007
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