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A Coalitional Power Value for Set Games

A Coalitional Power Value for Set Games We propose the concept of a coalitional power value for set games, and present its axiomatic characterization of global effciency, equal treatment property and coalitional power monotonicity. The coalitional power value is a generalization of the marginalistic value introduced by Aarts et al. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica Springer Journals

A Coalitional Power Value for Set Games

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A Coalitional Power Value for Set Games

Sun, Hao; Zhang, Sheng-gui; Li, Xue-liang
Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica , Volume 19 (3) – Mar 3, 2017

Abstract

We propose the concept of a coalitional power value for
set games, and present its axiomatic characterization of global
effciency, equal treatment property and coalitional power
monotonicity. The coalitional power value is a generalization of
the marginalistic value introduced by Aarts et al.

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References (3)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Subject
Mathematics; Applications of Mathematics; Math Applications in Computer Science; Theoretical, Mathematical and Computational Physics
ISSN
0168-9673
eISSN
1618-3932
DOI
10.1007/s10255-003-0116-0
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We propose the concept of a coalitional power value for set games, and present its axiomatic characterization of global effciency, equal treatment property and coalitional power monotonicity. The coalitional power value is a generalization of the marginalistic value introduced by Aarts et al.

Journal

Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica – Springer Journals

Published: Mar 3, 2017

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