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When Not One of the Crowd: The Effects of CEO Ideological Divergence on Lobbying Strategy

When Not One of the Crowd: The Effects of CEO Ideological Divergence on Lobbying Strategy This paper explores the extent to which CEO ideological divergence influences firm lobbying strategy. Because a CEO’s political ideological disposition is shown to affect firm outcomes, we theorize there are nonmarket strategic implications when the governing party is divergent or convergent from their ideology. Accordingly, we integrate insights from organizational fit literature regarding value congruence and strategic complementarity in order to examine whether CEO political ideological divergence affects lobbying investment and changes the balance between internal and external lobbying activities. Further, we theorize that these outcomes are less pronounced for firms that are highly regulated. Our results support our theorizing, therefore, by identifying how CEO ideology interacts with the opposing political ideology. We unpack the ways in which CEO political ideology influences firm political behavior, thus extending research on CEO political ideology and lobbying. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Management: Official Journal of the Southern Management Association SAGE

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References (114)

Publisher
SAGE
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2022
ISSN
0149-2063
eISSN
1557-1211
DOI
10.1177/01492063211073690
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper explores the extent to which CEO ideological divergence influences firm lobbying strategy. Because a CEO’s political ideological disposition is shown to affect firm outcomes, we theorize there are nonmarket strategic implications when the governing party is divergent or convergent from their ideology. Accordingly, we integrate insights from organizational fit literature regarding value congruence and strategic complementarity in order to examine whether CEO political ideological divergence affects lobbying investment and changes the balance between internal and external lobbying activities. Further, we theorize that these outcomes are less pronounced for firms that are highly regulated. Our results support our theorizing, therefore, by identifying how CEO ideology interacts with the opposing political ideology. We unpack the ways in which CEO political ideology influences firm political behavior, thus extending research on CEO political ideology and lobbying.

Journal

Journal of Management: Official Journal of the Southern Management AssociationSAGE

Published: Mar 1, 2023

Keywords: nonmarket strategies; business and government/political economy; CEO decision-making; strategic decision-making; top management teams/upper echelon

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