Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

The Mirage of Housing Affordability: An Analysis of Affordable Housing Plans in New York City:

The Mirage of Housing Affordability: An Analysis of Affordable Housing Plans in New York City: In the opening of the 21st century, housing affordability was described by the U.S. Congress as the most urgent issue facing America. This article provides an analysis of how feasible Mayor de Blasio’s Five Borough Ten-Year Plan will be in providing adequate affordable housing to low-income residents in New York City (NYC). It examines three main topics: (a) the Plan’s focus on using the private sector to achieve public goals and whether this is likely to come with unintended consequences such as less focus on the needy and gentrification of struggling neighborhoods, (b) the role of the nonprofit sector, which has historically been a major player in housing policies in the NYC, and (c) how much influence or control a municipal government has on economic forces to avoid negative outcomes. The analysis reveals that while providing any number of affordable units is a positive thing, it is unreasonable to assume that this intervention alone can adequately address the housing affordability crisis in NYC. This article also exposes other emerging problems as the plan is being implemented. One major concern is that through tax credits and rezoning efforts to encourage private-sector development, the Plan may wind up benefiting housing developers and gentrifiers more than actually ameliorating the housing crisis in NYC. Housing affordability is a multifaceted issue which requires a multifaceted approach from federal and state governments working in tandem with local governments. Keywords housing affordability, affordability spectrum, rezoning, mandatory inclusionary housing, low-income households two approaches: one that provides subsidies to the needy and Introduction another that focuses on adding new units to the market In 2002, a United States Congress bipartisan commission through construction and rehabilitation. concluded that housing affordability is the single most Looked at in a simple way, housing affordability is a func- important issue facing Americans in the new millennium tion of diminishing supply in times of increasing demand. (The Millennial Housing Commission, 2002). Affordable Looked at in a more nuanced way, affordability is a multifac- housing is defined as one that a household can obtain for eted problem that can go beyond simple supply and demand 30% or less of its income (U.S. Department of Housing and formulations since landlords can use various tactics to keep Urban Development [HUD], 2018). A dwelling is considered vacant units from the market which creates artificially high affordable for low-income families if it costs less than 24% rent prices. Barker (2018) showed that landlords can keep of the area median income (HUD, 2018). In his widely read units off the market by simply claiming that they are doing book Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City, renovation, or remove units from rent-stabilized stock by Mathew Desmond (2016) observed that “Today, over 1 in 5 conducting capital improvements that lead to increase in of all renting families in the country spends half of its income rental rates. Meantime, for the average renters there is lack of on housing” (p. 302). Although housing need exists across affordable units in the market and this shortage has reached a the country, the issue is particularly acute in New York City (NYC). In May 2018, The New York Times ran a series of articles titled “Unsheltered” on the housing crisis in the City, LIU Brooklyn, NY, USA affirming that the poor pay as much as 60% to 80% of their Corresponding Author: income on housing (Barker, Silver-Greenberg, Ashford, & Bakry Elmedni, MPA Program, LIU Brooklyn, One University Plaza, H-700, Cohen, 2018; Barker, 2018; Kleinfield, 2018). In the past, Brooklyn, NY 11201, USA. NYC has responded to housing affordability by combining Email: bakry.elmedni@liu.edu Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). 2 SAGE Open crisis point. A recent survey indicated that 50% of the City’s which despite significant improvements, remain poorly inte- residents cannot afford to live in the city (Barone, 2016). In grated and continue to have implementation problems” addition, between 2000 and 2012, NYC lost 400,000 units (Sullivan & Power, 2013, p. 331). Third, the federal funding renting for less than US$1,000 per month (NYC Comptroller, for the existing affordable housing programs continues to 2014). Generally, the loss of these units can be attributed to dwindle year after year (Freeman, 2002; Kleit & Page, 2015; market forces, but gentrification, in particular, coupled with Martens, 2009). As for how these programs impacted afford- loopholes in rent regulations were responsible for rent ability, Adams (2009) succinctly observed that the problem increases. of affordable housing is a systemic one with many parts and In response to this affordability crisis, shortly after he was will not be remedied by a bandage. In addition to the federal elected to office in 2014, Mayor Bill de Blasio introduced role, local governments also play a role in housing policies, Housing New York: A Five, Ten-Year Plan to supply afford- especially NYC. able housing units within the five boroughs (WNYC, 2014). The history of NYC housing policy goes back to the Like his predecessors, Mayor de Blasio’s plan focused on Tenement House Act of 1879, which predates any meaning- creating more units. The plan originally aimed to create ful federal interventions (NYU Furman Center, 2006). This 200,000 affordable units for all income groups with special unique position afforded NYC the opportunity to devise focus on low-income groups. In 2017, it was adjusted to cre- ambitious local housing programs. Various mayoral admin- ate and/or preserve 300,000 affordable housing units istrations in NYC have implemented affordable housing (Housing New York 2.0, 2017). This article provides an anal- programs. In the recent past, Mayor Koch implemented a ysis of how feasible Mayor de Blasio’s Five Borough Ten- housing plan that came to be known as the Ten-Year Plan for Year Plan will be in providing adequate affordable housing Housing in 1985, which lasted for 15 years and extended to low-income residents in NYC. It will examine three main into Dinkins’s and Giuliani’s administrations. Mayor Koch’s topics: plan spanned more than 100 programs, which can generally be categorized as utilizing three policy tools. The first tool 1. The Plan’s focus on using the private sector to achieve provided low-interest loans to owners to make upgrades and public goals and whether this is likely to come with repairs. The second approach consisted of programs that unintended consequences such as less focus on the provided subsidies for new construction projects, targeting needy and gentrification of struggling neighborhoods. home ownership. The largest of these programs was The 2. The role of the nonprofit sector, which has histori- New Homes Program of the New York City Housing cally been a major player in housing policies in Partnership, a public–private partnership. The third area NYC. was the use of Community Development Corporations 3. How much influence or control a municipal govern- (CPCs) and nonprofit organizations such as the Mutual ment has on economic forces to avoid negative Housing Association, St. Francis Friends of the Poor, and outcomes. the Neighborhood Redevelopment Program, all of which recognized the need and provided support for affordable Organizationally, this article is divided into five sections. housing units for low-income families (NYU Furman This introductory section covered how the problem of hous- Center, 2016). To finance the plan, Mayor Koch used mixed ing affordability in NYC is conceptualized and approached. sources, which included rent revenues from Battery Park The second section offers brief comments on the overarching City, the City’s Housing Development Corporation (a public characteristics of national housing policies and their impacts benefit corporation that issues bonds to raise capital for on the existing affordable housing programs. The third sec- affordable housing), the city’s capital budget, and other state tion provides a brief explanation of the research design and and federal sources. methodology used to conduct the study. The fourth section Mayor Bloomberg’s New Housing Marketplace Plan discusses de Blasio’s Housing New York plan, presenting the (2003-2014) was by design built on partnerships between plan’s specifics and relating them to potential outcomes. The private sector, nonprofit, and public agencies. These partner- final section gives brief concluding remarks. ships grew from a US$3.4 billion program to build and pre- serve 68,000 units by 2008, to a US$7.5 billion plan to build and preserve 165,000 units by 2013 (NYC Housing Housing Policies and Affordable Preservation and Development [HPD], 2016). Using a mix Housing Programs of public and private financing, Koch and Bloomberg’s plans Scholars studying housing are likely to agree on a few com- together provided a total of 332,106 units at a cost of US$12.6 mon defining characteristics of federal housing policies and billion dollars (NYU Furman Center, 2016). Notably, both their impacts on affordability. First, “Most housing programs plans targeted all income groups, but two thirds of in the United States do not focus on the most pressing hous- Bloomberg’s created units (124,106) were not affordable to ing needs” (Mueller & Schwartz, 2008, p. 122). Second, low-income groups (Association for Neighborhood and “there is no policy, only a collection of individual programs, Housing Development, Inc., 2012). Elmedni 3 Table 1. A Summary of Affordable Housing Programs in New York City. Accepting Program Originator Administration Funding No units No tenants application Wait time Public Housing Federal NYCHA Federal + State 176,066 396,581 Yes Varies: + City Average 9 years Housing Voucher Federal NYCHA Federal 86,194 204,049 No NA Program (Section 8) Project-based Federal NYCHA City 5,935 NA No NA Section 8 Federal HPD Federal + City 9,000 39,000 Case by Case Case by Case Federal DHCR Federal + State NA 7,100 Case by Case Case by Case Mitchell-Lama State Independent City + State 140,000 NA Yes Varies: by Housing development development Program Rent stabilization State Privately managed City 1,000,000 2.5 million Yes NA Laws Tax Incentives Federal/State/ Federal (HUD) State Federal/State/ 122,000 NA NA LIHTC and Tax City Housing Finance City LIHTC Abatement Authority 80/20 Note. NYCHA = New York City Housing Authority; HPD = Housing Preservation and Development; DHCR = New York State Department of Homes and Community Renewal; LIHTC = Low-Income Housing Tax Credit; HUD = U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. HPD and DHCR count household not number of tenants. Although generally, obtaining any type of Section 8 has become extremely difficult, there are exceptions for veteran and the elderly. Some of these units are now privately owned and are renting according to the market rate. On March 27, 2018, Mayor Bill de Blasio signed legislation to extend rent regulation laws for the next 3 years. The laws will remain in effect until April 1, 2021. State rent-stabilization laws continue to be effective when the vacancy rate is below 5%. It is not clear how many units are created by using the tax abatements programs because some of these units can be lost. Generally speaking, decades of national and local inter- capital and operations projects, and this has left it in need of ventions resulted in fragmented housing programs existing US$17 billion in major repairs (NYCHA, 2018). Its financial side by side in NYC, often managed by multiple depart- woes began in 1998 when former New York Governor ments. The national programs are implemented through George Pataki pulled state funding that had been used to coordination between HUD and various local authorities. operate more than 12,000 NYCHA apartments (WNYC, The current mix of affordable housing efforts in NYC can 2014). Unsurprisingly, the question of who is financially broadly be categorized in six areas in addition to the City’s responsible for NYCHA continues to fuel the ongoing feud unique approach for housing the homeless. Table 1 provides between Governor Andrew Cuomo and NYC Mayor Bill de a summary of the existing affordable housing programs, out- Blasio. To help with NYCHA’s financial troubles, the City lining programs’ originators, recipients, management, and has stepped up in major ways. In his 2018 State of the City current status. Address, Mayor de Blasio stated that his administration has First, the conventional public housing programs which provided US$2.1 billion of the City’s resources to NYCHA are funded jointly by the federal, state, and local authorities since he took office in 2014 (NPR, 2018). Yet, NYCHA runs and administered through New York City Housing Authority into frequent publicized management crises, the most recent (NYCHA), the largest public housing authority in North of which was the lack of lead inspection and adequate heat- America. Historically, NYCHA was considered one of the ing during cold winter months (Gartland, 2018). most successful public housing agencies in the country— Tenants in public housing pay 30% of their household success in terms of functionality and durability. Currently, income toward rent. The wait time for eligible applicants one in 14 New York residents live in an NYCHA-managed varies based on their priority code; employed individuals in unit. NYCHA is the sole responsible entity for managing the certain high need categories receive preference application process for new tenants as well as administering (Metropolitan Council on Housing, 2017). The wait time and maintaining public housing stocks (NYCHA, 2018). As for individuals in low priority categories can average 9 of 2018, NYCHA owns and manages 176,066 apartments, years. During that wait time, applicants must remain eligi- which serve 174,282 families and 396,581 authorized resi- ble and continue to reapply to stay on the waiting list for dents (NYCHA, 2017). Unfortunately, NYCHA has been open apartments. It is worth mentioning that the de Blasio dealing with a decline in federal and state funding for both administration has not only made a commitment to 4 SAGE Open improving the conditions of existing public housing stock Fourth, is the New York State-sponsored Mitchell-Lama but also is working to expand it through project-based Housing Program, which was conceived as a middle-income Section 8 (NYCHA, 2018). Mayor de Blasio has reiterated housing development program. It operated from the 1950s his administration’s commitment to maintaining NYCHA’s through the mid-1970s, creating more than 140,000 rental operation despite the reductions in federal funding. and limited-equity cooperative apartments. By design, Although far from adequate, it is arguable that NYC is tak- Mitchell-Lama buildings are privately owned, but are regu- ing the lead in ensuring housing affordability to the most lated under state law to maintain affordable prices to middle- vulnerable groups whose average household income is income households. Landlords have the option of leaving the US$23,672 with an average rent of US$483 a month Mitchell-Lama arrangement after the end of the contract, (NYCHA, 2018). Unfortunately, despite these efforts, there which usually lasts 20 years. However, if the building was are many people who remain on the waiting list who are occupied before 1974, it is likely to be subject to the rent- paying 50% or more of their income for housing. stabilization laws that came in 1974. Tenants in buildings Second, the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) Program participating in the program after 1974 (the cut-off-date) can (also known as Section 8) is another federal program man- see an increase in their rents if the owner opts to leave the aged by NYCHA, NYC HPD, and New York State program. Owner-occupants cannot sell their units for profit Department of Homes and Community Renewal (DHCR). during the 20-year contract; instead of rent they pay a main- The largest portion of Section 8 is managed through NYCHA, tenance fee. As for eligibility and access to these units, each which administers units serving 204,049 tenants residing in Mitchell-Lama development maintains its own waiting list 86,194 apartments with 26,297 participating private land- and the wait time varies depending on the demand. In 2017, lords. Unlike public housing, HCV gives recipients a choice one of the introduced changes to the Housing New York plan about where to live. Sadly, the waiting list for HCV is cur- includes saving 15,000 Mitchell-Lama units. This will be rently closed and the federal government has reduced the discussed further later. Unfortunately, like NYCHA the fate funding allocated to the program, which means that the City of the Mitchell-Lama program depends largely on whether might have to cover more financial ground to maintain hous- New York Governor Andrew Cuomo and Mayor Bill de ing for current Section 8 tenants. How feasible this will be Blasio can develop a working relationship to address hous- remains to be seen. ing affordability. Third, Project-Based Section 8, a version of the HCV Fifth, the Rent Stabilization Laws are a set of state laws Program, is a subsidized housing program for particular that regulate rents and leases in certain privately owned developments. Project-Based Section 8 is similar to the buildings. These are generally buildings with six or more Section 8 portable vouchers, the only difference is that proj- units that were constructed prior to 1974 as well as more ect-based vouchers (PBVs) are for particular buildings and recently constructed buildings that received subsidies. cannot be used elsewhere (Metropolitan Council on Housing, Landlords of rent-stabilized buildings can only increase rent 2017). Tenants living in Project-Based Section 8 buildings to certain levels set by local rent boards. Generally, tenants also dedicate 30% of their income toward rent and the local cannot be evicted or denied the right to renew their lease authority pays the balance. NYCHA currently manages except for nonpayment of rent, breaking terms of their lease, 4,350 units under the Project-Based Section 8 apartments in or being a nuisance. As of 2017, there are approximately 1 NYC (NYCHA, 2017). The Section 8 program is expanding: million rent-stabilized apartments in NYC (Metropolitan “Between 2016 and 2019 NYCHA plans to add an additional Council on Housing, 2017). Although these laws cannot 2,200 units to this program” (NYCHA, 2017, p. 2). There are guarantee that the rent-stabilized buildings are affordable to parts of PBV Section 8 that are run and managed through low-income groups, they are the first line of defense for NYC HPD and New York State DHCR. Also, there are PBV housing affordability in a tight market. Currently, there are units that are privately owned and managed. Currently, HPD more than 2.5 million residents who live in these protected provides subsidies to over 39,000 households in all five bor- units. Ironically, rental rates in the rent-stabilized buildings oughs with 9,000 participating landlords (NYC HPD, 2018). are often lower than rates in the so-called affordable housing DHCR also runs the state-wide Section 8 program, but its units created through tax incentives programs (Low-Income Subsidy Service Bureau administers Section 8 vouchers in Housing Tax Credit [LIHTC] and 80/20). This reality incen- NYC. The Subsidy Service Bureau currently assists more tivized landlords to lobby state elected officials, which even- than 7,100 families in NYC (DHCR, 2018). Some PBV units tually resulted in the weakening of rent-stabilization laws in are privately owned and managed buildings, some of which the past decade. Another troubling reality is that the City lead to home ownership. For the purpose of this study, the does not have much control over the future of these laws. numbers of families assisted by HPD and DHCR are reported Landlords can remove their units from the rent-stabilized list without distinction between privately owned and managed if the unit rent exceeds US$2,733.75, or if the combined and those still managed by government entities. In addition, income of a household exceeds US$200,000 (Barker, 2018; vouchers provided by both HPD and DHCR vary consider- DHCR, 2017). The most common tactic that landlords utilize ably in the amount they pay and are subject to various rules to bring the unit rent to or above US$2,733.75 is the use of in terms of portability. Major Capital Improvements (MCI). After going through the Elmedni 5 process, landlords can be granted rent increase for expenses the homeless problem was his announcement of plans to use incurred for these improvements, which can drive the rent up eminent domain to take control of private property. Under enough to force out some of the existing tenants (Barker, this newly devised initiative, the City would provide public 2018). financing for nonprofits to buy roughly a third of the apart- Sixth, the Tax Incentives Programs, which include the ments (800) that are currently used as shelters and convert LIHTC, a federal program and Local Tax Abatements them into affordable housing units (Stewart, 2017). If suc- Programs. LIHTC was created through the Tax Reform Act cessful in this takeover, de Blasio will accomplish two goals of 1986 and it is one of the federal mechanisms for “encour- with one move: reducing homelessness and adding to the aging the development and rehabilitation of affordable rental city’s affordable housing units. Despite the criticism, the de housing . . . tax credits are awarded to developers of qualified Blasio administration’s continuing efforts to house the home- rental projects via a competitive application process admin- less represent a serious commitment to addressing an afford- istered by state housing finance authorities” (Cantwell & ability crisis that affects the most vulnerable. Schumer, 2016, p. 5). Generally, private investors (a for- As we have seen, affordable housing programs in NYC profit or a nonprofit organizations) without any connection provide housing to more than 3 million of the City’s 8.6 mil- to the project can purchase tax credits to be subtracted from lion residents. The direct subsidies (public housing and their federal income tax. The payments are then put into a vouchers) serve more than 600,000 residents while 2.5 mil- fund distributed to state governments, which in turn allocate lion live in rent-stabilized buildings. Thousands of families funds to developers to build affordable housing. Nationally, reside in the 122,000 units created through LIHTC since its LIHTC “has contributed to the development of more than 1.5 inception in 1986. It is unknown exactly how many people million rental units (more than the entire stock of public live in units provided through the Mitchell-Lama Housing housing)” (Schwartz, 2010, p. 8). Between 1986 and 2013, Program and other local Tax Abatements Programs (80/20), LIHTC has helped create or preserve more than 170,290 but the modest estimate of one person per unit suggests that homes in New York State, of which an estimate of 122,000 Mitchell-Lama apartments house more than 105,000 indi- properties are in NYC (Cantwell & Schumer, 2016). The viduals. It is arguable that NYC would not be the same with- Local Tax Abatements Programs tend to benefit private out these programs. Yet, despite all these efforts, more than developers directly because they either eliminate or reduce half of the City’s residents are considered rent-burdened future property taxes on for-profit development in return for (Sugar, 2016). The following section gives a brief descrip- an allocation of below-market-priced units (usually 80/20). tion of methods used to conduct this study before turning to They may also forgive sales taxes on construction materials. the analysis of de Blasio’s Housing New York Plan. In terms of providing long-term affordability, the extent to which low-income people actually get access to affordable Research Design and Method units in these properties is unclear as landlords and develop- ers have been accused of utilizing various loopholes in these This is an exploratory study using mixed methods. It includes programs (NYU Furman Center, 2016). a systematic review of secondary data to assess the Housing Finally, is Mayor de Blasio’s Effort to House the Homeless. New York Plan and its potential impacts. This methodologi- Although de Blasio’s considerable efforts to house the home- cal design explains the driving forces for the increasing less do not directly connect to the Housing New York Plan, shortage of affordable housing and allows us to go beyond they do constitute a crucial element in providing housing to description to prediction. The data used in this study comes the most vulnerable groups who are unlikely to be served by from scholarly work and other sources such as the Housing the income structure included in the plan. De Blasio made a New York Five Borough Ten-Year plan, the NYU Furman commitment to address the homeless problem in the City Center (a housing research center), the HUD, NYC’s when he was elected to office for the first time. To do so, in Department of Housing Preservation and Development, the 2015, his administration proposed “plans to create 15,000 NYCHA, and the U.S Census Bureau. In particular, data additional units of housing that will be paired with social- drawn from the HUD is helpful in comparing several afford- service support, an initiative estimated to cost about $3 bil- able housing policies that have been in place even if gradu- lion” (Dawsey, 2016, p. 1). By the end of his first term in ally shrinking. 2017, de Blasio’s homeless policies were considered his big- Instead of employing solely quantitative data, I seek to gest failure (Max, 2017), for the number of homeless people clarify the underlying forces driving housing affordability, was at an historic high and the cost of temporary shelters was something that cannot adequately be explained simply by exceeding US$2 billion annually with no end in sight. This quantifying the number of units constructed or the number of policy invited a louder and harsher criticism, much of which households assisted. In processing the data, I make infer- was devoted to cluster sites (satellite shelters) and providing ences from the literature on affordable housing and from accommodation in expensive hotels (“Report: City Spending comparisons of de Blasio’s plan to the outcomes of similar $400K Per Day to House Homeless in Hotels,” 2017). The plans implemented by former mayors. Finally, an explana- most recent twist in the tale of de Blasio’s effort to deal with tory analysis is carried out of the Housing New York Plan’s 6 SAGE Open Table 2. A Summary of the Plan’s Objectives and the Tools for Obtaining Them. Objectives Policy tools Fostering diverse, livable neighborhoods Identify opportunities for affordable housing in the five boroughs Implement mandatory inclusionary housing program Preserving affordability and the existing housing programs Protect tenants (legal aid) Preserve affordability of unregulated housing, Pilot a new program to incentivize energy-efficient retrofits for buildings. Building new affordable housing for all residents Increase the number of units serving very low-income residents Develop affordable housing in underused public and private sites Develop small vacant sites, introduce new mixed-income programs Reform zoning, building, and housing codes Use the City’s housing subsidy dollars more efficiently. Promoting homeless, senior, supportive, and accessible Shift from high-cost homeless shelter to lower-cost permanent residents housing Develop more supportive housing to improve health outcomes Source. Housing New York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan (2014). specifics to determine whether building or renovating gentrification because it relies on rezoning as a tool for land 300,000 units with costs exceeding US$44 billion will be acquisition. Third, the income structure in the Plan is likely adequate to address the chronic housing affordability crisis to leave low-income households underserved; its reliance on in NYC. Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH) has been problem- atic in the past and likely to be in the future. Fourth, the Plan failed to clearly define a role for nonprofit organizations Mayor de Blasio’s Housing New York despite the existence of a broad umbrella of nonprofit stake- holders. Fifth, the use of the tax incentives programs (LIHTC Plan and the Affordability Quest and Local Tax Abatements Programs in form of 80/20), as a Although NYC might have historically shaped national way to incentivize private developers to build more units, housing policies, today the realities of the City’s housing can result in overproduction in generally attractive areas affordability are impacted by these national policies (NYU while leaving behind struggling neighborhoods. Tax Furman Center, 2016). A serious plan to address housing Incentives can also result in controversies like separate affordability in NYC has to look beyond the existing afford- entrances for market-rate tenants and low-income tenants. able housing programs. Nationally and locally, this is the This section closes with additional observations about the context within which de Blasio introduced the Housing New Plan’s guiding principles for stakeholder engagement, pro- York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan (hereafter referred to as posed funding sources, and relevant potential challenges. the Plan) in 2014, stating that First, a fundamental design flaw in the Plan is that it assumes that providing a steady supply of new units can We have a crisis of affordability on our hands. It’s a crisis in mitigate an affordability crisis in a tight market. For instance, many ways built on New York City’s success . . . And that the Plan states that “New York City’s shortage of affordable success story has put pressure on our housing stock . . . housing has reached a crisis point. The crisis has many Affordable housing is part of the bedrock of what makes New causes, starting with the erosion of New Yorkers’ purchas- York City work . . . And that is why today, we are laying out a ing power in the housing marketplace” (Housing New York: comprehensive plan to build and preserve 200,000 affordable A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan, 2014, p. 5) and that units over the coming decade. (p. 1) “Another cause of the affordable housing crisis is the mis- match between demand for, and the supply of, housing” (p. The Plan incorporates an array of broad objectives that 5). As such, the cornerstone of the plan is to intervene oftentimes appear as aspirational goals rather than achiev- through “increasing and protecting the supply of affordable able outcomes because there is no clear mechanism for meet- housing” (p. 6). There have been two notable past attempts ing them. Table 2 presents these objectives and the approaches to increase affordable housing stock by two former mayors for achieving them as shown in the Plan document. (Koch and Bloomberg) as previously discussed. Although In dissecting the Plan, five major points are highlighted both mayors created, preserved, and restored hundreds of and discussed in further detail in the following paragraphs. thousands of units, housing affordability remained a critical First, the results of the City’s past policies indicate that inter- problem for low-income households. Without explaining ventions centered primarily on private-sector development why his approach will produce different outcomes com- using cross-subsidies as the vehicle for generating supply pared with his predecessors, in November 2017, mayor de have had limited impacts on housing affordability. Second, Blasio announced that the Housing New York Plan “has de Blasio’s Plan can inadvertently become a driver for Elmedni 7 Figure 1. Number of rent-burdened households, 2005 and 2015 comparing NYC to the rest of East Coast Metros. Source. Apartment List Inc. (2016). Note. NYC = New York City. unprecedented 25,000 per year, while also increasing resources financed 77,651 affordable homes since its inception in and strategies for affordable homeownership programs and not- 2014—breaking records for the most affordable housing for-profit organizations purchasing rent-regulated buildings to produced in any three years in New York City’s history” preserve affordability. (p. 1) (Housing New York 2.0, 2017, p .1). Because of this early success, the Mayor has raised the target to build and pre- Despite the early celebrated success, the factors govern- serve 300,000 units. The new target will be accomplished by ing affordability remain unchanged. Historically, the decline investing US$250 million to save 15,000 units under the in the supply of affordable housing coincided with the Mitchell-Lama program that are at risk of shifting to mar- decline of purchasing power for low-income households, ket-rate rent (Housing New York 2.0, 2017). In addition, creating the biggest challenge for affordability. Figure 1 during the release of the new targets, the Mayor’s office shows that the number of rent-burdened households has stated that increased between the years 2005 and 2015. Because wages were not keeping up with the rising rental costs, the number Under the accelerated and expanded plan, the City will boost the of struggling renters continued to increase. number of affordable homes for seniors and families to an 8 SAGE Open Figure 2. Supply and demand among extremely low-income and very low-income renter households. Source. Housing and Vacancy Survey (U.S. Census, 2011). One obvious observation is that there are more low- shown in Figure 2. Despite the previous attempts, the num- income residents who are becoming rent-burdened than the bers of low-income families struggling to afford basic hous- plan is designed to help. In 2016, the American Community ing continues to rise. The shortage of adequate affordable Survey (ACS) indicated that more than half of the city resi- housing will continue to have detrimental effects on all low- dents are rent-burdened. New York City Rent Guidelines income groups, for “living in unaffordable housing causes Board (2018) reported that “Rent stabilized tenants report a stress for families because it often forces them to spend less median gross rent-to-income ratio of 36.0%, meaning a on other necessary items such as food, health and education” majority of rent stabilized tenants are not able to afford their (Buchanan & Budiwski, 2009, p. 19). apartments” (p. 10). Sugar (2016) stated that According to the New York City Rent Guidelines Board (2018), the increase in rent and utility costs resulted in a More than half of renters nation-wide are still paying more than larger numbers of renters becoming rent-burdened. The com- 30 percent of their pre-tax incomes in rent, and . . . the number promises low-income families have to endure can potentially is even higher in New York City, where a full 54.1 percent of have lasting effects in the future. Desmond (2016) warns that renters are cost-burdened. (p. 1) “Our cities have become unaffordable to our poorest fami- lies, and this problem is leaving a deep and jagged scar on the What makes things even worse is that other affordable next generation” (p. 299). When low-income households suf- housing programs have limited impacts and the initiative to fer the pain of unaffordable housing, the City also suffers by house the homeless remains under severe criticism for being providing other social services. Simply increasing housing costly and unsustainable. Even though public housing, HCV supply in NYC does not appear to be the answer as landlords and homeless shelters are currently serving a considerable may keep vacant units off the market to await the opportunity segment of low-income families, these programs are unlikely to raise rent. The Association for Neighborhood and Housing to be useful tools in dealing with the affordability crisis in the Development (2018) made the case in this statement: future for three reasons. First, currently NYCHA (2017) “is no longer accepting new Section 8 applications” (p. 1) and in Despite the recent building boom, the share of rental units in the the absence of federal funding this situation is unlikely to City fell from 64.2% in 2014 to 62.9% in 2017, and the share of change. Within existing public housing the length of the homeownership units dropped during the same period . . . New waiting list and the eligibility requirements leave a large York City saw a huge jump in the number of vacant units not number of people unserved. Second, public housing and available for sale or rent, from 182,600 in 2014 up to a whopping housing vouchers are federal programs and are perpetually 248,000 in 2017. The number of vacant units not available for rent or purchase is more than all the new housing units created affected by budgetary concerns at the national level. The from 2014 to 2017. (p. 1) Trump administration expressed a clear desire to further cut the federal subsidies, which could add to the pool of those in need of housing. Third, there are many residents whose A recent New York Times article partially explains why income exceeds the eligibility requirement for public sub- the number of vacant units not available for rent or purchase sides but cannot afford a market rental rate. has risen; it states that To complicate things further for de Blasio’s efforts, there In neighborhoods already gentrified or in the throes of are more than twice as many low-income households need- gentrifying, a relatively new class of mega-landlords has driven ing housing than there are affordable units available as Elmedni 9 up rents by exploiting enforcement gaps in a web of city and income targets, concerns about income levels—whether the state agencies. By churning through enough tenants and claiming housing is targeted at the deepest needs, whether the Mayor’s enough renovations, landlords can raise the rent enough— affordable housing might gentrify neighborhoods with very beyond $2,733.75 a month—to wrest an apartment from low incomes—will persist” (p. 1). regulation’s grip and into the free market (Barker, 2018, p. 2). The Plan calls for the creation of an Implementation Advisory Board to engage on a regular basis with the City The housing affordability crisis is also likely to be exacer- leadership. The board is comprised of stakeholders from the bated by the projected growth of the City’s population, which City’s housing community. The Plan also includes the imple- is predicted to increase to 9 million residents by 2030, requir- mentation of new mixed-income programs through the intro- ing a net gain of 318,500 housing units, with 250,660 of duction of MIH. According to the Housing New York: A Five those units affordable to low and moderate-income (NYC Borough, Ten-Year Plan (2014), “the affordable units in tra- Department of City Planning, 2016). ditional 80/20 are targeted towards a narrow band of house- Second, is the challenge of whether the Plan will become holds” (p. 10). a driver for gentrification because of the controversial rezon- Fourth, what is the role of nonprofit organizations in the ing reforms. In theory, the purpose of rezoning was “to create Housing New York Plan? A major shortcoming in the origi- new residential density that would include large numbers of nal Plan was the small—and vague—role given to the non- affordable apartments” (Murphy, 2017, p. 1). In reality, how- profit sector. In recent decades, nonprofit organizations ever, rezoning is feared to become a driving force for gentri- across the country—often CDCs—have been instrumental in fication as real estate investors rush in to transform creating successful partnerships with HUD and local govern- neighborhoods for quick profits. In a place like NYC, where ments in revitalizing dilapidated housing and selling or rent- land is scarce and hard to acquire, rezoning creates opportu- ing the units to low-income households. NYC has a unique nities for developers to build in rezoned areas, and real estate history of the nonprofit sector’s involvement in creating value start to appreciate faster, leading to increases in rent affordable housing programs. As such, it was assumed that and property taxes. This increase eventually makes gentrifi- de Blasio’s plan would give nonprofit organizations a greater cation an all but inevitable by-product. Although rezoning role in creating affordable units. This lack of a clear role for may prove counterproductive to the Plan’s ultimate objective the nonprofit sector in the original plan has invited wide crit- of providing and protecting affordable housing to preserve icisms from housing advocates and neighborhoods associa- the City’s diverse communities, Mayor de Blasio has not tions (Murphy, 2017). However, to be fair to de Blasio’s evaded that the plan will continue to encourage rezoning as a efforts, a crucial distinction must be made here. Mayor revitalization strategy (WNYC, 2018). Koch’s plan was executed during a time when there were Third, the income structure in the Plan leaves low-income many vacant buildings that the city acquired through foreclo- households underserved. According to the Housing New York: A sure. In New homes Programs, these buildings were then Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan (2014), 8% of affordable housing turned over to CDCs to create affordable units. Today, land will be designated for the extremely low-income category (less acquisition for developing affordable housing is much more than US$25,150), 12% for the very low-income category expensive, which is why rezoning is being used to increase (US$25,151-US$41,950), 58% in the low-income category the space available for housing construction despite the (US$41,951-US$67,120), 11% in the moderate-income category growing criticism. (US$67,121-US$100,680), and 11% in the middle-income group In response to criticism about the lack of clear role for (US$100,681-US$138, 435). These targets have received a wide nonprofit organizations, the newly introduced changes range of criticisms (Real Affordability for All Coalition [RAFA], appear to give the nonprofit sector a bigger role, though it 2017; Walker, 2017; Zimmer, 2017). In a report, RAFA (2017) remains unclear how big. One area of change is the role non- concluded that “To make a dent in the homelessness crisis, we profits are expected to play in obtaining housing units must increase the number of units developed for households who (known as satellite shelters) that are currently rented by the earn less than $25,000 a year—households that are not served by City to house the homeless. Another change is said to come the private market” (p. 2). In response to criticism, newly pro- in a program known as Neighborhood Pillars through which posed changes in the plan slightly increased the percentage for the the City plans to spend US$275 million to buy older rent- very low-income groups. In the adjusted plan, 25% (instead of regulated buildings in changing neighborhoods where mar- 20%) of the created units will be set aside for families with very ket speculation threatens existing affordable housing stock. low and extremely low income (less than US$41,950), 55% for This program is intended to “target 1,000 homes a year and low-income households (US$41,951-US$67,120) and 19.5% for 7,500 over the life of the plan” (Murphy, 2017, p. 1). moderate and middle-income households (US$67,121-US$138, Fifth, the use of the tax incentive programs—LIHTC and 435). These changes are still far from addressing the needs of Tax Abatements programs 80/20—as a tool for encouraging many struggling families. the private or nonprofit sector to develop affordable housing Reflecting views of the Plan’s critics, Murphy (2017) remain problematic and ineffective. In the past, many of the noted that “Since the expanded plan doesn’t alter those units built using LIHTC funds were allocated to relatively 10 SAGE Open well-off household. To break away from past mistakes, the legal jurisdiction over rent laws and landlords can lobby leg- Plan requires that the City mandate a portion of new housing islators in Albany to weaken rent-stabilization laws. In 2017, development to be permanently affordable to low- or moder- the vacancy rate in NYC remained at 3.63. However, the City ate-income households. To date most of the created units cannot ensure the long-term existence of rent-stabilization (more than 70,000) came through the use of the City’s capital regulation since the State has shown a propensity for loosen- resources not through use of LIHTC, Tax abatements or pri- ing those regulations in the past, which has allowed land- vate MIH development. In practice, the implementation of lords to aggressively pursue eviction (Barker et al., 2018). MIH can be a deterrent for many developers because “for Regardless of the vacancy status, the state still has rent regu- developers to agree to build 20% or more units of affordable lations that are in place, what remains to be seen is how housing, they have to be persuaded that the building’s effective these regulations would be in protecting affordabil- remainder will be lucrative enough to fill the gap” (Dawsey, ity in the City. The de Blasio administration announced that 2016, p. 1). Obviously, developers prefer to take on tasks that the City will provide tenants facing eviction with lawyers, generate more profitable outcomes than housing low-income which is commendable, but covering legal fees will not groups. More importantly, tax incentive programs (federal address the broader set of problems leading to housing and local) and MIH may combine to create perverse incen- courts. For example, when landlords are renovating other tives for developers, leading to overproduction of units in units in the building, tenants endure unhealthy conditions, certain part of the City or totally gentrifying struggling areas noise, and inconvenience. The ultimate goal for most land- (Bagli, 2016). lords is to take a unit out of the rent-stabilization program and put it into market rate, so driving tenants out by making living in the building unbearable might be part of their over- Additional Observations About de Blasio’s Plan all strategy. Moreover, the Plan will now run to 2026 instead In regard to working with stakeholders, partners, and play- of 2024, beyond the end of de Blasio’s second term on ers, the Plan was developed through coordination among 13 December 31, 2021. This will leave the Plan at the mercy of agencies and with input from more than 200 stakeholders. It his mayoral successor. incorporates more than 50 initiatives to support the goal of In addition, the 100,000 increase in the number of units to building or preserving 300,000 units. According to the Plan, be preserved or built requires an additional commitment of the guiding principles are the City’s resources. So far, Mayor de Blasio has added US$1.9 billion in City funding to pay for the part of the plan 1) Our housing policies must address the City’s changing targeting low-income household, seniors, and veterans. demographics and those we serve; 2) The City’s planning Funding for the plan will come from mixed sources, includ- processes and land-use policies need to be revamped; 3) ing the City’s capital budget. The adjusted plan is estimated Economic diversity must be a cornerstone of housing to cost more than US$44 billion by the time of its comple- development; 4) Our municipal tools and public assets should be tion. The Plan was estimated to cost US$8.2 billion of the deployed more effectively; 5) We must strategically protect past City’s money in 2014, and this number is now adjusted to investments and lock in affordability in changing neighborhoods; US$13.5 billion for the 12-year duration. The sources of 6) The City needs to protect tenants in rent-regulated units more funding for the Plan are outlined in Table 3, which shows the aggressively; 7) We must leverage today’s favorable markets original breakdown of public and private funding as envi- and adapt quickly to future conditions; and finally 8) We must sioned in the Plan. The majority of the funds will be allo- increase capital funding to our housing programs. (Housing New York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan, 2014, p. 7) cated to create new units and the remaining funding will be used to preserve existing housing stock. It is unclear, though, Although these are noble principles, there is no clear path whether the City can be confident of receiving money from or defined tool to honor them or the rest of the Plan’s bloated the state and federal government in the current political objectives. For instance, de Blasio’s administration plans to climate. use the same general tools—rezoning, LIHTC, Tax Although ambitious in its quest, de Blasio’s Housing New Abatements and MIH, rent-stabilization laws, protecting York Plan acknowledged the potential challenges, road- Mitchell-Lama units—to preserve the existing affordable blocks, and shortcomings. In the Plan, it was made clear that housing stock and to construct new units. Although rent-sta- tackling the housing affordability crisis in NYC cannot be bilization regulations fall under New York State jurisdiction, achieved without state and federal action, for “The State and in 2017, Mayor de Blasio signed legislation extending rent Federal governments have been stalwart partners throughout regulations up until April 1, 2021, because the state regula- many years and across multiple administrations, and their tions continue to be in effect as long as the vacancy rate is renewed commitment to affordable housing is absolutely below 5% (Center for New York City Law, 2018). This crucial to address the City’s affordability crisis” (Housing extension allows the City to ensure that landlords cannot New York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan, 2014, p. 12). move units from rent-stabilized stocks to market rates faster, However, considering the current political conditions, it is for if the vacancy rate is higher than 5%, the State has the highly unlikely that the City will receive adequate help from Elmedni 11 Table 3. Mayor de Blasio’s Housing Plan Original Budget intended to support development projects rather than improve Breakdown. the quality of peripheral neighborhoods, and rezoning for higher densities occurs in response to developer demands for more Mayor de Blasio: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan Budget—Fiscal profitable investment opportunities. (p. 1) years 2015-2024 Future research should focus on scrutinizing whether de Allocation Total budget Blasio’s approach for creating thousands of units can make New construction US$30,643,240.00 an immediate measurable impact on the relationship between Preservation US$10,489,956.00 supply and demand (through rent prices) as the Plan pro- Total budget US$41,133,196.00 claimed. In addition, future research might ask whether bil- lions of dollars would be more efficacious in assisting Sources Expected funding rent-burdened residents if they were targeted directly through City US$8,244,387.00 subsidies rather than indirectly provide benefit to developers Federal and State US$2,886,464.00 (see Desmond, 2016). Private US$30,002,345.00 Total expected funding US$41,133,196.00 Net balance - Conclusion Source. The information in the table was extracted from Housing New In the beginning, this article asked how feasible Mayor de York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan (2014). Blasio’s Five Borough Ten-Year Plan will be in providing adequate affordable housing to low-income families in NYC. The analysis in this article shows that Mayor de Blasio’s Plan the federal government. To the contrary, the City might need is likely to fall short in making a considerable change in the to commit even more resources to preserve the existing City’s housing affordability dilemma because (a) the Plan affordable housing programs. What is clear is that the conun- does not focus enough on serving the very low-income drum NYC faces regarding devising an effective plan for households and (b) housing affordability cannot be resolved providing affordable housing is typical compared with solely by creating new units. This article also exposes other attempts of other local governments. emerging problems as the Plan is being implemented. One In the meantime, de Blasio’s Plan is unlikely to funda- major concern is that through tax incentives programs and mentally reduce the hardships low-income families face rezoning efforts to encourage private-sector development, despite the declared intentions, as it will not provide an ade- the Plan may wind up benefiting housing developers and quate supply necessary to meet the needs of the existing gentrifiers more than actually ameliorating the housing crisis numbers in low-income groups. To do de Blasio’s Plan jus- in NYC. tice, it must be acknowledged that a municipal government does not have many policy tools to influence larger economic forces. Declaration of Conflicting Interests In an exhaustive report titled Rethinking Local Affordable The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Practice, Turner, Brown, Cunningham, and Sawyer (2003) concluded that prior local housing plans, though successful, Funding have not been effective in providing adequate affordable The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author- housing on the scale needed. The analysis provided in this ship, and/or publication of this article. article concurs with Turner et al.’s findings. Adding thou- sands of new units is an inadequate response to the afford- References ability crisis. Broadly speaking, de Blasio’s Housing New Adams, K. D. (2009). Homeownership: American dream or illusion York Plan falls within the domain of urban planning that of empowerment? South Carolina Law Review, 60(3), 574-616. caters to the powerful, builds on neoliberal ideology and Apartment List Inc. (2016). Which metros have the most cost-bur- relies on trickle-down economic growth. The Plan caters to dened renters? Retrieved from https://www.apartmentlist.com/ the powerful by relying on a rezoning strategy that often rentonomics/cost-burdened-renters-2016/ leads to gentrification. It builds on a neoliberal ideology in Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development. (2018, its reliance primarily on private developers. Fainstein (2010) March 7). Housing Vacancy Survey shows New York City is in the eloquently observed how this approach plays out in this midst of an affordability emergency. Retrieved from https://www. statement: anhd.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Real-Affordability- Evaluation-of-the-Bloomberg-Housing-Program2.pdf Decisions concerning where to locate facilities become warped Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, Inc. by considerations of their economic, as opposed to their social, (2012). An evaluation of the Bloomberg housing program and impacts. Thus, capital investments by city governments are recommendations to strengthen affordable housing policy. 12 SAGE Open Retrieved from https://www.anhd.org/wp-content/uploads/ Martens, B. (2009). A political history of affordable housing. Journal 2011/07/Real-Affordability-Evaluation-of-the-Bloomberg of Housing & Community Development, 6-12. Retrieved from -Housing-Program2.pdf http://content.csbs.utah.edu/~fan/fcs5400-6400/studentpresent Bagli, C. V. (2016, January 13). Looming end of tax-break pro- ation2009/03Reading_3.pdf. gram could harm Mayor’s housing plan. The New York Times. Max, B. (2017, July 17). Bill de Blasio’s big homelessness prob- Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/nyre- lem. Daily Beast. Retrieved from https://www.thedailybeast. gion/death-of-tax-break-program-could-hamper-mayor-de- com/bill-de-blasios-big-homelessness-problem blasios-housing-push.html?_r=0 Metropolitan Council on Housing. (2017). New York City's Barker, K. (2018, May 20). Behind New York’s housing crisis: affordable housing programs. Retrieved from http://met- Weakened laws and fragmented regulation. The New York councilonhousing.org/help_and_answers/nyc_affordable_ Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interac- housing_programs tive/2018/05/20/nyregion/affordable-housing-nyc.html The Millennial Housing Commission. (2002). Retrieved from Barker, K., Silver-Greenberg, J., Ashford, G., & Cohen, S. (2018, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mhc/MHCReport.pdf May 20). The eviction machine churning through New York Mueller, J., & Schwartz, A. (2008). Reversing the tide: Will state City. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www. and local governments house the poor as federal direct subsi- nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/nyc-affordable- dies decline? Journal of the American Planning Association, housing.html 74, 122-135. doi:10.1080/01944360701813300 Barone, V. (2016, November 22). NYC residents want to keep Murphy, J. (2017). Breaking down De Blasio’s expanded housing living in the city, but can’t afford to, poll shows. AM New plan. Retrieved from https://citylimits.org/2017/10/26/break- York. Retrieved from http://www.amny.com/real-estate/nyc- ing-down-de-blasios-expanded-housing-plan/ residents-want-to-keep-living-in-the-city-but-can-t-afford-to- New York City Comptroller. (2014). THE GROWING GAP: New poll-shows-1.12649036 York City’s housing affordability challenge. Retrieved from Buchanan, R., & Budiwski, C. (2009). The challenges of housing http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/ revitalization in poor urban neighborhoods: A case study on the Growing_Gap.pdf Spence neighborhood in Winnipeg. Undercurrent, 6(2), 17-24. New York City Department of City Planning. (2016). Retrieved Cantwell, M., & Schumer, C. (2016). Addressing the chal- from http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/index.page lenges of affordable housing & homelessness: The housing New York City Housing Authority. (2017). 2018 fact sheet. tax credit. Retrieved from http://www.nychdc.com/content/ Retrieved from https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/down- pdf/ProjectAdvertisements/NY%20LIHTC%20and%20 loads/pdf/NYCHA-Fact-Sheet_2018_Final.pdf Homelessness%20Report%20final.pdf New York City Housing Authority. (2018). Retrieved from http:// Center for New York City Law. (2018). Mayor signs legislation www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/nycha-2017-bud- to extend rent-stabilization laws. Retrieved from http://www. get-book.pdf citylandnyc.org/mayor-signs-legislation-to-extend-rent-stabi- New York City Housing Preservation and Development. (2016). lization-laws/ Retrieved from http://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/index.page Dawsey, J. (2016, November 20). Mayor Bill de Blasio’s afford- New York City Housing Preservation and Development. (2018). able housing plan faces roadblocks. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/section-8/ Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/mayor-bill-de-bla- about-section-8.page sios-affordable-housing-plan-faces-roadblocks-1458946840 New York City Rent Guidelines Board. (2018). 2018 Income and Desmond, M. (2016). Evicted: Poverty and profit in the American Affordability Study. Retrieved from https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ City. New York, NY: Crown. rentguidelinesboard/index.page Fainstein, S. (2011). The just city (1st ed.). Ithaca, NY: Cornell New York State Department Homes and Community Renewal. University Press. (2018). Retrieved from http://www.nyshcr.org/AboutUs/ Freeman, L. (2002). America’s affordable housing crisis: A contract Offices/HousingOperations/ unfulfilled. American Journal of Public Health, 92, 709-712. New York State Housing and Community Renewal. (2017). Gartland, M. (2018, January 23). NYCHA head gave false testi- Available from http://www.nyshcr.org mony on lead paints scandal: Letter. The New York Post. NPR. (2018, May 1). Public Housing Broken. But did de Blasio Retrieved from https://nypost.com/2018/01/23/nycha-head- break it? Retrieved from https://www.wnyc.org/story/de-bla- gave-false-testimony-on-lead-paint-scandal-letter/ sio-nycha/ Housing New York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan. (2014). NYU Furman Center. (2006). Housing policy in New York City: A Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/housing/assets/ brief history. Retrieved from http://furmancenter.org/files/pub- downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf lications/AHistoryofHousingPolicycombined0601_000.pdf Housing New York 2.0. (2017). Retrieved from http://www1.nyc. NYU Furman Center. (2016). Understanding affordable housing. gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/about/hny-2.pdf Retrieved from http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/ Kleit, R., & Page, S. (2015). The changing role of public housing AHistoryofHousingPolicycombined0601_000.pdf authorities in the affordable housing delivery system. Housing Real Affordability for All. (2017). How the mayor can create Studies, 30, 621-644. doi:10.1080/02673037.2014.953919 real affordable communities. Retrieved from http://www. Klienfield, N. (2018, May 20). Where Brooklyn tenants plead the coalitionforthehomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ case for keeping their homes. New York Times. Retrieved from RealAffordabilityForAllApril2014.pdf https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/ Report: City spending $400K per day to house homeless in hotels. landlord-tenant-disputes-housing-court.html (2017, December 14). NY 1. Retrieved from http://www.ny1. Elmedni 13 com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2016/12/14/city-housing-home- Walker, A. (2017). Bill de Blasio’s affordable housing initiative less-in-hotels-report-.html failing low-income New Yorkers, says report. Retrieved from Schwartz, A. (2010). Housing policy in the United States (2nd ed.). https://ny.curbed.com/2017/9/16/16319102/nyc-affordable- New York, NY: Routledge. housing-crisis-bill-de-blasio-report Stewart, N. (2017, December 12). De Blasio seeks to homeless WNYC. (2014, July 28). This is why public housing Buildings are “cluster sites” into affordable housing. The New York Times. falling apart. Retrieved from https://www.wnyc.org/story/ Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/nyre- report-says-only-city-and-state-can-save-public-housing- gion/homeless-shelter-cluster-nyc-de-blasio.html now/ Sugar, R. (2016, December 15). More than half of New Yorkers WNYC. (2018, February 15). NYCHA Residents and the state of are rent burdened: Study. Retrieved from https://ny.curbed. the City. Retrieved from https://www.wnyc.org/story/nycha- com/2016/12/15/13967302/new-yorkers-cost-burden-rental- residents-and-state-city/ market-apartment-list Zimmer, A. (2017, September 15). Mayor’s affordable housing Sullivan, J., & Power, K. (2013). Coming affordable housing challenges not helping people who need it most, study says. Retrieved for municipalities after the great recession. Journal of Affordable from https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20170915/ crown- Housing & Community Development Law, 21, 297-314. heights/affordable-housing-de-blasio-homeless-crisis/ Turner, M. A., Brown, K. D., Cunningham, M., & Sawyer, N. (2003). Rethinking local affordable housing strategies: Lessons from 70 years of policy and practice. Washington, DC: Brookings Author Biography Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy. Bakry Elmedni, PhD is an assistant professor in the Master of U.S. Census. (2011). New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey. Public Administration (MPA) Program, School of Business, Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2011/ Public Administration and Information Sciences, LIU Brooklyn. demo/nychvs/s1a-renter-occupied.html His research interest includes policy process, decision-making, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2018). Who organizational design, and the role of leadership and governance needs affordable housing? Retrieved from https://www.hud. in promoting social justice and organizational equity. gov/program_offices/comm_planning/ affordablehousing/ http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png SAGE Open SAGE

The Mirage of Housing Affordability: An Analysis of Affordable Housing Plans in New York City:

Elmedni, Bakry
SAGE Open , Volume 8 (4): 1 – Oct 31, 2018
Download PDF
13 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/sage/the-mirage-of-housing-affordability-an-analysis-of-affordable-housing-h30Afq06Zw

References (18)

Publisher
SAGE
Copyright
Copyright © 2022 by SAGE Publications Inc, unless otherwise noted. Manuscript content on this site is licensed under Creative Commons Licenses.
ISSN
2158-2440
eISSN
2158-2440
DOI
10.1177/2158244018809218
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In the opening of the 21st century, housing affordability was described by the U.S. Congress as the most urgent issue facing America. This article provides an analysis of how feasible Mayor de Blasio’s Five Borough Ten-Year Plan will be in providing adequate affordable housing to low-income residents in New York City (NYC). It examines three main topics: (a) the Plan’s focus on using the private sector to achieve public goals and whether this is likely to come with unintended consequences such as less focus on the needy and gentrification of struggling neighborhoods, (b) the role of the nonprofit sector, which has historically been a major player in housing policies in the NYC, and (c) how much influence or control a municipal government has on economic forces to avoid negative outcomes. The analysis reveals that while providing any number of affordable units is a positive thing, it is unreasonable to assume that this intervention alone can adequately address the housing affordability crisis in NYC. This article also exposes other emerging problems as the plan is being implemented. One major concern is that through tax credits and rezoning efforts to encourage private-sector development, the Plan may wind up benefiting housing developers and gentrifiers more than actually ameliorating the housing crisis in NYC. Housing affordability is a multifaceted issue which requires a multifaceted approach from federal and state governments working in tandem with local governments. Keywords housing affordability, affordability spectrum, rezoning, mandatory inclusionary housing, low-income households two approaches: one that provides subsidies to the needy and Introduction another that focuses on adding new units to the market In 2002, a United States Congress bipartisan commission through construction and rehabilitation. concluded that housing affordability is the single most Looked at in a simple way, housing affordability is a func- important issue facing Americans in the new millennium tion of diminishing supply in times of increasing demand. (The Millennial Housing Commission, 2002). Affordable Looked at in a more nuanced way, affordability is a multifac- housing is defined as one that a household can obtain for eted problem that can go beyond simple supply and demand 30% or less of its income (U.S. Department of Housing and formulations since landlords can use various tactics to keep Urban Development [HUD], 2018). A dwelling is considered vacant units from the market which creates artificially high affordable for low-income families if it costs less than 24% rent prices. Barker (2018) showed that landlords can keep of the area median income (HUD, 2018). In his widely read units off the market by simply claiming that they are doing book Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City, renovation, or remove units from rent-stabilized stock by Mathew Desmond (2016) observed that “Today, over 1 in 5 conducting capital improvements that lead to increase in of all renting families in the country spends half of its income rental rates. Meantime, for the average renters there is lack of on housing” (p. 302). Although housing need exists across affordable units in the market and this shortage has reached a the country, the issue is particularly acute in New York City (NYC). In May 2018, The New York Times ran a series of articles titled “Unsheltered” on the housing crisis in the City, LIU Brooklyn, NY, USA affirming that the poor pay as much as 60% to 80% of their Corresponding Author: income on housing (Barker, Silver-Greenberg, Ashford, & Bakry Elmedni, MPA Program, LIU Brooklyn, One University Plaza, H-700, Cohen, 2018; Barker, 2018; Kleinfield, 2018). In the past, Brooklyn, NY 11201, USA. NYC has responded to housing affordability by combining Email: bakry.elmedni@liu.edu Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). 2 SAGE Open crisis point. A recent survey indicated that 50% of the City’s which despite significant improvements, remain poorly inte- residents cannot afford to live in the city (Barone, 2016). In grated and continue to have implementation problems” addition, between 2000 and 2012, NYC lost 400,000 units (Sullivan & Power, 2013, p. 331). Third, the federal funding renting for less than US$1,000 per month (NYC Comptroller, for the existing affordable housing programs continues to 2014). Generally, the loss of these units can be attributed to dwindle year after year (Freeman, 2002; Kleit & Page, 2015; market forces, but gentrification, in particular, coupled with Martens, 2009). As for how these programs impacted afford- loopholes in rent regulations were responsible for rent ability, Adams (2009) succinctly observed that the problem increases. of affordable housing is a systemic one with many parts and In response to this affordability crisis, shortly after he was will not be remedied by a bandage. In addition to the federal elected to office in 2014, Mayor Bill de Blasio introduced role, local governments also play a role in housing policies, Housing New York: A Five, Ten-Year Plan to supply afford- especially NYC. able housing units within the five boroughs (WNYC, 2014). The history of NYC housing policy goes back to the Like his predecessors, Mayor de Blasio’s plan focused on Tenement House Act of 1879, which predates any meaning- creating more units. The plan originally aimed to create ful federal interventions (NYU Furman Center, 2006). This 200,000 affordable units for all income groups with special unique position afforded NYC the opportunity to devise focus on low-income groups. In 2017, it was adjusted to cre- ambitious local housing programs. Various mayoral admin- ate and/or preserve 300,000 affordable housing units istrations in NYC have implemented affordable housing (Housing New York 2.0, 2017). This article provides an anal- programs. In the recent past, Mayor Koch implemented a ysis of how feasible Mayor de Blasio’s Five Borough Ten- housing plan that came to be known as the Ten-Year Plan for Year Plan will be in providing adequate affordable housing Housing in 1985, which lasted for 15 years and extended to low-income residents in NYC. It will examine three main into Dinkins’s and Giuliani’s administrations. Mayor Koch’s topics: plan spanned more than 100 programs, which can generally be categorized as utilizing three policy tools. The first tool 1. The Plan’s focus on using the private sector to achieve provided low-interest loans to owners to make upgrades and public goals and whether this is likely to come with repairs. The second approach consisted of programs that unintended consequences such as less focus on the provided subsidies for new construction projects, targeting needy and gentrification of struggling neighborhoods. home ownership. The largest of these programs was The 2. The role of the nonprofit sector, which has histori- New Homes Program of the New York City Housing cally been a major player in housing policies in Partnership, a public–private partnership. The third area NYC. was the use of Community Development Corporations 3. How much influence or control a municipal govern- (CPCs) and nonprofit organizations such as the Mutual ment has on economic forces to avoid negative Housing Association, St. Francis Friends of the Poor, and outcomes. the Neighborhood Redevelopment Program, all of which recognized the need and provided support for affordable Organizationally, this article is divided into five sections. housing units for low-income families (NYU Furman This introductory section covered how the problem of hous- Center, 2016). To finance the plan, Mayor Koch used mixed ing affordability in NYC is conceptualized and approached. sources, which included rent revenues from Battery Park The second section offers brief comments on the overarching City, the City’s Housing Development Corporation (a public characteristics of national housing policies and their impacts benefit corporation that issues bonds to raise capital for on the existing affordable housing programs. The third sec- affordable housing), the city’s capital budget, and other state tion provides a brief explanation of the research design and and federal sources. methodology used to conduct the study. The fourth section Mayor Bloomberg’s New Housing Marketplace Plan discusses de Blasio’s Housing New York plan, presenting the (2003-2014) was by design built on partnerships between plan’s specifics and relating them to potential outcomes. The private sector, nonprofit, and public agencies. These partner- final section gives brief concluding remarks. ships grew from a US$3.4 billion program to build and pre- serve 68,000 units by 2008, to a US$7.5 billion plan to build and preserve 165,000 units by 2013 (NYC Housing Housing Policies and Affordable Preservation and Development [HPD], 2016). Using a mix Housing Programs of public and private financing, Koch and Bloomberg’s plans Scholars studying housing are likely to agree on a few com- together provided a total of 332,106 units at a cost of US$12.6 mon defining characteristics of federal housing policies and billion dollars (NYU Furman Center, 2016). Notably, both their impacts on affordability. First, “Most housing programs plans targeted all income groups, but two thirds of in the United States do not focus on the most pressing hous- Bloomberg’s created units (124,106) were not affordable to ing needs” (Mueller & Schwartz, 2008, p. 122). Second, low-income groups (Association for Neighborhood and “there is no policy, only a collection of individual programs, Housing Development, Inc., 2012). Elmedni 3 Table 1. A Summary of Affordable Housing Programs in New York City. Accepting Program Originator Administration Funding No units No tenants application Wait time Public Housing Federal NYCHA Federal + State 176,066 396,581 Yes Varies: + City Average 9 years Housing Voucher Federal NYCHA Federal 86,194 204,049 No NA Program (Section 8) Project-based Federal NYCHA City 5,935 NA No NA Section 8 Federal HPD Federal + City 9,000 39,000 Case by Case Case by Case Federal DHCR Federal + State NA 7,100 Case by Case Case by Case Mitchell-Lama State Independent City + State 140,000 NA Yes Varies: by Housing development development Program Rent stabilization State Privately managed City 1,000,000 2.5 million Yes NA Laws Tax Incentives Federal/State/ Federal (HUD) State Federal/State/ 122,000 NA NA LIHTC and Tax City Housing Finance City LIHTC Abatement Authority 80/20 Note. NYCHA = New York City Housing Authority; HPD = Housing Preservation and Development; DHCR = New York State Department of Homes and Community Renewal; LIHTC = Low-Income Housing Tax Credit; HUD = U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. HPD and DHCR count household not number of tenants. Although generally, obtaining any type of Section 8 has become extremely difficult, there are exceptions for veteran and the elderly. Some of these units are now privately owned and are renting according to the market rate. On March 27, 2018, Mayor Bill de Blasio signed legislation to extend rent regulation laws for the next 3 years. The laws will remain in effect until April 1, 2021. State rent-stabilization laws continue to be effective when the vacancy rate is below 5%. It is not clear how many units are created by using the tax abatements programs because some of these units can be lost. Generally speaking, decades of national and local inter- capital and operations projects, and this has left it in need of ventions resulted in fragmented housing programs existing US$17 billion in major repairs (NYCHA, 2018). Its financial side by side in NYC, often managed by multiple depart- woes began in 1998 when former New York Governor ments. The national programs are implemented through George Pataki pulled state funding that had been used to coordination between HUD and various local authorities. operate more than 12,000 NYCHA apartments (WNYC, The current mix of affordable housing efforts in NYC can 2014). Unsurprisingly, the question of who is financially broadly be categorized in six areas in addition to the City’s responsible for NYCHA continues to fuel the ongoing feud unique approach for housing the homeless. Table 1 provides between Governor Andrew Cuomo and NYC Mayor Bill de a summary of the existing affordable housing programs, out- Blasio. To help with NYCHA’s financial troubles, the City lining programs’ originators, recipients, management, and has stepped up in major ways. In his 2018 State of the City current status. Address, Mayor de Blasio stated that his administration has First, the conventional public housing programs which provided US$2.1 billion of the City’s resources to NYCHA are funded jointly by the federal, state, and local authorities since he took office in 2014 (NPR, 2018). Yet, NYCHA runs and administered through New York City Housing Authority into frequent publicized management crises, the most recent (NYCHA), the largest public housing authority in North of which was the lack of lead inspection and adequate heat- America. Historically, NYCHA was considered one of the ing during cold winter months (Gartland, 2018). most successful public housing agencies in the country— Tenants in public housing pay 30% of their household success in terms of functionality and durability. Currently, income toward rent. The wait time for eligible applicants one in 14 New York residents live in an NYCHA-managed varies based on their priority code; employed individuals in unit. NYCHA is the sole responsible entity for managing the certain high need categories receive preference application process for new tenants as well as administering (Metropolitan Council on Housing, 2017). The wait time and maintaining public housing stocks (NYCHA, 2018). As for individuals in low priority categories can average 9 of 2018, NYCHA owns and manages 176,066 apartments, years. During that wait time, applicants must remain eligi- which serve 174,282 families and 396,581 authorized resi- ble and continue to reapply to stay on the waiting list for dents (NYCHA, 2017). Unfortunately, NYCHA has been open apartments. It is worth mentioning that the de Blasio dealing with a decline in federal and state funding for both administration has not only made a commitment to 4 SAGE Open improving the conditions of existing public housing stock Fourth, is the New York State-sponsored Mitchell-Lama but also is working to expand it through project-based Housing Program, which was conceived as a middle-income Section 8 (NYCHA, 2018). Mayor de Blasio has reiterated housing development program. It operated from the 1950s his administration’s commitment to maintaining NYCHA’s through the mid-1970s, creating more than 140,000 rental operation despite the reductions in federal funding. and limited-equity cooperative apartments. By design, Although far from adequate, it is arguable that NYC is tak- Mitchell-Lama buildings are privately owned, but are regu- ing the lead in ensuring housing affordability to the most lated under state law to maintain affordable prices to middle- vulnerable groups whose average household income is income households. Landlords have the option of leaving the US$23,672 with an average rent of US$483 a month Mitchell-Lama arrangement after the end of the contract, (NYCHA, 2018). Unfortunately, despite these efforts, there which usually lasts 20 years. However, if the building was are many people who remain on the waiting list who are occupied before 1974, it is likely to be subject to the rent- paying 50% or more of their income for housing. stabilization laws that came in 1974. Tenants in buildings Second, the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) Program participating in the program after 1974 (the cut-off-date) can (also known as Section 8) is another federal program man- see an increase in their rents if the owner opts to leave the aged by NYCHA, NYC HPD, and New York State program. Owner-occupants cannot sell their units for profit Department of Homes and Community Renewal (DHCR). during the 20-year contract; instead of rent they pay a main- The largest portion of Section 8 is managed through NYCHA, tenance fee. As for eligibility and access to these units, each which administers units serving 204,049 tenants residing in Mitchell-Lama development maintains its own waiting list 86,194 apartments with 26,297 participating private land- and the wait time varies depending on the demand. In 2017, lords. Unlike public housing, HCV gives recipients a choice one of the introduced changes to the Housing New York plan about where to live. Sadly, the waiting list for HCV is cur- includes saving 15,000 Mitchell-Lama units. This will be rently closed and the federal government has reduced the discussed further later. Unfortunately, like NYCHA the fate funding allocated to the program, which means that the City of the Mitchell-Lama program depends largely on whether might have to cover more financial ground to maintain hous- New York Governor Andrew Cuomo and Mayor Bill de ing for current Section 8 tenants. How feasible this will be Blasio can develop a working relationship to address hous- remains to be seen. ing affordability. Third, Project-Based Section 8, a version of the HCV Fifth, the Rent Stabilization Laws are a set of state laws Program, is a subsidized housing program for particular that regulate rents and leases in certain privately owned developments. Project-Based Section 8 is similar to the buildings. These are generally buildings with six or more Section 8 portable vouchers, the only difference is that proj- units that were constructed prior to 1974 as well as more ect-based vouchers (PBVs) are for particular buildings and recently constructed buildings that received subsidies. cannot be used elsewhere (Metropolitan Council on Housing, Landlords of rent-stabilized buildings can only increase rent 2017). Tenants living in Project-Based Section 8 buildings to certain levels set by local rent boards. Generally, tenants also dedicate 30% of their income toward rent and the local cannot be evicted or denied the right to renew their lease authority pays the balance. NYCHA currently manages except for nonpayment of rent, breaking terms of their lease, 4,350 units under the Project-Based Section 8 apartments in or being a nuisance. As of 2017, there are approximately 1 NYC (NYCHA, 2017). The Section 8 program is expanding: million rent-stabilized apartments in NYC (Metropolitan “Between 2016 and 2019 NYCHA plans to add an additional Council on Housing, 2017). Although these laws cannot 2,200 units to this program” (NYCHA, 2017, p. 2). There are guarantee that the rent-stabilized buildings are affordable to parts of PBV Section 8 that are run and managed through low-income groups, they are the first line of defense for NYC HPD and New York State DHCR. Also, there are PBV housing affordability in a tight market. Currently, there are units that are privately owned and managed. Currently, HPD more than 2.5 million residents who live in these protected provides subsidies to over 39,000 households in all five bor- units. Ironically, rental rates in the rent-stabilized buildings oughs with 9,000 participating landlords (NYC HPD, 2018). are often lower than rates in the so-called affordable housing DHCR also runs the state-wide Section 8 program, but its units created through tax incentives programs (Low-Income Subsidy Service Bureau administers Section 8 vouchers in Housing Tax Credit [LIHTC] and 80/20). This reality incen- NYC. The Subsidy Service Bureau currently assists more tivized landlords to lobby state elected officials, which even- than 7,100 families in NYC (DHCR, 2018). Some PBV units tually resulted in the weakening of rent-stabilization laws in are privately owned and managed buildings, some of which the past decade. Another troubling reality is that the City lead to home ownership. For the purpose of this study, the does not have much control over the future of these laws. numbers of families assisted by HPD and DHCR are reported Landlords can remove their units from the rent-stabilized list without distinction between privately owned and managed if the unit rent exceeds US$2,733.75, or if the combined and those still managed by government entities. In addition, income of a household exceeds US$200,000 (Barker, 2018; vouchers provided by both HPD and DHCR vary consider- DHCR, 2017). The most common tactic that landlords utilize ably in the amount they pay and are subject to various rules to bring the unit rent to or above US$2,733.75 is the use of in terms of portability. Major Capital Improvements (MCI). After going through the Elmedni 5 process, landlords can be granted rent increase for expenses the homeless problem was his announcement of plans to use incurred for these improvements, which can drive the rent up eminent domain to take control of private property. Under enough to force out some of the existing tenants (Barker, this newly devised initiative, the City would provide public 2018). financing for nonprofits to buy roughly a third of the apart- Sixth, the Tax Incentives Programs, which include the ments (800) that are currently used as shelters and convert LIHTC, a federal program and Local Tax Abatements them into affordable housing units (Stewart, 2017). If suc- Programs. LIHTC was created through the Tax Reform Act cessful in this takeover, de Blasio will accomplish two goals of 1986 and it is one of the federal mechanisms for “encour- with one move: reducing homelessness and adding to the aging the development and rehabilitation of affordable rental city’s affordable housing units. Despite the criticism, the de housing . . . tax credits are awarded to developers of qualified Blasio administration’s continuing efforts to house the home- rental projects via a competitive application process admin- less represent a serious commitment to addressing an afford- istered by state housing finance authorities” (Cantwell & ability crisis that affects the most vulnerable. Schumer, 2016, p. 5). Generally, private investors (a for- As we have seen, affordable housing programs in NYC profit or a nonprofit organizations) without any connection provide housing to more than 3 million of the City’s 8.6 mil- to the project can purchase tax credits to be subtracted from lion residents. The direct subsidies (public housing and their federal income tax. The payments are then put into a vouchers) serve more than 600,000 residents while 2.5 mil- fund distributed to state governments, which in turn allocate lion live in rent-stabilized buildings. Thousands of families funds to developers to build affordable housing. Nationally, reside in the 122,000 units created through LIHTC since its LIHTC “has contributed to the development of more than 1.5 inception in 1986. It is unknown exactly how many people million rental units (more than the entire stock of public live in units provided through the Mitchell-Lama Housing housing)” (Schwartz, 2010, p. 8). Between 1986 and 2013, Program and other local Tax Abatements Programs (80/20), LIHTC has helped create or preserve more than 170,290 but the modest estimate of one person per unit suggests that homes in New York State, of which an estimate of 122,000 Mitchell-Lama apartments house more than 105,000 indi- properties are in NYC (Cantwell & Schumer, 2016). The viduals. It is arguable that NYC would not be the same with- Local Tax Abatements Programs tend to benefit private out these programs. Yet, despite all these efforts, more than developers directly because they either eliminate or reduce half of the City’s residents are considered rent-burdened future property taxes on for-profit development in return for (Sugar, 2016). The following section gives a brief descrip- an allocation of below-market-priced units (usually 80/20). tion of methods used to conduct this study before turning to They may also forgive sales taxes on construction materials. the analysis of de Blasio’s Housing New York Plan. In terms of providing long-term affordability, the extent to which low-income people actually get access to affordable Research Design and Method units in these properties is unclear as landlords and develop- ers have been accused of utilizing various loopholes in these This is an exploratory study using mixed methods. It includes programs (NYU Furman Center, 2016). a systematic review of secondary data to assess the Housing Finally, is Mayor de Blasio’s Effort to House the Homeless. New York Plan and its potential impacts. This methodologi- Although de Blasio’s considerable efforts to house the home- cal design explains the driving forces for the increasing less do not directly connect to the Housing New York Plan, shortage of affordable housing and allows us to go beyond they do constitute a crucial element in providing housing to description to prediction. The data used in this study comes the most vulnerable groups who are unlikely to be served by from scholarly work and other sources such as the Housing the income structure included in the plan. De Blasio made a New York Five Borough Ten-Year plan, the NYU Furman commitment to address the homeless problem in the City Center (a housing research center), the HUD, NYC’s when he was elected to office for the first time. To do so, in Department of Housing Preservation and Development, the 2015, his administration proposed “plans to create 15,000 NYCHA, and the U.S Census Bureau. In particular, data additional units of housing that will be paired with social- drawn from the HUD is helpful in comparing several afford- service support, an initiative estimated to cost about $3 bil- able housing policies that have been in place even if gradu- lion” (Dawsey, 2016, p. 1). By the end of his first term in ally shrinking. 2017, de Blasio’s homeless policies were considered his big- Instead of employing solely quantitative data, I seek to gest failure (Max, 2017), for the number of homeless people clarify the underlying forces driving housing affordability, was at an historic high and the cost of temporary shelters was something that cannot adequately be explained simply by exceeding US$2 billion annually with no end in sight. This quantifying the number of units constructed or the number of policy invited a louder and harsher criticism, much of which households assisted. In processing the data, I make infer- was devoted to cluster sites (satellite shelters) and providing ences from the literature on affordable housing and from accommodation in expensive hotels (“Report: City Spending comparisons of de Blasio’s plan to the outcomes of similar $400K Per Day to House Homeless in Hotels,” 2017). The plans implemented by former mayors. Finally, an explana- most recent twist in the tale of de Blasio’s effort to deal with tory analysis is carried out of the Housing New York Plan’s 6 SAGE Open Table 2. A Summary of the Plan’s Objectives and the Tools for Obtaining Them. Objectives Policy tools Fostering diverse, livable neighborhoods Identify opportunities for affordable housing in the five boroughs Implement mandatory inclusionary housing program Preserving affordability and the existing housing programs Protect tenants (legal aid) Preserve affordability of unregulated housing, Pilot a new program to incentivize energy-efficient retrofits for buildings. Building new affordable housing for all residents Increase the number of units serving very low-income residents Develop affordable housing in underused public and private sites Develop small vacant sites, introduce new mixed-income programs Reform zoning, building, and housing codes Use the City’s housing subsidy dollars more efficiently. Promoting homeless, senior, supportive, and accessible Shift from high-cost homeless shelter to lower-cost permanent residents housing Develop more supportive housing to improve health outcomes Source. Housing New York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan (2014). specifics to determine whether building or renovating gentrification because it relies on rezoning as a tool for land 300,000 units with costs exceeding US$44 billion will be acquisition. Third, the income structure in the Plan is likely adequate to address the chronic housing affordability crisis to leave low-income households underserved; its reliance on in NYC. Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH) has been problem- atic in the past and likely to be in the future. Fourth, the Plan failed to clearly define a role for nonprofit organizations Mayor de Blasio’s Housing New York despite the existence of a broad umbrella of nonprofit stake- holders. Fifth, the use of the tax incentives programs (LIHTC Plan and the Affordability Quest and Local Tax Abatements Programs in form of 80/20), as a Although NYC might have historically shaped national way to incentivize private developers to build more units, housing policies, today the realities of the City’s housing can result in overproduction in generally attractive areas affordability are impacted by these national policies (NYU while leaving behind struggling neighborhoods. Tax Furman Center, 2016). A serious plan to address housing Incentives can also result in controversies like separate affordability in NYC has to look beyond the existing afford- entrances for market-rate tenants and low-income tenants. able housing programs. Nationally and locally, this is the This section closes with additional observations about the context within which de Blasio introduced the Housing New Plan’s guiding principles for stakeholder engagement, pro- York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan (hereafter referred to as posed funding sources, and relevant potential challenges. the Plan) in 2014, stating that First, a fundamental design flaw in the Plan is that it assumes that providing a steady supply of new units can We have a crisis of affordability on our hands. It’s a crisis in mitigate an affordability crisis in a tight market. For instance, many ways built on New York City’s success . . . And that the Plan states that “New York City’s shortage of affordable success story has put pressure on our housing stock . . . housing has reached a crisis point. The crisis has many Affordable housing is part of the bedrock of what makes New causes, starting with the erosion of New Yorkers’ purchas- York City work . . . And that is why today, we are laying out a ing power in the housing marketplace” (Housing New York: comprehensive plan to build and preserve 200,000 affordable A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan, 2014, p. 5) and that units over the coming decade. (p. 1) “Another cause of the affordable housing crisis is the mis- match between demand for, and the supply of, housing” (p. The Plan incorporates an array of broad objectives that 5). As such, the cornerstone of the plan is to intervene oftentimes appear as aspirational goals rather than achiev- through “increasing and protecting the supply of affordable able outcomes because there is no clear mechanism for meet- housing” (p. 6). There have been two notable past attempts ing them. Table 2 presents these objectives and the approaches to increase affordable housing stock by two former mayors for achieving them as shown in the Plan document. (Koch and Bloomberg) as previously discussed. Although In dissecting the Plan, five major points are highlighted both mayors created, preserved, and restored hundreds of and discussed in further detail in the following paragraphs. thousands of units, housing affordability remained a critical First, the results of the City’s past policies indicate that inter- problem for low-income households. Without explaining ventions centered primarily on private-sector development why his approach will produce different outcomes com- using cross-subsidies as the vehicle for generating supply pared with his predecessors, in November 2017, mayor de have had limited impacts on housing affordability. Second, Blasio announced that the Housing New York Plan “has de Blasio’s Plan can inadvertently become a driver for Elmedni 7 Figure 1. Number of rent-burdened households, 2005 and 2015 comparing NYC to the rest of East Coast Metros. Source. Apartment List Inc. (2016). Note. NYC = New York City. unprecedented 25,000 per year, while also increasing resources financed 77,651 affordable homes since its inception in and strategies for affordable homeownership programs and not- 2014—breaking records for the most affordable housing for-profit organizations purchasing rent-regulated buildings to produced in any three years in New York City’s history” preserve affordability. (p. 1) (Housing New York 2.0, 2017, p .1). Because of this early success, the Mayor has raised the target to build and pre- Despite the early celebrated success, the factors govern- serve 300,000 units. The new target will be accomplished by ing affordability remain unchanged. Historically, the decline investing US$250 million to save 15,000 units under the in the supply of affordable housing coincided with the Mitchell-Lama program that are at risk of shifting to mar- decline of purchasing power for low-income households, ket-rate rent (Housing New York 2.0, 2017). In addition, creating the biggest challenge for affordability. Figure 1 during the release of the new targets, the Mayor’s office shows that the number of rent-burdened households has stated that increased between the years 2005 and 2015. Because wages were not keeping up with the rising rental costs, the number Under the accelerated and expanded plan, the City will boost the of struggling renters continued to increase. number of affordable homes for seniors and families to an 8 SAGE Open Figure 2. Supply and demand among extremely low-income and very low-income renter households. Source. Housing and Vacancy Survey (U.S. Census, 2011). One obvious observation is that there are more low- shown in Figure 2. Despite the previous attempts, the num- income residents who are becoming rent-burdened than the bers of low-income families struggling to afford basic hous- plan is designed to help. In 2016, the American Community ing continues to rise. The shortage of adequate affordable Survey (ACS) indicated that more than half of the city resi- housing will continue to have detrimental effects on all low- dents are rent-burdened. New York City Rent Guidelines income groups, for “living in unaffordable housing causes Board (2018) reported that “Rent stabilized tenants report a stress for families because it often forces them to spend less median gross rent-to-income ratio of 36.0%, meaning a on other necessary items such as food, health and education” majority of rent stabilized tenants are not able to afford their (Buchanan & Budiwski, 2009, p. 19). apartments” (p. 10). Sugar (2016) stated that According to the New York City Rent Guidelines Board (2018), the increase in rent and utility costs resulted in a More than half of renters nation-wide are still paying more than larger numbers of renters becoming rent-burdened. The com- 30 percent of their pre-tax incomes in rent, and . . . the number promises low-income families have to endure can potentially is even higher in New York City, where a full 54.1 percent of have lasting effects in the future. Desmond (2016) warns that renters are cost-burdened. (p. 1) “Our cities have become unaffordable to our poorest fami- lies, and this problem is leaving a deep and jagged scar on the What makes things even worse is that other affordable next generation” (p. 299). When low-income households suf- housing programs have limited impacts and the initiative to fer the pain of unaffordable housing, the City also suffers by house the homeless remains under severe criticism for being providing other social services. Simply increasing housing costly and unsustainable. Even though public housing, HCV supply in NYC does not appear to be the answer as landlords and homeless shelters are currently serving a considerable may keep vacant units off the market to await the opportunity segment of low-income families, these programs are unlikely to raise rent. The Association for Neighborhood and Housing to be useful tools in dealing with the affordability crisis in the Development (2018) made the case in this statement: future for three reasons. First, currently NYCHA (2017) “is no longer accepting new Section 8 applications” (p. 1) and in Despite the recent building boom, the share of rental units in the the absence of federal funding this situation is unlikely to City fell from 64.2% in 2014 to 62.9% in 2017, and the share of change. Within existing public housing the length of the homeownership units dropped during the same period . . . New waiting list and the eligibility requirements leave a large York City saw a huge jump in the number of vacant units not number of people unserved. Second, public housing and available for sale or rent, from 182,600 in 2014 up to a whopping housing vouchers are federal programs and are perpetually 248,000 in 2017. The number of vacant units not available for rent or purchase is more than all the new housing units created affected by budgetary concerns at the national level. The from 2014 to 2017. (p. 1) Trump administration expressed a clear desire to further cut the federal subsidies, which could add to the pool of those in need of housing. Third, there are many residents whose A recent New York Times article partially explains why income exceeds the eligibility requirement for public sub- the number of vacant units not available for rent or purchase sides but cannot afford a market rental rate. has risen; it states that To complicate things further for de Blasio’s efforts, there In neighborhoods already gentrified or in the throes of are more than twice as many low-income households need- gentrifying, a relatively new class of mega-landlords has driven ing housing than there are affordable units available as Elmedni 9 up rents by exploiting enforcement gaps in a web of city and income targets, concerns about income levels—whether the state agencies. By churning through enough tenants and claiming housing is targeted at the deepest needs, whether the Mayor’s enough renovations, landlords can raise the rent enough— affordable housing might gentrify neighborhoods with very beyond $2,733.75 a month—to wrest an apartment from low incomes—will persist” (p. 1). regulation’s grip and into the free market (Barker, 2018, p. 2). The Plan calls for the creation of an Implementation Advisory Board to engage on a regular basis with the City The housing affordability crisis is also likely to be exacer- leadership. The board is comprised of stakeholders from the bated by the projected growth of the City’s population, which City’s housing community. The Plan also includes the imple- is predicted to increase to 9 million residents by 2030, requir- mentation of new mixed-income programs through the intro- ing a net gain of 318,500 housing units, with 250,660 of duction of MIH. According to the Housing New York: A Five those units affordable to low and moderate-income (NYC Borough, Ten-Year Plan (2014), “the affordable units in tra- Department of City Planning, 2016). ditional 80/20 are targeted towards a narrow band of house- Second, is the challenge of whether the Plan will become holds” (p. 10). a driver for gentrification because of the controversial rezon- Fourth, what is the role of nonprofit organizations in the ing reforms. In theory, the purpose of rezoning was “to create Housing New York Plan? A major shortcoming in the origi- new residential density that would include large numbers of nal Plan was the small—and vague—role given to the non- affordable apartments” (Murphy, 2017, p. 1). In reality, how- profit sector. In recent decades, nonprofit organizations ever, rezoning is feared to become a driving force for gentri- across the country—often CDCs—have been instrumental in fication as real estate investors rush in to transform creating successful partnerships with HUD and local govern- neighborhoods for quick profits. In a place like NYC, where ments in revitalizing dilapidated housing and selling or rent- land is scarce and hard to acquire, rezoning creates opportu- ing the units to low-income households. NYC has a unique nities for developers to build in rezoned areas, and real estate history of the nonprofit sector’s involvement in creating value start to appreciate faster, leading to increases in rent affordable housing programs. As such, it was assumed that and property taxes. This increase eventually makes gentrifi- de Blasio’s plan would give nonprofit organizations a greater cation an all but inevitable by-product. Although rezoning role in creating affordable units. This lack of a clear role for may prove counterproductive to the Plan’s ultimate objective the nonprofit sector in the original plan has invited wide crit- of providing and protecting affordable housing to preserve icisms from housing advocates and neighborhoods associa- the City’s diverse communities, Mayor de Blasio has not tions (Murphy, 2017). However, to be fair to de Blasio’s evaded that the plan will continue to encourage rezoning as a efforts, a crucial distinction must be made here. Mayor revitalization strategy (WNYC, 2018). Koch’s plan was executed during a time when there were Third, the income structure in the Plan leaves low-income many vacant buildings that the city acquired through foreclo- households underserved. According to the Housing New York: A sure. In New homes Programs, these buildings were then Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan (2014), 8% of affordable housing turned over to CDCs to create affordable units. Today, land will be designated for the extremely low-income category (less acquisition for developing affordable housing is much more than US$25,150), 12% for the very low-income category expensive, which is why rezoning is being used to increase (US$25,151-US$41,950), 58% in the low-income category the space available for housing construction despite the (US$41,951-US$67,120), 11% in the moderate-income category growing criticism. (US$67,121-US$100,680), and 11% in the middle-income group In response to criticism about the lack of clear role for (US$100,681-US$138, 435). These targets have received a wide nonprofit organizations, the newly introduced changes range of criticisms (Real Affordability for All Coalition [RAFA], appear to give the nonprofit sector a bigger role, though it 2017; Walker, 2017; Zimmer, 2017). In a report, RAFA (2017) remains unclear how big. One area of change is the role non- concluded that “To make a dent in the homelessness crisis, we profits are expected to play in obtaining housing units must increase the number of units developed for households who (known as satellite shelters) that are currently rented by the earn less than $25,000 a year—households that are not served by City to house the homeless. Another change is said to come the private market” (p. 2). In response to criticism, newly pro- in a program known as Neighborhood Pillars through which posed changes in the plan slightly increased the percentage for the the City plans to spend US$275 million to buy older rent- very low-income groups. In the adjusted plan, 25% (instead of regulated buildings in changing neighborhoods where mar- 20%) of the created units will be set aside for families with very ket speculation threatens existing affordable housing stock. low and extremely low income (less than US$41,950), 55% for This program is intended to “target 1,000 homes a year and low-income households (US$41,951-US$67,120) and 19.5% for 7,500 over the life of the plan” (Murphy, 2017, p. 1). moderate and middle-income households (US$67,121-US$138, Fifth, the use of the tax incentive programs—LIHTC and 435). These changes are still far from addressing the needs of Tax Abatements programs 80/20—as a tool for encouraging many struggling families. the private or nonprofit sector to develop affordable housing Reflecting views of the Plan’s critics, Murphy (2017) remain problematic and ineffective. In the past, many of the noted that “Since the expanded plan doesn’t alter those units built using LIHTC funds were allocated to relatively 10 SAGE Open well-off household. To break away from past mistakes, the legal jurisdiction over rent laws and landlords can lobby leg- Plan requires that the City mandate a portion of new housing islators in Albany to weaken rent-stabilization laws. In 2017, development to be permanently affordable to low- or moder- the vacancy rate in NYC remained at 3.63. However, the City ate-income households. To date most of the created units cannot ensure the long-term existence of rent-stabilization (more than 70,000) came through the use of the City’s capital regulation since the State has shown a propensity for loosen- resources not through use of LIHTC, Tax abatements or pri- ing those regulations in the past, which has allowed land- vate MIH development. In practice, the implementation of lords to aggressively pursue eviction (Barker et al., 2018). MIH can be a deterrent for many developers because “for Regardless of the vacancy status, the state still has rent regu- developers to agree to build 20% or more units of affordable lations that are in place, what remains to be seen is how housing, they have to be persuaded that the building’s effective these regulations would be in protecting affordabil- remainder will be lucrative enough to fill the gap” (Dawsey, ity in the City. The de Blasio administration announced that 2016, p. 1). Obviously, developers prefer to take on tasks that the City will provide tenants facing eviction with lawyers, generate more profitable outcomes than housing low-income which is commendable, but covering legal fees will not groups. More importantly, tax incentive programs (federal address the broader set of problems leading to housing and local) and MIH may combine to create perverse incen- courts. For example, when landlords are renovating other tives for developers, leading to overproduction of units in units in the building, tenants endure unhealthy conditions, certain part of the City or totally gentrifying struggling areas noise, and inconvenience. The ultimate goal for most land- (Bagli, 2016). lords is to take a unit out of the rent-stabilization program and put it into market rate, so driving tenants out by making living in the building unbearable might be part of their over- Additional Observations About de Blasio’s Plan all strategy. Moreover, the Plan will now run to 2026 instead In regard to working with stakeholders, partners, and play- of 2024, beyond the end of de Blasio’s second term on ers, the Plan was developed through coordination among 13 December 31, 2021. This will leave the Plan at the mercy of agencies and with input from more than 200 stakeholders. It his mayoral successor. incorporates more than 50 initiatives to support the goal of In addition, the 100,000 increase in the number of units to building or preserving 300,000 units. According to the Plan, be preserved or built requires an additional commitment of the guiding principles are the City’s resources. So far, Mayor de Blasio has added US$1.9 billion in City funding to pay for the part of the plan 1) Our housing policies must address the City’s changing targeting low-income household, seniors, and veterans. demographics and those we serve; 2) The City’s planning Funding for the plan will come from mixed sources, includ- processes and land-use policies need to be revamped; 3) ing the City’s capital budget. The adjusted plan is estimated Economic diversity must be a cornerstone of housing to cost more than US$44 billion by the time of its comple- development; 4) Our municipal tools and public assets should be tion. The Plan was estimated to cost US$8.2 billion of the deployed more effectively; 5) We must strategically protect past City’s money in 2014, and this number is now adjusted to investments and lock in affordability in changing neighborhoods; US$13.5 billion for the 12-year duration. The sources of 6) The City needs to protect tenants in rent-regulated units more funding for the Plan are outlined in Table 3, which shows the aggressively; 7) We must leverage today’s favorable markets original breakdown of public and private funding as envi- and adapt quickly to future conditions; and finally 8) We must sioned in the Plan. The majority of the funds will be allo- increase capital funding to our housing programs. (Housing New York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan, 2014, p. 7) cated to create new units and the remaining funding will be used to preserve existing housing stock. It is unclear, though, Although these are noble principles, there is no clear path whether the City can be confident of receiving money from or defined tool to honor them or the rest of the Plan’s bloated the state and federal government in the current political objectives. For instance, de Blasio’s administration plans to climate. use the same general tools—rezoning, LIHTC, Tax Although ambitious in its quest, de Blasio’s Housing New Abatements and MIH, rent-stabilization laws, protecting York Plan acknowledged the potential challenges, road- Mitchell-Lama units—to preserve the existing affordable blocks, and shortcomings. In the Plan, it was made clear that housing stock and to construct new units. Although rent-sta- tackling the housing affordability crisis in NYC cannot be bilization regulations fall under New York State jurisdiction, achieved without state and federal action, for “The State and in 2017, Mayor de Blasio signed legislation extending rent Federal governments have been stalwart partners throughout regulations up until April 1, 2021, because the state regula- many years and across multiple administrations, and their tions continue to be in effect as long as the vacancy rate is renewed commitment to affordable housing is absolutely below 5% (Center for New York City Law, 2018). This crucial to address the City’s affordability crisis” (Housing extension allows the City to ensure that landlords cannot New York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan, 2014, p. 12). move units from rent-stabilized stocks to market rates faster, However, considering the current political conditions, it is for if the vacancy rate is higher than 5%, the State has the highly unlikely that the City will receive adequate help from Elmedni 11 Table 3. Mayor de Blasio’s Housing Plan Original Budget intended to support development projects rather than improve Breakdown. the quality of peripheral neighborhoods, and rezoning for higher densities occurs in response to developer demands for more Mayor de Blasio: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan Budget—Fiscal profitable investment opportunities. (p. 1) years 2015-2024 Future research should focus on scrutinizing whether de Allocation Total budget Blasio’s approach for creating thousands of units can make New construction US$30,643,240.00 an immediate measurable impact on the relationship between Preservation US$10,489,956.00 supply and demand (through rent prices) as the Plan pro- Total budget US$41,133,196.00 claimed. In addition, future research might ask whether bil- lions of dollars would be more efficacious in assisting Sources Expected funding rent-burdened residents if they were targeted directly through City US$8,244,387.00 subsidies rather than indirectly provide benefit to developers Federal and State US$2,886,464.00 (see Desmond, 2016). Private US$30,002,345.00 Total expected funding US$41,133,196.00 Net balance - Conclusion Source. The information in the table was extracted from Housing New In the beginning, this article asked how feasible Mayor de York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan (2014). Blasio’s Five Borough Ten-Year Plan will be in providing adequate affordable housing to low-income families in NYC. The analysis in this article shows that Mayor de Blasio’s Plan the federal government. To the contrary, the City might need is likely to fall short in making a considerable change in the to commit even more resources to preserve the existing City’s housing affordability dilemma because (a) the Plan affordable housing programs. What is clear is that the conun- does not focus enough on serving the very low-income drum NYC faces regarding devising an effective plan for households and (b) housing affordability cannot be resolved providing affordable housing is typical compared with solely by creating new units. This article also exposes other attempts of other local governments. emerging problems as the Plan is being implemented. One In the meantime, de Blasio’s Plan is unlikely to funda- major concern is that through tax incentives programs and mentally reduce the hardships low-income families face rezoning efforts to encourage private-sector development, despite the declared intentions, as it will not provide an ade- the Plan may wind up benefiting housing developers and quate supply necessary to meet the needs of the existing gentrifiers more than actually ameliorating the housing crisis numbers in low-income groups. To do de Blasio’s Plan jus- in NYC. tice, it must be acknowledged that a municipal government does not have many policy tools to influence larger economic forces. Declaration of Conflicting Interests In an exhaustive report titled Rethinking Local Affordable The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Practice, Turner, Brown, Cunningham, and Sawyer (2003) concluded that prior local housing plans, though successful, Funding have not been effective in providing adequate affordable The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author- housing on the scale needed. The analysis provided in this ship, and/or publication of this article. article concurs with Turner et al.’s findings. Adding thou- sands of new units is an inadequate response to the afford- References ability crisis. Broadly speaking, de Blasio’s Housing New Adams, K. D. (2009). Homeownership: American dream or illusion York Plan falls within the domain of urban planning that of empowerment? South Carolina Law Review, 60(3), 574-616. caters to the powerful, builds on neoliberal ideology and Apartment List Inc. (2016). Which metros have the most cost-bur- relies on trickle-down economic growth. The Plan caters to dened renters? Retrieved from https://www.apartmentlist.com/ the powerful by relying on a rezoning strategy that often rentonomics/cost-burdened-renters-2016/ leads to gentrification. It builds on a neoliberal ideology in Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development. (2018, its reliance primarily on private developers. Fainstein (2010) March 7). Housing Vacancy Survey shows New York City is in the eloquently observed how this approach plays out in this midst of an affordability emergency. Retrieved from https://www. statement: anhd.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Real-Affordability- Evaluation-of-the-Bloomberg-Housing-Program2.pdf Decisions concerning where to locate facilities become warped Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, Inc. by considerations of their economic, as opposed to their social, (2012). An evaluation of the Bloomberg housing program and impacts. Thus, capital investments by city governments are recommendations to strengthen affordable housing policy. 12 SAGE Open Retrieved from https://www.anhd.org/wp-content/uploads/ Martens, B. (2009). A political history of affordable housing. Journal 2011/07/Real-Affordability-Evaluation-of-the-Bloomberg of Housing & Community Development, 6-12. Retrieved from -Housing-Program2.pdf http://content.csbs.utah.edu/~fan/fcs5400-6400/studentpresent Bagli, C. V. (2016, January 13). Looming end of tax-break pro- ation2009/03Reading_3.pdf. gram could harm Mayor’s housing plan. The New York Times. Max, B. (2017, July 17). Bill de Blasio’s big homelessness prob- Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/nyre- lem. Daily Beast. Retrieved from https://www.thedailybeast. gion/death-of-tax-break-program-could-hamper-mayor-de- com/bill-de-blasios-big-homelessness-problem blasios-housing-push.html?_r=0 Metropolitan Council on Housing. (2017). New York City's Barker, K. (2018, May 20). Behind New York’s housing crisis: affordable housing programs. Retrieved from http://met- Weakened laws and fragmented regulation. The New York councilonhousing.org/help_and_answers/nyc_affordable_ Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interac- housing_programs tive/2018/05/20/nyregion/affordable-housing-nyc.html The Millennial Housing Commission. (2002). Retrieved from Barker, K., Silver-Greenberg, J., Ashford, G., & Cohen, S. (2018, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mhc/MHCReport.pdf May 20). The eviction machine churning through New York Mueller, J., & Schwartz, A. (2008). Reversing the tide: Will state City. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www. and local governments house the poor as federal direct subsi- nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/nyc-affordable- dies decline? Journal of the American Planning Association, housing.html 74, 122-135. doi:10.1080/01944360701813300 Barone, V. (2016, November 22). NYC residents want to keep Murphy, J. (2017). Breaking down De Blasio’s expanded housing living in the city, but can’t afford to, poll shows. AM New plan. Retrieved from https://citylimits.org/2017/10/26/break- York. Retrieved from http://www.amny.com/real-estate/nyc- ing-down-de-blasios-expanded-housing-plan/ residents-want-to-keep-living-in-the-city-but-can-t-afford-to- New York City Comptroller. (2014). THE GROWING GAP: New poll-shows-1.12649036 York City’s housing affordability challenge. Retrieved from Buchanan, R., & Budiwski, C. (2009). The challenges of housing http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/ revitalization in poor urban neighborhoods: A case study on the Growing_Gap.pdf Spence neighborhood in Winnipeg. Undercurrent, 6(2), 17-24. New York City Department of City Planning. (2016). Retrieved Cantwell, M., & Schumer, C. (2016). Addressing the chal- from http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/index.page lenges of affordable housing & homelessness: The housing New York City Housing Authority. (2017). 2018 fact sheet. tax credit. Retrieved from http://www.nychdc.com/content/ Retrieved from https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/down- pdf/ProjectAdvertisements/NY%20LIHTC%20and%20 loads/pdf/NYCHA-Fact-Sheet_2018_Final.pdf Homelessness%20Report%20final.pdf New York City Housing Authority. (2018). Retrieved from http:// Center for New York City Law. (2018). Mayor signs legislation www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/nycha-2017-bud- to extend rent-stabilization laws. Retrieved from http://www. get-book.pdf citylandnyc.org/mayor-signs-legislation-to-extend-rent-stabi- New York City Housing Preservation and Development. (2016). lization-laws/ Retrieved from http://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/index.page Dawsey, J. (2016, November 20). Mayor Bill de Blasio’s afford- New York City Housing Preservation and Development. (2018). able housing plan faces roadblocks. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/section-8/ Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/mayor-bill-de-bla- about-section-8.page sios-affordable-housing-plan-faces-roadblocks-1458946840 New York City Rent Guidelines Board. (2018). 2018 Income and Desmond, M. (2016). Evicted: Poverty and profit in the American Affordability Study. Retrieved from https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ City. New York, NY: Crown. rentguidelinesboard/index.page Fainstein, S. (2011). The just city (1st ed.). Ithaca, NY: Cornell New York State Department Homes and Community Renewal. University Press. (2018). Retrieved from http://www.nyshcr.org/AboutUs/ Freeman, L. (2002). America’s affordable housing crisis: A contract Offices/HousingOperations/ unfulfilled. American Journal of Public Health, 92, 709-712. New York State Housing and Community Renewal. (2017). Gartland, M. (2018, January 23). NYCHA head gave false testi- Available from http://www.nyshcr.org mony on lead paints scandal: Letter. The New York Post. NPR. (2018, May 1). Public Housing Broken. But did de Blasio Retrieved from https://nypost.com/2018/01/23/nycha-head- break it? Retrieved from https://www.wnyc.org/story/de-bla- gave-false-testimony-on-lead-paint-scandal-letter/ sio-nycha/ Housing New York: A Five Borough, Ten-Year Plan. (2014). NYU Furman Center. (2006). Housing policy in New York City: A Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/housing/assets/ brief history. Retrieved from http://furmancenter.org/files/pub- downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf lications/AHistoryofHousingPolicycombined0601_000.pdf Housing New York 2.0. (2017). Retrieved from http://www1.nyc. NYU Furman Center. (2016). Understanding affordable housing. gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/about/hny-2.pdf Retrieved from http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/ Kleit, R., & Page, S. (2015). The changing role of public housing AHistoryofHousingPolicycombined0601_000.pdf authorities in the affordable housing delivery system. Housing Real Affordability for All. (2017). How the mayor can create Studies, 30, 621-644. doi:10.1080/02673037.2014.953919 real affordable communities. Retrieved from http://www. Klienfield, N. (2018, May 20). Where Brooklyn tenants plead the coalitionforthehomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ case for keeping their homes. New York Times. Retrieved from RealAffordabilityForAllApril2014.pdf https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/ Report: City spending $400K per day to house homeless in hotels. landlord-tenant-disputes-housing-court.html (2017, December 14). NY 1. Retrieved from http://www.ny1. Elmedni 13 com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2016/12/14/city-housing-home- Walker, A. (2017). Bill de Blasio’s affordable housing initiative less-in-hotels-report-.html failing low-income New Yorkers, says report. Retrieved from Schwartz, A. (2010). Housing policy in the United States (2nd ed.). https://ny.curbed.com/2017/9/16/16319102/nyc-affordable- New York, NY: Routledge. housing-crisis-bill-de-blasio-report Stewart, N. (2017, December 12). De Blasio seeks to homeless WNYC. (2014, July 28). This is why public housing Buildings are “cluster sites” into affordable housing. The New York Times. falling apart. Retrieved from https://www.wnyc.org/story/ Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/nyre- report-says-only-city-and-state-can-save-public-housing- gion/homeless-shelter-cluster-nyc-de-blasio.html now/ Sugar, R. (2016, December 15). More than half of New Yorkers WNYC. (2018, February 15). NYCHA Residents and the state of are rent burdened: Study. Retrieved from https://ny.curbed. the City. Retrieved from https://www.wnyc.org/story/nycha- com/2016/12/15/13967302/new-yorkers-cost-burden-rental- residents-and-state-city/ market-apartment-list Zimmer, A. (2017, September 15). Mayor’s affordable housing Sullivan, J., & Power, K. (2013). Coming affordable housing challenges not helping people who need it most, study says. Retrieved for municipalities after the great recession. Journal of Affordable from https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20170915/ crown- Housing & Community Development Law, 21, 297-314. heights/affordable-housing-de-blasio-homeless-crisis/ Turner, M. A., Brown, K. D., Cunningham, M., & Sawyer, N. (2003). Rethinking local affordable housing strategies: Lessons from 70 years of policy and practice. Washington, DC: Brookings Author Biography Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy. Bakry Elmedni, PhD is an assistant professor in the Master of U.S. Census. (2011). New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey. Public Administration (MPA) Program, School of Business, Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2011/ Public Administration and Information Sciences, LIU Brooklyn. demo/nychvs/s1a-renter-occupied.html His research interest includes policy process, decision-making, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2018). Who organizational design, and the role of leadership and governance needs affordable housing? Retrieved from https://www.hud. in promoting social justice and organizational equity. gov/program_offices/comm_planning/ affordablehousing/

Journal

SAGE Open – SAGE

Published: Oct 31, 2018

Keywords: housing affordability; affordability spectrum; rezoning; mandatory inclusionary housing; low-income households

There are no references for this article.