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Abstract
Policies are made and pursue their goals through policy instruments. Furthermore, policy instruments have become a relevant topic in many policy fields due to their theoretical and empirical relevance. The study of this field dates back to Lowi and others who developed many typologies and theories in classic works by authors such as Hood, Salamon, Linder and Peters, Peters and van Nispen, Schneider and Ingram, Lascomes and Le Galès, among others. This is important work that is linked closely to current research on policy design but, despite much effort, many fundamental issues remain unknown or understudied with respect to the topic. It is time to take inventory of the knowns and unknowns about policy tools. The current article examines four clusters of basic issues in the field which require further research. Keywords public administration and public policy, political science, social sciences, government and representation, legal studies, comparative politics, public administration and nonprofit management, management, political behavior Despite much effort, however, many fundamental issues Introduction remain unknown or understudied and there are key elements Policy tools, or the techniques through which governments concerning individual policy tools and policy mixes which generate, evaluate, and implement policy options, have been require further investigation. the subject of research throughout the history of the policy It is time to take inventory of what is known and unknown sciences. The study of the field dates back to Lowi and others about policy tools. This article presents a survey of informed who developed many typologies and theories on the subject thinking about policymaking, policy processes, the manner in the period 1950–1980 as well as works such as Hood in which tool choices are made, and the ways that tool bun- (1983), Salamon (2002), Linder and Peters (1989), Peters dles evolve over time. Based on the most recent reviews of and van Nispen (1998), Schneider and Ingram (1990), and the literature (Acciai & Capano, 2018; Howlett, 2019a; Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007) in the era since then. Central Vargas & Restrepo, 2019) and the combined 50-year experi- to all these studies is the need for a clearer understanding not ence of the authors in dealing with the subject, it examines only of individual policy instruments but how these are four clusters of basic issues in the field which still require arrayed in a mix or bundle and how they relate to each other additional research. The current level of knowledge about when combined, what impact this combination has on the each of these issues is set out and serves as the basis for a effectiveness of policies when enacted, and how these pack- multipronged research agenda into the subject. ages or portfolios evolve and change over time (Gunningham et al., 1998; Rogge & Reichardt, 2016). This work is important for policy scholars interested in explaining policy dynamics as well for those adopting a pol- icy design perspective (Howlett, 2019a). In fact, it can now University of Bologna, Italy be argued convincingly that an instrument-based approach Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada can better enlighten the nature of policy dynamics, from a Corresponding Author: prescriptive point of view, and assist policymakers in taking Michael Howlett, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser more effective decisions than can a purely input-based University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada V5A 1S6. approach (Capano, Pritoni, & Vicentini, 2019). Email: howlett@sfu.ca Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). 2 SAGE Open subsidies and other means to affect policy change on the The Emergence and Consolidation ground (Hood, 1983; Salamon, 2002). of Policy Instrument Research Both these kinds of tools are commonly deployed in a There are many ways to study public policy which, given its mix, bundle, or portfolio which creates interactive effects processual nature, has always involved consideration of pol- among them (Boonekamp, 2006; Justen et al., 2013a, 2013b; icy dynamics and change. This has most commonly been Yi & Feiock, 2012). These can be complementary or supple- approached through an “input” lens, in which actors and mentary but can also feature counterproductive effects their interactions in the policy process have been at the core among policy instruments, as well as synergies (Lecuyer & of studies in the discipline (Araral et al., 2013; Capano, Bibas, 2012; Philibert, 2011) when two or more tools, taken 2020). The most commonly adopted theoretical frame- together, are more effective than when deployed alone. works—from the advocacy coalition framework to the punc- Tools in an instrument mix, for example, can be considered tuated equilibrium theory and from the multiple stream to be consistent or complementary when they work together to approach to the narrative policy framework (Weible & support a policy strategy (Kern & Howlett, 2009; Rogge & Sabatier, 2017)—all examine the dynamics of actors in Reichardt, 2016), but there is a wide consensus in the policy attempting to make sense of policymaking. design literature that not all tools are inherently complemen- However, there has been a parallel stream in policy stud- tary (Boonekamp, 2006; Del Río et al., 2011; Grabosky, 1995; ies that has been more focused on the examination of the Gunningham et al., 1998; Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999; outputs of policymaking, analyzing in detail the content of Howlett, 2017; Tinbergen, 1952) and that some generate coun- adopted decisions (Salamon, 1981). These are conceptual- terproductive responses in policy targets (Schneider & Ingram, ized as deploying policy instruments to attain policy goals, 1990, 2005). Counterproductive effects, for example, may be with scholars working backwards from outputs to inputs in manifest when command and control regulation is used along- assessing policymaking not as an open-ended struggle side voluntary compliance (Grabosky, 1995). between ideas or interests but rather as a process of choosing Complementary effects, however, occur, for example, or selecting specific kinds of tools expected to address policy when command and control regulation minimizing undesir- aims. This stream has its roots in the work of authors such as able modes of behavior are employed alongside financial Salamon, Doern, and Vedung (Eliadis et al., 2005; Howlett, incentives to promote more desirable ones (Hou & Brewer, 2014; Howlett et al., 2014; Phidd & Doern, 1983; Salamon, 2010). However, they can also be neutral or overlapping as in 1981; Vedung, 1998), although Theodore Lowi’s (1972, the case of renewable energy and building energy efficiency 1985) theoretical work can be considered the precursor to standards (Del Río, 2010; Rosenow et al., 2007). Furthermore, these efforts. some combinations of tools may be superior in reinforcing or This work has recently added an additional degree of supplementing an arrangement (Hou & Brewer, 2010). Such complexity as there is now a shared scholarly view that in arrangements may be unnecessarily duplicate in one context, every field sets of adopted policy instruments are adopted for example, when a problem is not very severe, but may be which have a mixed nature and feature different patterns and advantageous in another when the level of severity increases trajectories of change over time (Bressers & O’Toole, 2005; (Braathen, 2007; Braathen & Croci, 2005). A key principle Del Río, 2010; Grabosky, 1995; Gunningham & Sinclair, of current policy design thinking, therefore, is to maximize 1999; Howlett, 2005; Justen et al., 2013b; Leplay & Thoyer, complementary effects and minimize conflicting ones, while 2011). This makes the historical study of public policy mixes are developed (Daugbjerg, 2009). instruments based on examinations of single tool uses prob- But the level of existing knowledge with respect to how lematic and has led to a reconsideration of the policy instru- such policy mixes are designed is limited. While many stud- ment approach, linking it more closely to studies of ies try to conceptually grasp how policy instruments are cho- governance and policy and program design, for example sen or formulated by policymakers, there is very little (Howlett, 2011, 2019a). empirical research on the subject (Taylor et al., 2012, 2013) These instrument mixes, often somewhat mislabelled as nor any systematic empirically informed analysis about how “policy mixes,” “feature the use of combinations of different designs have developed over time. kinds of policy tools (market-based, hierarchical, network and others) whose exact configuration changes from location Studying Policy Tools: Knowns to location” (Rayner et al., 2017, p. 473). Such instrument and Unknowns mixes are complex, given the nature of the tools involved and how they relate to each other. They include both instru- Because of these recent moves toward the study of policy tools ments oriented toward policymaking and affecting activities in policy mixes and a new or renewed emphasis on their role in such as agenda-setting or formulation (Jordan & Turnpenny, policy design, the findings of an earlier era of instruments stud- 2015) as well as more “classical” implementation-oriented ies are less relevant and secure. This new focus on policy tools, from the use of government agencies to financial instrument mixes underlines the need to pay more attention to Capano and Howlett 3 the actual way in which policies achieve expected results as enhanced the notion that it is possible to design public policy well as the nature of the interactions of tools within mixes. And in a sophisticated way. the lacunas within the instrument literature today around these However, the pattern of research on policy instruments issues are pronounced. More research is needed to order the has developed in a very uncoordinated way and is uneven. complex world of mixes and above all to disentangle how dif- Despite the richness of the literature, there are still many ana- ferent factors drive the design of good or bad policy mixes. lytical “black holes,” theoretical lacunas, and an excess of descriptivism. If the policy instruments approach is to pro- ceed toward an effective process of the accumulation of sci- What is Known entific knowledge, these gaps must be addressed. In general, policy instruments have been the topic of contin- In particular, there is a need to deepen knowledge of many uous research and analysis and past policy instrument studies relevant dimensions of the policy instrument approach to have focused on the following issues and questions, with address unresolved questions around policy instrument mixes some progress having been made on most of them: such as why policymakers choose some instruments over oth- ers in the context of an existing or desired mix, whether and 1. What are the basic kinds of tools, making distinctions how specific policy instruments operating in a mix directly such as those mooted between “procedural” and impact policy performance, how the characteristics and the “substantive” tools or between “implementation” and effects of policy mixes can be studied, and how policy instru- “non-implementation”-oriented tools (Howlett, ments truly work when delivering their outcomes. 2000; Jordan & Turnpenny, 2015). Table 1 outlines a list of 14 issues based on the most 2. Why and how policymakers choose particular instru- recent reviews of the literature (Acciai & Capano, 2018; ments rather than others, and whether and how they Howlett, 2019a; Vargas & Restrepo, 2019) and on our own change previous choices (Capano & Lippi, 2017). long-lasting research activities around public policy and pol- This was the basis of extensive work conducted by icy instruments and divides them into four clusters. As these authors such as Salamon (1989, 2002), Hood (1983), four clusters show, while much is known about many policy Linder and Peters (1989, 1998), among others. tools, much remains to be understood. 3. Why and how governance modes change over time These clusters are defined by the following: (a) problems and how instrument choices change with them. This with understanding instrument and mix dynamics, (b) under- was noted by Le Galès (2011) and integrated into the examined behavioral issues around policy tools in general literature by Capano et al. (2015). and more specifically, (c) measurement and methodological 4. How policy actors aggregate around specific policy issues, and (d) a variety of issues related to how policy instruments to form “instrument constituencies” pro- implementation affects tool deployment and use and, subse- moting certain kinds of tools, often regardless of the quently, policy success or failure. nature of the problem to which they might be applied. This idea was developed by Voß and Simons (2014) Problems With Understanding and extended by the case studies conducted by Patterns of Instrument and Mix Béland and Howlett (2016). Deployment and Dynamics Over Time 5. What political and policy effects are achieved by adopting specific policy instruments and how instru- The first category of problems deals with missing empirical ment deployment alters the space of politics, creating studies that, consequently, create or reinforce theoretical new configurations of actors benefiting (or not) from shortcomings (in terms of under-theorization and even over- these efforts (Borras & Edquist, 2013; Bressers & theorization) about important aspects of policy mix design Klok, 1988; Campbell et al., 2004; Edler et al., 2016; and evolution. Despite the very large amount of work which Jordan & Matt, 2014; May et al., 2005). has been done recently on policy tools and mixes, several 6. And, taken together, whether and how policy instru- large gaps remain. ments can be considered as institutions and thus as bearers of social and political values, identities, and Temporality Issues (Sequencing, Trajectories, worldviews which in turn affect support and conflict and Critical Junctures) regarding their choice (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2004, 2007). There is clearly a temporal aspect which is a constitutive dimension of policy instrument research but which has been poorly served by existing research. We know that time makes What is Unknown and Remains to be Revealed a difference in how instrument choices and patterns evolve The knowledge about specific tools and their impacts gener- and that the temporal sequencing of policy elements is a cru- ated in this research has created the basis for an improved cial component of policy mix design and evolution (Justen understanding of the nature of policy instrument choice and et al., 2013a, 2013b; Taeihagh et al., 2013). Policy instruments 4 SAGE Open Table 1. Research Agenda Items in Policy Instruments Research by Cluster: Design Issues and Gaps in Knowledge. Problems with understanding patterns of instrument 1. Temporality issues around tool adoptions and mix sequencing, trajectories, and mix deployment and dynamics over time and critical junctures. 2. Sectorial and national variations and patterns/styles in tool use and mixes including links of tool choices to national traditions in administration and implementation. 3. Policy sector convergence and intersections and their impact on policy mix coherence. 4. Links of tools choices to ideational paradigms and paradigm changes Under-examined behavioral issues 5. Identifying types of targets and what motivates targets (“policy-taker” behavior and compliance issues) 6. Decision-makers (“policy makers”) behavior in designing, discovering, and deciding upon tools in mixes 7. Describing and measuring the mechanisms which tools activate to attain their effects and impacts Measurement and methodological issues 8. Defining and measuring the types of tools found in policy mixes 9. Measuring performance and effectiveness of tool deployment and mixes Implementation issues 10. Understanding the volatility of tools and mixes—predicting risks of failure and perverse outcomes 11. Understanding government capacity and its impact on tool choices and use 12. Multilevel governance dimensions of tool choice and program creation 13. Calibrations (substantial and procedural)—what they are and how they are selected 14. Better describing procedural tools, how they relate to mixes, and how they are implemented can become highly institutionalized and/or generate positive/ bricolage (Capano, 2018; Howlett & Rayner, 2013) which negative feedbacks over time which significantly affect the range in terms of coverage and deliberativeness. And layer- operation and reform of policy portfolios. The policy solu- ing can lead to policy instruments mixed in a consistent, tions—a set of adopted policy instruments—present at a given counterproductive, or a tense way (Capano, 2019). This is point in time may enshrine problems as well as specific tools the case, for example, when existing mixes are developed that actors must eventually confront in the next decision-mak- unsystematically through processes of policy layering ing moment. (Carter, 2012; Howlett & Rayner, 2007; Organisation for Thus, negative and positive feedback around policy Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 1996; instruments inform the policy debate, and policymakers can Thelen, 2004; Van der Heijden, 2011). And the same is true proceed to alter a policy mix in several ways; for example, of the need to better operationalize concepts such as pack- they can proceed by layering, conversion, or drift in addition aging and patching, as well tense layering, in terms of what to fully replacing a mix (Thelen, 2004). they mean for instrument-based content. However, if we know something about these general There are thus many empirical gaps in our knowledge modes and types of policy instrument design, we are missing of policy tools and mixes when the temporal dimension is reliable empirical knowledge about the micro-components of considered. Notwithstanding the problems raised above, these different kinds of processes. There is a need to consider also we know very little about whether and how the speed the effect of policy formulation processes on the character of the sequence can make a difference in terms of choosing and effectiveness of complex policy mixes (Feindt & Flynn, one instrument or another and in terms of change or persis- 2009; Kay, 2007; Larsen et al., 2006). tence of the adopted set of policy instruments. Furthermore, That is, none of the terms cited above—layering, drift, another under-investigated dimension of the temporal conversion, or replacement, is clearly enough defined or con- dimension is the composition of the sequence itself: what sistently employed by various authors working in the field are the events of the sequence? Can the sequence be con- and, in some studies, are used without an appropriate under- ceptualized only as a diachronic shift from the less to the standing of the underlying concepts or methods necessary to more mandatory tools as proposed by Bemelmans-Videc analyze and evaluate their impact upon a policy mix. et al. (1998). Or can the sequence develop in different Layering, for example, is thought to be the most com- ways (thus also through a dialectical process in which the monly adopted process but layering can be done in different event progression can be reversible)? What are the rela- ways. That is, policy instruments can be assembled through tionships between actors in the different events of the processes such as packaging, patching, stretching, and sequence itself? Capano and Howlett 5 the meso- and micro-level mechanism which links these Better Understanding Sectorial and National macro-level phenomenon to policy mixes and specific tool Variations and Patterns/Styles in Tool Use choices? Including Links to National Traditions in Here, the most intuitive hypothesis is that the institution- Administration and Implementation alization of policy/implementation styles as well as the char- acteristics of politico-administrative regimes should create What causes stability and change in mixes and tool choices permanent effects and path dependency in terms of instru- over time is another key temporal issue. Sectoral variation in ment adoption. However, we also know that new instruments instrument choices, for example, is one of the most obvious have also been adopted in countries, for example which usu- problems in policy instrument studies which current research ally eschew market-based regulation. How much of this is a has described but failed to address theoretically or analyti- consequence, for example, of the diffusion of New Public cally. We have a deep knowledge of the list of substantial and Management or other general administrative and governance procedural policy instruments put into place in different reform efforts or of different methods of implementation or fields, especially in fields such as the environment, climate formulation? change, innovation policy, as well as in social and education All in all, this means that “comparative policy instruments policy (Capano, 2019; Hannaway & Woodroffe, 2003; Jensen research” is quite undeveloped and consequently there is often et al., 2018). But while much is known about instruments in a mismatch between empiricism and conceptualization and different policy sectors, this knowledge is either very descrip- between the descriptive nature of instruments and the typolo- tive or so specialized on a specific policy field that the empiri- gies offered by the literature, as well an under-theorization of cal richness does not lead to theoretical generalizations about the causes of the variations between sectors and countries. All the impact of sectoral particularities on the development of of which undermines efforts at effective policy design. mixes and tool choices and their reform or change. That is, a key point which has not been systematically addressed to date has to do with the persistence of specific pat- Sectoral Convergence and Intersection and Its terns of instrument preferences and adoptions either by sector Impact on Policy Instrument Mix Coherence or jurisdictionally, or both. The insights of Freeman (1985) A related item refers to change processes that occur in mixes concerning development and persistence of sectoral policy or bundles of policy instruments when activities in otherwise styles and patterns of instrument deployment in particular distinct subsystems transcend old boundaries and affect the have been under-investigated. If different types of policy structure or behavior of other subsystems (Dery, 1999; Djelic instruments are adopted in different policy sectors according it & Quack, 2007; Kay, 2006; Lynggaard, 2001). Instances to the characteristics of the policy issues, then what is it about such as those, for example, occurred when Internet-based these issues that determine this pattern and how does this computing collided with existing telecommunications affect propensities for change? Can we expect to, for example, regimes and when long-established natural resource policy have more incentive-driven or cooperative-based instruments actors found it necessary to deal with Aboriginal land claims in environmental policy (Bouwma et al., 2015) than in educa- (Gehring & Oberthur, 2000; Grant & MacNamara, 1995; tion policy (Hannaway & Woodroffe, 2003)? In these, or other Hoberg & Morawaski, 1997; R. Marion, 1999; Rayner et al., directions, how likely are these systems to change over time? 2001; Rosendal, 2001). Similarly, we do not know much about why and how This particular process of policy mix change has received national mix variations develop from a comparative perspec- almost no treatment at all in the literature. But a large research tive. If different regimes express a preference for particular agenda exists here. Thus, for example, sectoral interactions types of mixes and tools—for example, a U.S. preference for can occur in specific issues without any permanent change in regulation or a Korean preference for “guided competition” the mixes of tools used in each sector (subsystem intersec- in the area of industrial policy and tool choices—then how tion) or they can be more long term in nature and involve are these variations in policy styles linked to factors such as some gain and/or loss of tools in a new multisectoral or national administrative traditions or to the characteristics of cross-sectoral mix (subsystem convergence) (Deeg, 2007; bureaucratic and other political institutions? May et al., 2007). What is the impact of such changes? That is, we know that policy styles exist and that national Which tools remain and which are removed? How does this traditions in administration and implementation are crucial vary between intersection and convergence? These are all determinants of instrument preferences. There is, in fact, a key questions requiring more research. stimulating empirical literature, built up on the seminal les- sons of Richardson (1982), showing that there are national policy styles of formulation (Howlett & Tosun, 2018) and of Links of Tools Choices to Ideational Paradigms implementation (Tosun & Treib, 2018) and that these differ- and Paradigm Changes ent ways of designing and implementing policies are related Policy paradigms, belief systems, and ideas matter when to the types of politico-administrative regimes found in dif- policy instruments are developed and also are at play in ferent jurisdictions (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). But what is 6 SAGE Open policy and policy mix change (Hogan & Howlett, 2015). viewpoint of, policymakers. But there is a large second area Their precise impact on policy tool choices and deployments, of concern which also exists: which is related to the behavior however, are little known. Paradigms provide general guid- of policy “takers.” ance to policymakers because their normative and cognitive Here, the idea commonly found in the policy literature is dimensions structure the goals they pursue. But, as Hall that the only real issue in policy tool choices is around the (1993) noted, they also affect considerations of the appropri- issue of compliance and that compliance is merely a matter ate tools and tool calibrations considered necessary for of “getting incentives (and disincentives)’ right” (Howlett, achieving those goals. The ideational turn in political science 2018). This not only ignores aspects involved in the social and public policy has generated new attention to how para- and political construction of targets highlighted by Schneider digms, beliefs, and ideas can drive the choice of policy and Ingram (1990) but also minimizes the complex behav- instruments but without providing much insight into these iors which go into compliance, most notably considerations specific processes and outcomes. of legitimacy, trust, and other social and individual behav- To date, studies have been quite ambiguous and not defini- ioral characteristics (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Howlett, tive. When policymaking is analyzed from a micro-perspective, 2019a; Thomas et al., 2016). different ideas, frames, and belief systems are usually seen as Not the least of the problem with this view is that it often competing and confronting each other with respect to instru- has a notion of policy-takers as static targets who do not try, ment choices. In addition, this variety of ideational drivers or at least do not try very hard, to evade policies or even to can be one of the causes of initiating change or institutional- profit from them (Braithwaite, 2003; Howlett, 2019a; J. izing a policy mix without it being clear what will occur and Marion & Muehlegger, 2007). Such activities on the part of why. For example, over time, new paradigms/ideas/frames policy takers, however, are key in determining the success of can and do emerge, but the older ones and the tool mixes eliminating various government initiatives ranging from associated with them may not be dissolved (Lieberman, tobacco control to bus fare evasion (Delbosc & Currie, 2016; 2002; Oliver & Pemberton, 2004). This can lead to obvious Kulick et al., 2016) and these behaviors should be “designed conflicts and confrontations affecting tool choices if differ- for.” That is, adverse or malicious, mendacious, and/or ent instruments pursuing different goals are in place. Thus, Machiavellian behavior on the part of policy-takers is a criti- very discordant policy mixes can be generated by the layer- cal subject but one often glossed over in studies of policy ing of different paradigms/frames over time or by an agree- compliance and “target behavior” (Howlett, 2018). ment between different actors holding different cognitive Just as much as willing compliance, determined noncom- and normative beliefs with respect to policy problems and pliance and gaming should be taken into account in design- the instruments chosen to deal with them. ing policies, along with many other such policy target All in all, we lack a solid understanding of the role of behaviors, such as free ridership, fraud, and misrepresenta- these ideational structures when policy instruments are at tion (Harring, 2016). As it stands, these are often thought of stake; this is disappointing if we recall the high hopes which as purely “implementation” issues and left up to administra- accompanied the “ideational turn” in public policy annalysis tors to deal with rather than forming an essential component (Schmidt, 2008, 2011). of policy formulation and instrument design considerations (Doig & Johnson, 2001; Kuhn & Siciliani, 2013). Under-Examined Behavioral Issues How Decision-Makers (“Policy Makers”) Design/ A second major cluster of issues is related to the behavior of Discover/Decide Upon Tools in Mixes policymakers and policy-takers. This has a temporal aspect as well but mainly concerns the different modes possible for Policy instrument choices are a part of policy formulation, designing policy and choosing instruments and the different and at a time when policymakers are often tasked with devel- types of designs which can emerge in terms of instrument oping innovative solutions to increasingly complex policy content. Within that general rubric, key questions remain problems, the need for intelligent choices of tools and a bet- about the behavior of policy makers and how that behaviour ter understanding of the policy formulation processes they intersects with that of policy takers or targets. Despite some involve has never been greater. work on this by Schneider and Ingram (1994) and those who In general, a means-ends understanding of policy formu- followed in their footsteps (Schneider & Sidney, 2009), this lation permeates the existing research on policy instrument remains a key set of issues which existing research has failed selection (Colebatch, 2018). This instrumental orientation is to address systematically. significant in that policy formulators operating in accordance with its strictures are expected to base their actions on analy- ses which are logical, knowledge, and evidence-based Identifying Types of Targets and What Motivates (Bhatta, 2002). Conceptually, an instrument design process Targets (Policy Takers’ Behavior and Compliance) is often said to begin with an assessment of the abilities of Most of the concerns raised above, when they have been different policy tools to affect policy outputs and outcomes examined, have been analyzed in the case of, and from the and considerations of the availability of the resources Capano and Howlett 7 required to allow a policy to operate as intended. As Linder partial success. Thus, we can now measure the “density” or and Peters (1991) noted, this involves a series of choices, number of policy instruments enacted in a policy mix and the which emphasize “not only the potential for generating new “intensity” or grade of significance/stringency assigned to mixtures of conventional solutions, but also the importance each instrument (T. Schmidt & Sewerin, 2018). of giving careful attention to tradeoffs among design criteria But research on these measures is uneven. The research when considering instrument choices” (p. 130). on policy density is fairly clear and involves counting the But policymaking does not always necessarily lend itself number of distinct tools involved in a mix. Intensity, how- to or result in purely instrumental thinking about policy ever, is less well-developed. Starting from the use of expert issues, including instrument choices. As discussed above, panels or media coverage, there has now been a convergence understanding how the use of specific kinds of instruments toward measuring policy intensity in terms of the level of affects target group behavior and compliance with govern- coercion involved in tools and their calibrations (Knill et al., ment aims (Weaver, 2015) is often lacking. Many constraints 2012). This focus on intensity has allowed measuring the on tool use originate both in the limits of existing knowledge development of policy dynamics in terms of balance among and which may promote other more `interest-driven’ policy different policy instruments as well as change in intensity (T. processes in prevailing government norms and governance Schmidt & Sewerin, 2018) and thus helps assess the amount structures (Torgerson, 1986). And a more “rational” process of resources, effort, and activities invested in the adopted also requires both analytical and evidentiary capacity on the instruments (Schaffrin et al., 2015). part of the government as well as the intention to exercise it But these advances beg questions about how many tools which may or may not be present in any given formulation there should be and how the components of a policy mix situation (Howlett, 2015). (goals, instruments, context) should be measured or related to each other, including the requisite grade of consistency, coherence, and congruency needed for policy success Describing and Delimiting the Mechanisms (Howlett & Rayner, 2017; Rogge et al., 2017). Which Tools Activate to Attain Their Effects and Empirical research has not yet sufficiently developed with Impacts regard to measuring these characteristics, and there is still a certain disagreement about the definition of these concepts These points highlight another lacuna, which concerns a lack especially regarding the semantical difference between terms of knowledge around the mechanisms which policy tools acti- such as consistency and coherence (Rogge & Reichardt, vate in order to have an impact on the ground (Capano et al., 2016). 2019; Capano & Howlett, 2019; Pawson, 2013). How pre- More conceptual and empirical research on the effects of cisely policy instruments/mixes encourage or structure policy the level of coherence, consistency, and congruency on the targets’ behavior and whether and how this can be harnessed output and the outcomes of policy tool deployment would be to achieve expected results is a major research gap. quite welcome. As discussed above, there is a need to under- A key analytical point is how the adopted solution can be stand whether and how the interaction between goals and a genuine driver of a pursued outcome, that is, capable of instruments, old instruments, and newly adopted instruments activating the proper mechanisms and thus the causal chain and different policy mixes operates in different policy sec- needed to accomplish a goal. tors and countries. Measurement and Methodological Measuring Performance and Effectiveness Issues of Tool Deployment and Mixes A third cluster of issues involves a set of methodological Governments design policies to reach specific goals, that is, concerns around measuring and operationalizing policy tools to change the quality of the performance of the addressed and tool interactions in mixes. Difficulties associated with policies. Thus, governments reform education policy because the effort to measure variation in mixes involves consider- they want more well-educated citizens and more citizens ation and assessment of what are the relevant dimensions of with degrees; they intervene in environmental policy because policy instruments and instrument mixes which allow them they want to pursue, for example, decreased pollution and to be distinguished and which are needed to further under- better water quality. standing of their evolution and change. While the link between policy instruments and their out- comes is indirect and limited (Koontz & Thomas, 2012) since policy performance is co-driven by many other factors, Defining and Measuring the Types of Tools it remains the case that the main method through which gov- Found in Policy Mixes ernments can steer their policy systems is by adopting spe- The recent literature on the subject has shown some significant cific sets of policy tools that address the behavior of specific efforts in measuring policy mixes which can be considered a targets. However, we do not know much about the linkage 8 SAGE Open between policy instruments and policy outcomes, although Understanding Government Capacity and Its some recent research has shown that some policy instru- Impact on Tool Choices and Use ments and some types of instrument mixes are associated The process of selecting policy instruments, as well that of with better performance than others (Capano et al., 2019). assessing the effects of the adopted choices, depends on the resources and capacities at the disposal of governments. Implementation Issues around Regarding resources, Christopher Hood (1983) has shown us Policy Tools that policy instruments use four main ones in designing and delivering policy: nodality, authority, funding, and organiza- A fourth set of issues is related largely to the administrative tion (NATO). At the same time, we know that these resources details and considerations which go into this same process of are not sufficient reason to choose specific kinds of instru- putting policy tools into practice or administering policy ments, because it is necessary to have specific policy capaci- mixes. These are quite wide-ranging in themselves but cover ties—analytical, organizational, and systemic competences many essential questions whose answers should drive design and individual, operational, and political capabilities (Wu and choice considerations. Many of these points are placed at et al., 2017)—to decide best which of the four resources at the critical interface between policy design and implementa- governments’ disposal can be used to design new policies or tion which has been a subject of much interest in instrument support new instrument-based interventions. studies since their inception. However, there are at least three significant empirical gaps when discussing resources and capacities that require more research. First, we do not know whether governments Understanding and Avoiding the Volatility of are sufficiently aware of their weaknesses and strengths in Tools and Mixes—Predicting Risks of Failure policy capacities. Second, there is insufficient empirical evi- and Perverse Outcomes dence on whether and how the characteristics of the actual stock of resources and capacities at governments’ disposal As noted above, most instrument studies to date have influence the choice of policy instruments and eventually focussed almost exclusively on the “good” side of policy for- their implementation. And third, most research to date has mulation, that is, dealing with concerns around ensuring that focussed on state resources and capacities and has paid less knowledge is marshaled toward developing the best feasible attention to civil society capabilities and competences, such policy in any given context. This approach operates under as those of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), think the assumption of well-intentioned governments and accom- tanks, pressure groups, lobbyists, and others active in the modating policy targets. Such work has looked at issues policy process, which are also important to the operation and around how policies evolve over time and focused upon success and failure of specific policy mixes especially those understanding how such policies can be made more robust involving high levels of collaboration or co-production. and resilient but without carefully examining or allowing for the possibility that government intentions may not be solely oriented toward the creation of public value, or that policy Multilevel Governance Dimensions of Tool targets and policy-makers may indulge in various forms of Choice and Program Creation “misconduct” from fraud to gamesmanship, undermining government intentions of whatever kind. Related to these capacity issues, policymaking very often has While self-interested, corrupt, or clientelistic policymak- a multilevel governance (MLG) arrangement as many policy ing has been the subject of many studies in administrative areas are codetermined or cogoverned by local, state, and regulatory law and development administration, even the national, or international orders of government. But different best of policy intentions can be perverted in implementation, levels of government are likely to have some common but and the need to design policies to be resilient against con- also different goals and instrument preferences and reconcil- scious and determined efforts on the part of policy makers ing them involves the use of the overt political calculus of and targets to undermine them is pressing. intragovernmental or intergovernmental bargaining and These aspects of policymaking and policy design consti- decision-making which may or may not lead to efficient or tute the degree of “volatility,” found in a policy area, that is, effective instrument choices and policy designs (Bolleyer & the likelihood or propensity of certain instruments and cer- Borzel, 2010; Kaiser et al., 2012). tain design situations to lead to unstable policy mixes. This is We know that the design of MLG arrangements is cru- due to the deployment of instruments and tools which by cial, but how the arrangement of MLG impacts tool choice their nature inherently involve a high risk of failure. This can and system selection remains to be understood. For exam- be contrasted with more stable tools and more benign mixes ple, in the EU MLG, there are some policy fields in which in which designs are likely to approximate the image often higher levels cannot establish the instruments to be used but set out in the literature. The exact causes and contours of can only propose policy guidelines and goals. In other cases, such volatility, however, are not well understood. MLG can be highly vertical wherein higher levels can Capano and Howlett 9 impose the instruments to be adopted by lower orders of Procedurally oriented implementation tools have received government; however, their effectiveness still depends on much less attention than substantive ones, even though sev- the implementation styles of the lower levels. Neither of eral procedural techniques, such as the use of specialized these kinds of processes are well understood, including their investigatory commissions and government reorganizations, impact on the capacity needs of different levels of partici- are quite old and well-used and have been the objects of pating governments. study in fields such as public administration, public man- agement, and organizational behavior (Schneider & Sidney, 2009). More and better work on this subject is essential if Calibrations (Substantial or Procedural Ones)— instrument studies are to progress. What They are and How They are Selected Calibrations are those contextual actions and decisions Conclusion: A Call for Increased and through which policymakers adjust the actual setting of pol- Improved Analysis of Policy Tools and icy instruments with respect to the target of interest. We Policy Mixes know these kinds of calibrations are the order of the day in policymaking, especially in the implementation stage when Policy instruments are a highly promising topic of research policies need to be delivered in an effective way (Hall, 1993; in public policy, not only for those interested in policymak- Ostrom, 2003). ing and policy processes as a whole but also for those inter- These calibrations involve key actions in policy deliv- ested in policy design (Howlett, 2019b). ery such as increasing the number of policemen if there is Although much is known about individual types of tools a risk of a riot, increasing the number of beds in hospitals and how they are combined in mixes, there remains a great if there is an unexpected disease in the population, or alter- deal of room for substantial improvement in our knowledge. ing some rules of subsidy distributions against poverty There are still many lacunas and gaps that need to be filled, when earlier ones fail. Calibrations thus represent a huge and in this article, we have focussed on those issues which set of instrument-based decisions that are put into place are crucial in moving policy instrument research forward. when policymakers consider precisely how a policy will be As we have shown, there is much we already know, but implemented. much that remains to be studied, some of which needs more There is a wealth of empirical evidence about various empirical research while other topics require more theoreti- kinds of calibrations, some of which involve routine adjust- cal clarity and scholarly agreement. ments of ongoing policies, pressures, practices, but little of it Policy instruments research has much to offer for improv- helps us understand what kinds of regularities or patterns ing our understanding on how policies develop and could be exist when policymakers calibrate policies. better designed. Once the work set out above has been done, this approach to studying and understanding public policy- making will have been placed on much firmer ground and Procedural Tools and How They Relate to Mixes will help generate many useful insights for both scholars and practitioners in the field. Policies have a both substantive element that comprises of the technical arrangements of alternatives that can poten- Declaration of Conflicting Interests tially resolve the policy problem at hand and a procedural The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect component that entails all the processes and activities neces- to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. sary to coordinate the activities of policy actors in charge of formulating, making decisions, and administering the alter- Funding natives (Howlett, 2011). Procedural implementation tools are an important part of The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author- government activities aimed at altering policy interaction ship, and/or publication of this article. within policy sub-systems (Klijn et al., 1995). That is, policy actors are arrayed in various kinds of policy communities, ORCID iD and just as substantive tools can alter or affect the actions and Michael Howlett https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4689-740X behavior of citizens toward government goals, so too can instruments affect and alter other aspects of policymaking Note behavior, including goal-setting itself (Knoke, 1987, 1993, 1. There are some theoretical and empirical studies that focus 2004). As an essential component of modern governance, the on the dimensions of policy design, whereby the political range of procedural policy instruments comprises at least half capacity/will of governments and their technical capacities are the toolbox from which governments select specific tools taken into consideration (Capano, 2018; Howlett et al., 2015; expected to resolve policy problems (Howlett, 2000, 2019b). Howlett & Mukherjee, 2018). These studies, however, should These two kinds of policy instruments, however, have be considered only the beginning of a potentially relevant not received equal treatment from students of the subject. research stream. 10 SAGE Open References Capano, G. (2019). Reconceptualizing layering. From mode of institutional change to mode of institutional design: Types and Acciai, C., & Capano, G. (2018, June 26–28) Climbing down outputs. Public Administration, 97, 590–604. the ladder: A meta-analysis of policy instruments applica- Capano, G. (2020). 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Journal
SAGE Open – SAGE
Published: Jan 24, 2020
Keywords: public administration and public policy; political science; social sciences; government and representation; legal studies; comparative politics; public administration and nonprofit management; management; political behavior