Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Public Diplomacy Effort Across Facebook: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Consulate in Erbil and the Kurdistan Representation in Washington:

Public Diplomacy Effort Across Facebook: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Consulate in Erbil... Widespread communication tools such as Facebook and Twitter have become vital channels of public diplomacy. Today, policymakers must implement a successful Facebook diplomacy to enhance their nation’s branding, lobbying, and culture exchange and to expand and build good relationships. This article evaluates how Facebook has been used as a tool of public diplomacy by both the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Representation in Washington by performing a quantitative content analysis of their posts and the responses of their users. The results of the content analysis suggest that the United States more successfully utilizes Facebook as a public diplomacy tool to communicate than does the KRG. This article presents a theoretical argument that assumes that public diplomacy can be practiced by nonstate actors and states. The Kurds are considered and targeted by the U.S. public diplomacy program across Facebook, and this helps the Kurds develop their relationship with the United States as a supporter of potential Kurdish statehood. This research also strongly recommends that the KRG improves its Facebook webpage and highlights the values of internationally promoting the KRG as a brand. Keywords public diplomacy, Facebook, comparative analysis, U.S., Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) governmental institutions to engage, persuade, and influence Introduction foreign publics, and such behaviors support foreign policy Over the last century, countries have used traditional media (Sharp & Wiseman, 2012). The United States has a long his- broadcasting, such as cinema, radio, and television, to pro- tory of using public diplomacy and media, which have played mote their nations and to inform foreign publics of their a vital role in shaping American public diplomacy. For national politics (Gilboa, 2001). This communication model example, Voice of America (VOA) first started radio broad- is essentially a one-way communication model and works casting in 1942 in 45 languages and to over 100 million lis- under the press agentry model of propaganda (Iyer, 2002; teners worldwide (Cox & Stokes, 2012). Public diplomacy Nicholas, O’Malley, & Williams, 2013). Social media has has been practiced from before the time it emerged as a dis- allowed for the transition from one-way communication to tinct concept, and it has become the hub of diplomatic func- two-way communication, enabling nations to attract and tions. In Obama’s administration, public diplomacy was engage the foreign public more effectively (Hartig, 2015). linked with diplomacy and, organizationally, became an Bjola and Holmes (2015) argue that “the application of social activity within the Department of State (Gregory, 2011; media to the field of diplomacy has failed as a transformative Sharp & Wiseman, 2012; Wiseman, 2015). However, this development of international politics” (p. 71). Social media designation does not mean that public diplomacy is limited enable diplomats to directly communicate and interact with to states. In this respect, Sharp and Wiseman (2012) argue foreign publics and institutions and conversely. Public diplo- that public diplomacy “today has become an instrument used macy refers to the planned efforts of the nation’s actors, such as governmental institutions, nongovernmental organiza- tions, officials, public figures, and ordinary people, to foster The University of Human Development, Kurdistan Regional, Iraq favorable opinions and a positive image among the general Corresponding Author: public (d’Hooghe, 2014; Harris, 2013). Ahmed Omar Bali, Head of Diplomacy and Public Relations Department, Over the 20th century, public diplomacy was mostly used The University of Human Development, Kurdistan Regional, Iraq. as a state-based tool by foreign ministries and other Email: ahmed.abdullah@uhd.edu.iq Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). 2 SAGE Open by associations of states, sub-state and non-state actors to examines the U.S. Consulate and the Kurdish Representation understand cultures, attitude, and behavior; to build and in Washington is to compare and to identify the criteria for manage relationships; and to influence thoughts which even- analyses. This study assumes that the U.S. Consulate is suc- tually advance their interests and values” (p. 119). This pro- cessful in implementing public diplomacy via Facebook vides an effective platform for political entities that are not because the United States has considerable experience with states, such as the Kurdistan Region, to play diplomatic roles public diplomacy, which is in contrast to the KRG’s experi- because this mechanism allows the traditional approach to ence. The United States’s approach can be used as a standard diplomacies such that the diplomats in consulates and embas- guideline to evaluate the contents of two Facebook pages. sies can act as diplomats. The development of communica- Consequently, the evaluation of the United States per se tion technology has created an international space where the allows us to understand the position of the Kurdistan region public and politicians in different countries are globally in promoting the priorities and perspectives that also concern linked more than ever. Thus, diplomats, politicians, activists, the United States. Based on the research objectives, several and even ordinary people can play the role of diplomats models of the impact of Facebook and other social media on regardless of where they are located. In this regard, Facebook public diplomacy will be considered. and other social media sites have become effective tools uti- lized by public diplomacy practitioners. From this perspec- Networking Diplomacy Across tive, the current research seeks to evaluate how successfully the U.S. Consulate in Erbil and the Kurdistan Regional Facebook Government (KRG) Representation office, which is viewed The development of communication technology has removed by the Kurdish people as a consulate or embassy of Kurdistan traditional borders between countries and created an interna- in Washington, use Facebook as a public diplomacy tool. tional space. Such technology also provides a platform to facilitate collaboration between states and nonstate actors, Conceptual Framework creating a growing global culture and increasing the interest of the foreign public. Specifically, the Internet in general and Despite scholars’ interest in and the academic study of the social media in particular has enabled officials and diplomats role and influence of media technology in the field of public to communicate and exchange their ideas with foreign pub- diplomacy, there is a lack of empirical research on this topic lics, states, and nonstate organizations. This communication (Fisher, 2010). Gregory (2011) identifies another major approach has been described as “network diplomacy” by problem in conducting research in this field: the “lack of Marie Slaughter (Bjola & Holmes, 2015). In this regard, agreement amongst public diplomacy practitioners and Goof (2013) argues that “network diplomacy” is a transfor- scholars on analytical boundaries” (p. 335). Thus, most mative stage in club diplomacy, which is a significant shift in research in the public diplomacy context has focused on modern diplomacy. With this new phenomenon, diplomats Western countries, China, and Japan, which vary in their can better fulfill their functions of (a) representing their political systems, economies, and cultural structures. As a countries in host countries, (b) negotiating issues on behalf consequence, where countries can use public diplomacy of their home countries, (c) reporting, and (d) protecting the based on their strategies and resources is a contested issue interests of their home countries, including citizens’ interests among public diplomacy theorists and practitioners. Several in host countries (Aneek, 2010). The term “club diplomacy” factors control public diplomacies, such as tools, methods, is used to express “traditional diplomacy” (Cooper, Heine, & organizational structure and the culture, identity, and experi- Thakur, 2013). On this subject, Thakur (2007) differentiates ence of public diplomacy practitioners, which fundamentally between network diplomacy and club diplomacy in terms of affect the successful of public diplomacy maneuvers. Despite diplomacy players and forms of communication: the dispute among scholars and practitioners on the use of public diplomacy, both groups allege that public diplomacy Network diplomacy has more players than club diplomacy, is can be used by small, medium, and large states as well as by flat rather than hierarchical, engages in multiple forms of substate and nonstate actors regardless of their political, cul- communication beyond merely the written, is more transparent tural, or structural backgrounds (Gregory, 2011). than confidential, and its “consummation” takes the form of To overcome the limitations of the theoretical framework, increased bilateral flows—of tourists, students, labor, credits, it is important to identify the research aims. Using a com- investments, technology, and goods and services—instead of formal signing ceremonies. (pp. 49-50) parative analysis method, this study examines how the U.S. Consulate in Erbil and the KRG Representation in In line with this statement, network diplomacy allows Washington use Facebook as a public diplomacy tool. These governments and diplomats to create new communities and two actors have different sources, types of power, tactics, build relationships with the foreign public and foreign insti- and mechanisms of using public diplomacy. Nevertheless, tutions, both governmental and nongovernmental, particu- they can both use public diplomacy to set their agendas, as larly across social media (Buckle, 2012; Dale, 2009; Park & their priorities differ as well. Another reason that this study Bali et al. 3 Lim, 2014). Thus, this connection will build and enlarge the “Nation Branding” is a new term in public diplomacy, relationships between a country’s public, the foreign public, and public diplomacy relies on the nation branding strat- and foreign governmental and nongovernmental organiza- egy (Fitzpatrick, 2009; Szondi, 2008). In this respect, van tions beyond physical barriers such as international borders Ham (2008) argues that both concepts use the same tools to (Park & Lim, 2014). From this perspective, of all social achieve the same goals. Nation branding, however, is more media websites, Facebook is the most popular network complex and wider and implements more effort, sources, among the Kurds and the Americans. and strategies. From the system theory perspective, public In addition to all the above benefits of network diplo- diplomacy is an interdisciplinary conception that functions macy, Facebook can provide significant opportunities for as a communication mechanism within a state to achieve Kurdish politicians to create a solid symbiotic relationship long-term diplomacy. In other words, public diplomacy with the foreign public, politicians, and international organi- relates to several branches of knowledge and fields within zations to gain their support and to raise Kurdistan’s national a foreign policy and international communication (Gregory, profile internationally, eventually leading to Kurdistan’s 2011). Joseph Nye, an American political scholar, claims independence. that public diplomacy is a tool of “soft power” and is the best approach to achieving foreign policy goals, while hard power does not function as effectively (Renken, 2014). Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy Since September 11, the United States has been taking “Nation branding,” as a term, was first used in 1996, and it public diplomacy seriously (Hayden, 2012). The United is attributed to Simon Anholt, a British scholar and consul- States’s image became more negative and iniquitous from tant (Kaneva, 2011). Anholt determines nation branding the Arab and Muslim world’s perspective, particularly according to people’s perceptions of a country across the after the United States’s occupation of Iraq in 2003. following six areas of competence: “tourism, exports, gov- Nevertheless, the Kurds are one of the actors who wel- ernance, investment and immigration, culture and heritage, comed the American military operation to remove and people” (Renken, 2014, p. 7). Additional terms that rep- Saddam’s regime because the Kurds suffered grievously resent nation brandings include “national images, national under his regime and were subjected to ethnic cleansing, stereotypes, national identity, and national brand identity; chemical attacks, bombardments, and the demolition of and today these tend to be replaced by the term national their dwellings. branding” (Surowiec, 2016, p. 20). Surowiec also refers to The United States began to restore its image, particu- applying branding and marketing communication tech- larly in the Middle East, through a campaign called “the niques and to branding a nation to represent and promote the shared value.” The campaign utilized media power to nation as a brand. According to this concept, any country is change people’s perceptions. For example, the campaign viewed as a specific brand in people’s minds. Then, the established Sawa Radio in 2002 and the Al-Hurra TV chan- question of the benefits of branding a nation arises. Nation nel in 2005, both of which focused heavily on Iraq. branding competition has grown increasingly because a pos- Moreover, the U.S. embassy funded Nawa Radio, which itive national brand identity promotes tourism, immigration, was the first private, political radio station established in international investment, exports, and currency stability. Iraqi Kurdistan that focused on Kurdistan and broadcasted These developments also restore international credibility in the Kurdish language. The United States targeted the and investor confidence. Nation branding can also boost Kurds through a specific strategy, and the Kurds claim that international political influence; secure international part- they are friends with only America and Israel. This stated nerships; and advance nation building, particularly in the friendship is because of America’s intervention against the globalized economy, through “nourishing confidence, pride, Saddam regime in favor of the Kurds’ interests in 1991 and harmony, ambition, (and) national resolve” (Dinnie, 2015, because, recently, the United States immediately con- pp. 17-18). ducted airstrikes as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) As aforementioned, countries compete to raise their was about to take over Erbil, the capital city of the positions to a higher positive level and higher valuable Kurdistan region. brand ranking; to attract several aspects, such as people’s Under the Obama administration, public diplomacy sentiments, tourism, exports, and investments; and to efforts have improved (Nakamura, 2010). This administra- strengthen their profiles and positions in the international tion emphasized “the shared value,” which is “rooted in the space. A country’s power, political system, and economic U.S. ideal values: Freedom, Equality, Democracy and needs are crucial to its ability to take advantage of these Human Rights” (Gregory, 2011, p. 362). In this regard, social aspects. How can a small country win in this tough interna- media played a significant role in the Obama administra- tional competition? Širvinskytė (2016) argues that smaller, tion’s public diplomacy efforts and nation branding of the less developed, or emerging nations can play a major role in United States (Gregory, 2011; Harris, 2013), and Facebook is nation branding because the Internet has provided a signifi- a central, forceful tool implemented by the U.S. Consulate in cant opportunity to promote any brand. Erbil. 4 SAGE Open help to people displaced across Iraq and accommodating Social Media’s Contribution to Public Syrian refugees; and (e) promoting religious equality. These Diplomacy concepts represent the Kurds’ respect for human values and As a tool of public diplomacy, social media have significant desire to avoid building a nation based on religious and racial effects in this context. In this respect, Bjola, Jiang, and identity, as this basis for nation building has been creating Holmes (2015) suggest a model to describe and evaluate conflicts in Iraq for several decades. social media’s impacts on public diplomacy, and this model consists of a three-dimensional framework: “agenda-setting, Presence Expansion presence expansion, engagement and conversion generating” (pp. 7-9). The current research considers and utilizes this In both traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy, diplo- framework because these three dimensions largely describe mats always need to make their voice heard (Reynolds, 2002; the role of social media in a new public diplomacy context. Goof, 2013). In traditional diplomacy, diplomats’ participa- tion in cultural, educational, political, and trade events are the central means through which they can disseminate their Agenda-Setting comments and views. In this regard, Facebook greatly ampli- The first dimension of social media’s contribution is agenda- fies diplomats’ voices and gives them greater influence. setting theory, which is a significant theory for determining Thus, Facebook and other social media sites expand diplo- media’s influence, including social media’s influence, on matic efforts among the foreign public, officials, and activi- people’s perceptions. This theory focuses on the role of ties of nongovernmental organizations, which broadens media ownership and those who drive the media’s strategies relationships and partnerships to serve national interests and to choose and cover certain issues for the sake of predicted intentions. Accordingly, this approach can help Kurdish impacts on the target audience (Scheufele & Tewksbury, diplomacy achieve global support for many issues given that 2007; Weaver, 2007). From this standpoint, the task of public the Kurds complain about not receiving sufficient interna- diplomacy is to disseminate information about what should tional attention regarding some issue such as the acknowl- be cultivated among the foreign public. In public diplomacy, edgment of the Kurds’ right to have their own nation state the information provided via social media should meet the and the acknowledgment of the Anfal genocide operated by mutual interests of the diplomats, the foreign public, and the Saddam’s regime in 1998. If “presence expansion” is suc- institutions such that discussions are held via two-way com- cessful, the third Facebook dimensional impact of “generat- munication. In connection with this point, Facebook and ing conversational engagement” will be achieved. other social media function as a vital tool that allows diplo- mats to set agendas to foster a positive image of their coun- Engagement and Conversation Generating tries (nation branding) in the mind of the target audience. The following essential questions must be answered: What Facebook allows diplomats to engage in two-way and multi- are the themes and values does the United States focus on? directional communication to create dialogues with the for- What efforts should be made by the Kurdistan public diplo- eign public, which includes different stakeholders. This macy in the United States? Public diplomacy is only an interactive communication across Facebook greatly increases approach in the practice of foreign policy; thus, the use of the possibility of engaging a large target audience in a public public diplomacy is based on the countries’ objectives. This diplomacy program. In addition, it offers sustained conversa- requires applying political, economic, and communicative tions between diplomats and the foreign public; these advan- strategy sources in public diplomatic operations while tages provide a mutual understanding and support diplomats’ emphasizing core common values and interests within the ability to change their messages, if required, in light of the host country or within international society. audience’s response or to continue effective messages and Corresponding to U.S. public diplomacy, this research approaches. Together, these actions will affect foreign public aims to evaluate Kurdistan public diplomacy and to offer opinion and foster favorable opinions of a state’s image and some suggestions for Kurdistan public diplomacy. According national brand. to Kurdish political discourse, the proclamation of the inde- pendence of the Kurdistan region, as a national right, was the Research Questions main goal throughout World War I (WWI) and Iraq’s regimes. Based on the theoretical framework and research objectives, The agenda of Kurdistan’s public diplomacy focuses on the the following research questions are presented: following valuable actions: (a) exporting oil and natural gas to secure the world’s energy; (b) highlighting democratic Research Question 1 (RQ1): How do the U.S. Consulate practices, which seems unique among the countries in the in Erbil and the KRG Representation in Washington Middle East; (c) fighting terrorist groups through the Kurdish employ their Facebook accounts to expand their presence Peshmerga, who are appreciated internationally, especially and to build their relationships? for fighting ISIS successfully; (d) providing humanitarian Bali et al. 5 Table 1. Posts and Follows on the Facebook Accounts of the posts were identified according to terms related to the United States and the KRG. United States’s identity, freedom, equality, democracy, and human rights, and according to some actions planned Facebook account by the KRG, as follows: (a) exporting oil and natural gas Facebook account of of the KRG to secure the world’s energy; (b) highlighting democracy the U.S. Consulate Representation in General in Erbil the United States Total which seems unique among countries in the Middle East (c) successfully fighting terrorist groups such as ISIS F % F % % through the Kurdish Peshmerga, whose efforts are appre- Blogs 121 89.6 14 10.4 100 ciated internationally; (d) providing humanitarian aid to Follows 270,740 93.2 19,824 6.8 100 people displaced across Iraq and accommodating Syrian refugees; and (e) promoting religious equality. Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. Results Research Question 2 (RQ2): To what extent do the Examining the research questions, the current research found Facebook posts published by the U.S. Consulate in Erbil significant results, which are discussed in the following four and the KRG Representation in Washington generate dis- sections. cussion and engage people? Research Question 3 (RQ3): What are the agendas of the The United States and the KRG Public posts published on the Facebook accounts of the U.S. Consulate in Erbil and the KRG Representation in Diplomacy’s Use of Facebook to Present and Washington? In addition, to what extent do the contents of Build Relationships the posts reflect the agendas and identity of their foreign This section traces the first research question and examines policy? the use of Facebook to present and build relationships within Research Question 4 (RQ4): What are the values of the the public diplomacy efforts of the U.S. Consulate in Erbil posts published on the Facebook accounts of the U.S. and the KRG Representation office in Washington. Table 1 Consulate in Erbil and the KRG Representation in indicates that the U.S. Facebook published more posts (121 Washington? posts = 89.6%) than the KRG Facebook (14 blogs = 10.4%). This is a large difference in disseminating posts, which indi- cates that the KRG Representation office does not rely on Method Facebook to present its values and to set the KRG’s agendas in the United States. The above argument is based on the A quantitative content analysis was performed to explore the finding that the Facebook of the KRG Representation pub- research questions. Posts published on the Facebook accounts lished only 14 posts during 2 months, which is equivalent to of both the American Consulate in Erbil and the KRG less than one post per 4 days. Table 1 provides evidence that Representation in Washington over a 2-month period were the U.S. Consulate is more successful in building relation- selected as the sample. The data collection period was ships via Facebook. As the results show, through the data November and December 2016, which allows us to examine collection date, the number of U.S. Consulate followers, the agendas and the values of the blogs. A total of 135 posts reached 270,740, which represents 93.2% of the followers. were selected for the sample. Of these posts, 121 were on the By contrast, the Facebook of the KRG Representation had Facebook of the U.S. Consulate and 14 were on the Facebook only 19,824 followers, which represents 6.8% of the follow- of the KRG Representation office. The analysis categories ers. The data illustrate that the U.S. Consulate was more and coding procedure were identified based on the agendas effective in targeting the Kurdish people than was the and values of the posts; the number of likes, comments, and Kurdish office, particularly in terms of building relationships shares; and the language of the posts—English, Kurdish, or and creating allies within the public of the host country. For English and Kurdish. example, the number U.S. consulate Facebook followers The agendas of the posts were classified into nine cat- equaled 6% of the Kurdish population, whereas the number egories, which essentially represent the agendas of public of the followers of the Kurdish representation in the United diplomacy on Facebook: (a) informing the country’s own States was not comparable to the U.S population. Table 2 people in the host country, (b) informing the local people, indicates that the U.S. Consulate Facebook used both English (c) informing the local public about the different activities and Kurdish languages in the posts—Kurdish and English of the mission, (d) spreading the country’s culture, 77.9%, Kurdish 16.9%, and English 5.2%. These outcomes (e) informing the local public about the country’s policy, indicate that the United States considers respecting its lan- (f) commemorating international days, (g) creating dia- guage, which is a part of promoting American culture, and logue with the local public, (h) covering help programs using Kurdish language to target the Kurdish people, whereas provided, and (i) promoting investment. The values of the 6 SAGE Open Table 2. Language Used to Write the Posts of the United States platform and an effective network communication approach and the KRG. to help the diplomacy mission meet its goals in the public diplomacy area. Table 4 indicates that the majority of the Facebook account posts published by the Kurdish representation were not pre- Facebook account of of the KRG pared successfully; they were mostly texts without photos or the U.S. Consulate Representation General in Erbil in the United States photos without text—seven texts, three photos, and four text- photos. The U.S. Facebook, in comparison, published most of Language used F % F % their posts with both texts and photos—one text, two photos, and 118 text-photos. In relation to public diplomacy’s princi- Kurdish 20 16.9 — — ples, postings should be at a high technical level to engage English 6 5.2 14 100 and fascinate the foreign public. Such postings are filled with Kurdish and English 92 77.9 — — diplomatic missions representing political angles, cultural 118 14 100 events, and activities. In this respect, the U.S. Facebook Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. attracted their foreign users through the use of different lan- guages and effective text and photo posts. the Kurdish Representation office used only English in the The Agendas of the Posts Published on Facebook posts. Of course, arguably, it is not easy to advocate that the by the United States and KRG American people should learn the Kurdish language. Nevertheless, the Kurdish people in the United States should This section examines the third research question and evaluates also be targeted in their own language on the Facebook of the agenda-setting of posts disseminated by the two organiza- their representation office. tions. Table 5 indicates that the United States devoted 38 posts (32.2%) to informing the local public in the host country, whereas the KRG devoted only one blog (7.1%) to this pur- The United States and the KRG Public pose. This result shows that the United States targeted the Diplomacy’s Use of Facebook to Generate Kurdish people in its agenda-setting and that the U.S. Facebook Discussion and Involvement is much more active than the KRG Facebook. The KRG Table 3 answers the second research question, which ana- Facebook devoted four posts to informing the foreign public lyzed the role of the Facebook accounts of the representations about its own policy, while the U.S. Facebook devoted 14 posts of the United States and the KRG to generate discussion and to the same purpose. Informing Americans of the development engage people in the host country. The results indicate that the of democracy in Kurdistan and strengthening their coalition to U.S. consulate’s Facebook account received more comments fight terrorism is very important to the KRG. Although addi- and feedbacks—51,838 likes, 2,789 comments, and 712 tional events and news were published in the Kurdish local shares—than the Facebook account of the KRG Representation media, the KRG Facebook did not republish them. in Washington—61 likes, 100 comments, and two shares. The second area, aid programs provided for Kurdish peo- This result implies a large gap between the endeavors of the ple and the KRG, was covered by 24 posts of the U.S. two organizations, and the data express the United States’s Consulate Facebook, that is, 20.3% of the posts. By contrast, greater enterprise and success in using Facebook, compared the KRG Facebook devoted only three posts to that domain with those of the KRG, to engage the Kurdish people. The (21.4%). In addition, the U.S. Facebook created more posts score of the KRG Facebook shows that the Kurdish represen- about all areas except for “promoting investments.” These tation does not believe in employing Facebook as a unique data are illustrated in Table 5. Table 3. Likes, Comments, and Shares Across Facebook Accounts of the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil and the KRG Representation in Washington. Facebook account of the U.S. Facebook account of the KRG Consulate General in Erbil Representation in the United States F % F % Total % Likes 51,838 99.8 61 0.2 100 Comments 2,789 96.5 100 3.5 100 Shares 721 99.7 2 0.3 100 Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. Bali et al. 7 Table 4. Type of Posts—Text, Photo, and Text and Photo— Essentially, the U.S. Facebook produced 120 posts; simul- Across Facebook Accounts of the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil taneously, the KRG Facebook produced only 14 posts. These and the KRG Representation in Washington. results illustrate that the KRG Facebook did not publish any posts about crucial areas such as spreading the country’s cul- Facebook account ture, commemorating international days, creating dialogue Facebook account of of the KRG the U.S. Consulate Representation in the with the local public, and informing the local public about General in Erbil United States the different activities of the mission. Type of blogs F % F % Values of the Posts Published on the Facebook Text 1 0.8 7 50 Accounts of the United States and KRG Photo 2 1.6 3 21.4 Text and photo 118 97.6 4 28.6 This section analyzes the final research question, which 121 14 100 investigated the values of the posts on the Facebook accounts of the two selected actors. Table 6 indicates that Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. Table 5. Post Agendas on the Facebook Accounts of the United States and the KRG. Facebook of the U.S. Consulate Facebook of the KRG Representation General in Erbil in the United States Agendas F % F % Informing own people in the host country — 1 7.1 Informing local people 38 32.2 1 7.1 Informing local public about the different activities of 14 11.8 — the mission Spreading the country’s culture 9 7.6 — Informing local public about own policy 14 11.8 4 28.5 Commemorating international days 3 2.5 — Creating a dialogue with the local public 5 4.1 — Covering aid programs provided 24 20.3 3 21.4 Promoting investment — 3 21.4 Others — 2 14.2 Total 120 100 14 100 Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. Table 6. Values of the Posts on the Facebook Accounts of the United States and the KRG. Facebook account of the U.S. Consulate Facebook account of the KRG Representation General in Erbil in the United States Values F % F % Freedom 1 0.7 Equality 18 13.3 — Democracy 2 1.4 — Human rights 16 11.8 2 12.5 Exporting oil and natural gas Practicing democracy 2 1.4 — Fighting terrorist groups 14 11.6 4 25 Providing humanitarian aid 16 11.8 2 12.5 Promoting religious equality 5 3.7 — Promoting democracy 2 1.4 — Others 59 43.7 8 50 Total 135 100 16 100 Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. 8 SAGE Open the U.S. Facebook created 59 posts (49.1%) about “others,” Representation’s mismanagement of Facebook in promoting whereas the KRG Facebook created eight such posts the KRG as a brand. From this standpoint, we strongly rec- (57.1%). The category “others” represents general themes ommend that the KRG employ professional staff as public such as activities, historical places, meeting with local peo- diplomacy practitioners to expand its activities across the ple, weather, and local and global news. The U.S. Facebook United States and to cover all activities and updates on the gave priority to equality, with 18 posts (15%); human Facebook of the KRG Representation in the United States. rights, with 16 posts (13.3%); and humanitarian aid, with Considering the values on the posts to serve the KRG as 16 posts (13.3%). These themes represent American values. a brand, the values of practicing democracy and promoting The KRG Facebook, by contrast, disseminated only eight religious equality were not highlighted. In addition, the posts on the values presented in Table 6—four posts (25%) KRG did not prioritize the agendas of the themes particu- on fighting terrorist groups, two posts (12.5%) on humani- larly related to the people in the host country and the tarian aid, and two posts (12.5%) on human rights. Kurdish communities there. The tasks of building relation- Furthermore, Table 6 indicates that the U.S. Facebook pri- ships and expanding the network require intensive public oritized the United States’s ideal values—one post (0.7%) diplomacy (Bjola & Holmes, 2015; Goof, 2013; Park & on freedom, 18 posts (13.3%) on equality, two posts (1.4%) Lim, 2014). on democracy, and 16 posts (13.3%) on human rights, Interestingly, the U.S. Facebook’s use of the Kurdish lan- whereas the KRG Facebook did not offer any posts to pro- guage instead of Arabic can be analyzed through two per- mote the four values of promoting religious equality, high- spectives. First, the KRG appears to be important to the lighting democracy, exporting oil and natural gas, and United States, which will help the Kurds develop a symbiotic practicing democracy. relationship with the United States to secure support in build- ing a Kurdish statehood—if statehood is realized. Second, it validates the theoretical perspective claiming that public Conclusion diplomacy can be practiced by nonstate actors (d’Hooghe, An analysis was performed to compare the public diplomacy 2014; Harris, 2013; Sharp & Wiseman, 2012). In addition, and nation branding efforts of the U.S. Consulate in Erbil and this research has significantly proven that public diplomacy the KRG Representation in Washington on Facebook and to can be practiced between a state (the United States) and a identify how the United States communicates with the nonstate (the Kurdistan region) regardless of the balance of Kurdish people in Iraq and how the KRG Representation in their power in terms of experience, sources, and organiza- the United States uses Facebook to build relationships to tional structure, which are viewed as crucial elements in pub- serve the Kurdish statehood in the future. The results revealed lic diplomacy contexts (Gregory, 2011). that the United States employs Facebook more successfully than the KRG. The U.S. Facebook disseminated more posts Declaration of Conflicting Interests and received more likes and comments. In addition, more The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect foreign people became involved with the U.S. posts. to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Furthermore, the U.S. Facebook was followed by a larger number of people than the KRG Facebook. The results also Funding showed that the KRG did not consider Facebook as a major The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author- effective platform to pursue its agendas and to communicate ship, and/or publication of this article. with Americans or with the Kurdish communities in the United States. This argument was proven by the inadequate, Note ineffective attempts to post only 14 blogs within 2 months 1. In the following, the phrase “the U.S. Facebook” is used instead and with a small number of followers. Although numerous of “the Facebook account of the U.S. Consulate General in materials and news stories of the Kurdish media could have Erbil”; and the phrase “the KRG Facebook” is used instead of been reposted by the KRG Facebook to enhance Kurdish “the Facebook account of the Kurdistan Regional Government public diplomacy and to enrich the KRG image, KRG Representation in the U.S.” Facebook did not utilize these materials. In addition, the lack of postings on their Facebook revealed that the Kurdish mis- References sions in the United States are not active; otherwise, they Aneek, C. (2010). International relations today: Concepts would have published their activities on their Facebook. In and applications. New Delhi: Pearson Education India, spite of the few posts of the KRG Facebook in contrast to the Compositore: Arete Publishing. U.S. Facebook, the majority of the posts were either photos Bjola, C., & Holmes, M. (2015). Digital diplomacy: Theory and or texts—there were very few photo-text combinations. practice. London, England: Routledge. Furthermore, most of the texts were written only in English, Bjola, C., Jiang, L., & Holmes, M. (2015). Social media and while the U.S. Facebook used both Kurdish and English public diplomacy: A comparative analysis of the digital diplomatic strategies of the EU, US, and Japan in China. simultaneously. These weaknesses indicate the KRG Bali et al. 9 In C. Bkola & M. Holmes (Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory Renken, W. (2014). Social media use in public diplomacy: A case and practice (pp. 71-88). London, England: Routledge. study of the German missions’ Facebook use (Master’s thesis). Buckle, A. E. (2012). The new diplomacy: Devising a rela- University of Stirling, UK. tional model of public diplomacy. Pursuit—The Journal of Reynolds, S. (2002). France between the wars: Gender and poli- Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee, 3(2), tics. London, England: Routledge. Article 3. Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda set- Cooper, A. F., Heine, J., & Thakur, R. (Eds.). (2013). The Oxford ting, and priming: The evolution of three media effects models. handbook of modern diplomacy. Oxford, UK: Oxford Journal of Communication, 57, 9-20. University Press. Sharp, P., & Wiseman, G. (Eds.). (2012). American diplomacy. Cox, M., & Stokes, D. (2012). U.S. foreign policy. Oxford, UK: Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Oxford University Press. Širvinskytė, V. (2016). How the online presence of a tourist des- Dale, H. C. (2009). Public diplomacy 2.0: Where the U.S. government tination affects the country brand. The case of Lithuania meets “new media.” Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation. (Master’s thesis). University of Applied Dciences, Stralsund d’Hooghe, I. (2014). China’s public diplomacy. Boston, MA: in Germany. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Surowiec, P. (2016). Nation branding, public relations and soft Dinnie, K. (2015). Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice. power: Corporatising Poland. New York, NY: Routledge. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Szondi, G. (2008). Public diplomacy and nation brand- Fisher, A. (2010). Mapping the great beyond: Identifying meaning- ing: Conceptual similarities and differences. Rotterdam: ful networks in public diplomacy. CPD Perspectives on Public Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” Diplomacy, 2, 1-87. Desk Top Publishing. Fitzpatrick, K. (2009). The future of U.S. public diplomacy: An Thakur, R. (2007). Asia–Pacific challenges for diplomacy. The uncertain fate. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, 9(1), 47-70. Gilboa, E. (2001). Diplomacy in the media age: Three models of Van Ham, P. (2008). Place branding: The state of the art. The uses and effects. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 12(2), 1-28. ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Goof, P. (2013). Cultural diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & Science, 616, 126-149. R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of modern diplomacy Weaver, D. H. (2007). Thoughts on agenda setting, framing, and (pp. 419-436). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. priming. Journal of Communication, 57, 142-147. Gregory, B. (2011). American public diplomacy: Enduring char- Wiseman, G. (2015). Isolate or engage: Adversarial states, US acteristics, elusive transformation. The Hague Journal of foreign policy, and public diplomacy. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Diplomacy, 6, 351-372. University Press. Harris, B. (2013). Diplomacy 2.0: The future of social media in nation branding. Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Author Biographies 4(1), Article 3. Ahmed Omar Bali is the head of the diplomacy and public rela- Hartig, F. (2015). Chinese public diplomacy: The rise of the tions department and a lecturer at the University of Human Confucius Institute. London, England: Routledge. Development in Iraqi Kurdistan. He holds a PhD in media and com- Hayden, C. (2012). The rhetoric of soft power: Public diplomacy in munication from Sheffield Hallam University in the United global contexts. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Kingdom. Iyer, V. (Ed.). (2002). Media ethics in Asia: Addressing the dilem- mas in the information age. Manila, Philippines: Asian Media Mahdi Sofi Karim is an assistant lecturer at the University of Human Information and Communication Centre. Development, Department of Diplomacy and Public Relations in Kaneva, N. (2011). Nation branding: Toward an agenda for critical Sulaimanyah, Iraqi Kurdistan. He received his MA in Teaching research. International Journal of Communication, 5, 117-141. English as a Second Language at Webster University in the United Nakamura, K. H. (2010). U.S. public diplomacy: Background and States with a GPA of 3.760. His academic strengths and interests current issues. Collingdale, PA. DIANE Publishing. include TESL, interpretation, translation, media and politics. Nicholas, S., O’Malley, T., & Williams, K. (2013). Reconstructing the past: History of the mass media 1890–2005. New York, Kardo Rached is a lecturer at the University of Human Development, NY: Routledge. Department of Diplomacy and Public Relations in Sulaimanyah, Park, S. J., & Lim, Y. S. (2014). Information networks and social Iraqi Kurdistan. He received his MA in Contemporary Middle East media use in public diplomacy: A comparative analysis of South Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. His research field is Korea and Japan. Asian Journal of Communication, 24, 79-98. non-state actors in the Middle East and their politics. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png SAGE Open SAGE

Public Diplomacy Effort Across Facebook: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Consulate in Erbil and the Kurdistan Representation in Washington:

SAGE Open , Volume 8 (1): 1 – Feb 23, 2018

Loading next page...
 
/lp/sage/public-diplomacy-effort-across-facebook-a-comparative-analysis-of-the-2NIUpN7rRT

References (15)

Publisher
SAGE
Copyright
Copyright © 2022 by SAGE Publications Inc, unless otherwise noted. Manuscript content on this site is licensed under Creative Commons Licenses.
ISSN
2158-2440
eISSN
2158-2440
DOI
10.1177/2158244018758835
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Widespread communication tools such as Facebook and Twitter have become vital channels of public diplomacy. Today, policymakers must implement a successful Facebook diplomacy to enhance their nation’s branding, lobbying, and culture exchange and to expand and build good relationships. This article evaluates how Facebook has been used as a tool of public diplomacy by both the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Representation in Washington by performing a quantitative content analysis of their posts and the responses of their users. The results of the content analysis suggest that the United States more successfully utilizes Facebook as a public diplomacy tool to communicate than does the KRG. This article presents a theoretical argument that assumes that public diplomacy can be practiced by nonstate actors and states. The Kurds are considered and targeted by the U.S. public diplomacy program across Facebook, and this helps the Kurds develop their relationship with the United States as a supporter of potential Kurdish statehood. This research also strongly recommends that the KRG improves its Facebook webpage and highlights the values of internationally promoting the KRG as a brand. Keywords public diplomacy, Facebook, comparative analysis, U.S., Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) governmental institutions to engage, persuade, and influence Introduction foreign publics, and such behaviors support foreign policy Over the last century, countries have used traditional media (Sharp & Wiseman, 2012). The United States has a long his- broadcasting, such as cinema, radio, and television, to pro- tory of using public diplomacy and media, which have played mote their nations and to inform foreign publics of their a vital role in shaping American public diplomacy. For national politics (Gilboa, 2001). This communication model example, Voice of America (VOA) first started radio broad- is essentially a one-way communication model and works casting in 1942 in 45 languages and to over 100 million lis- under the press agentry model of propaganda (Iyer, 2002; teners worldwide (Cox & Stokes, 2012). Public diplomacy Nicholas, O’Malley, & Williams, 2013). Social media has has been practiced from before the time it emerged as a dis- allowed for the transition from one-way communication to tinct concept, and it has become the hub of diplomatic func- two-way communication, enabling nations to attract and tions. In Obama’s administration, public diplomacy was engage the foreign public more effectively (Hartig, 2015). linked with diplomacy and, organizationally, became an Bjola and Holmes (2015) argue that “the application of social activity within the Department of State (Gregory, 2011; media to the field of diplomacy has failed as a transformative Sharp & Wiseman, 2012; Wiseman, 2015). However, this development of international politics” (p. 71). Social media designation does not mean that public diplomacy is limited enable diplomats to directly communicate and interact with to states. In this respect, Sharp and Wiseman (2012) argue foreign publics and institutions and conversely. Public diplo- that public diplomacy “today has become an instrument used macy refers to the planned efforts of the nation’s actors, such as governmental institutions, nongovernmental organiza- tions, officials, public figures, and ordinary people, to foster The University of Human Development, Kurdistan Regional, Iraq favorable opinions and a positive image among the general Corresponding Author: public (d’Hooghe, 2014; Harris, 2013). Ahmed Omar Bali, Head of Diplomacy and Public Relations Department, Over the 20th century, public diplomacy was mostly used The University of Human Development, Kurdistan Regional, Iraq. as a state-based tool by foreign ministries and other Email: ahmed.abdullah@uhd.edu.iq Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). 2 SAGE Open by associations of states, sub-state and non-state actors to examines the U.S. Consulate and the Kurdish Representation understand cultures, attitude, and behavior; to build and in Washington is to compare and to identify the criteria for manage relationships; and to influence thoughts which even- analyses. This study assumes that the U.S. Consulate is suc- tually advance their interests and values” (p. 119). This pro- cessful in implementing public diplomacy via Facebook vides an effective platform for political entities that are not because the United States has considerable experience with states, such as the Kurdistan Region, to play diplomatic roles public diplomacy, which is in contrast to the KRG’s experi- because this mechanism allows the traditional approach to ence. The United States’s approach can be used as a standard diplomacies such that the diplomats in consulates and embas- guideline to evaluate the contents of two Facebook pages. sies can act as diplomats. The development of communica- Consequently, the evaluation of the United States per se tion technology has created an international space where the allows us to understand the position of the Kurdistan region public and politicians in different countries are globally in promoting the priorities and perspectives that also concern linked more than ever. Thus, diplomats, politicians, activists, the United States. Based on the research objectives, several and even ordinary people can play the role of diplomats models of the impact of Facebook and other social media on regardless of where they are located. In this regard, Facebook public diplomacy will be considered. and other social media sites have become effective tools uti- lized by public diplomacy practitioners. From this perspec- Networking Diplomacy Across tive, the current research seeks to evaluate how successfully the U.S. Consulate in Erbil and the Kurdistan Regional Facebook Government (KRG) Representation office, which is viewed The development of communication technology has removed by the Kurdish people as a consulate or embassy of Kurdistan traditional borders between countries and created an interna- in Washington, use Facebook as a public diplomacy tool. tional space. Such technology also provides a platform to facilitate collaboration between states and nonstate actors, Conceptual Framework creating a growing global culture and increasing the interest of the foreign public. Specifically, the Internet in general and Despite scholars’ interest in and the academic study of the social media in particular has enabled officials and diplomats role and influence of media technology in the field of public to communicate and exchange their ideas with foreign pub- diplomacy, there is a lack of empirical research on this topic lics, states, and nonstate organizations. This communication (Fisher, 2010). Gregory (2011) identifies another major approach has been described as “network diplomacy” by problem in conducting research in this field: the “lack of Marie Slaughter (Bjola & Holmes, 2015). In this regard, agreement amongst public diplomacy practitioners and Goof (2013) argues that “network diplomacy” is a transfor- scholars on analytical boundaries” (p. 335). Thus, most mative stage in club diplomacy, which is a significant shift in research in the public diplomacy context has focused on modern diplomacy. With this new phenomenon, diplomats Western countries, China, and Japan, which vary in their can better fulfill their functions of (a) representing their political systems, economies, and cultural structures. As a countries in host countries, (b) negotiating issues on behalf consequence, where countries can use public diplomacy of their home countries, (c) reporting, and (d) protecting the based on their strategies and resources is a contested issue interests of their home countries, including citizens’ interests among public diplomacy theorists and practitioners. Several in host countries (Aneek, 2010). The term “club diplomacy” factors control public diplomacies, such as tools, methods, is used to express “traditional diplomacy” (Cooper, Heine, & organizational structure and the culture, identity, and experi- Thakur, 2013). On this subject, Thakur (2007) differentiates ence of public diplomacy practitioners, which fundamentally between network diplomacy and club diplomacy in terms of affect the successful of public diplomacy maneuvers. Despite diplomacy players and forms of communication: the dispute among scholars and practitioners on the use of public diplomacy, both groups allege that public diplomacy Network diplomacy has more players than club diplomacy, is can be used by small, medium, and large states as well as by flat rather than hierarchical, engages in multiple forms of substate and nonstate actors regardless of their political, cul- communication beyond merely the written, is more transparent tural, or structural backgrounds (Gregory, 2011). than confidential, and its “consummation” takes the form of To overcome the limitations of the theoretical framework, increased bilateral flows—of tourists, students, labor, credits, it is important to identify the research aims. Using a com- investments, technology, and goods and services—instead of formal signing ceremonies. (pp. 49-50) parative analysis method, this study examines how the U.S. Consulate in Erbil and the KRG Representation in In line with this statement, network diplomacy allows Washington use Facebook as a public diplomacy tool. These governments and diplomats to create new communities and two actors have different sources, types of power, tactics, build relationships with the foreign public and foreign insti- and mechanisms of using public diplomacy. Nevertheless, tutions, both governmental and nongovernmental, particu- they can both use public diplomacy to set their agendas, as larly across social media (Buckle, 2012; Dale, 2009; Park & their priorities differ as well. Another reason that this study Bali et al. 3 Lim, 2014). Thus, this connection will build and enlarge the “Nation Branding” is a new term in public diplomacy, relationships between a country’s public, the foreign public, and public diplomacy relies on the nation branding strat- and foreign governmental and nongovernmental organiza- egy (Fitzpatrick, 2009; Szondi, 2008). In this respect, van tions beyond physical barriers such as international borders Ham (2008) argues that both concepts use the same tools to (Park & Lim, 2014). From this perspective, of all social achieve the same goals. Nation branding, however, is more media websites, Facebook is the most popular network complex and wider and implements more effort, sources, among the Kurds and the Americans. and strategies. From the system theory perspective, public In addition to all the above benefits of network diplo- diplomacy is an interdisciplinary conception that functions macy, Facebook can provide significant opportunities for as a communication mechanism within a state to achieve Kurdish politicians to create a solid symbiotic relationship long-term diplomacy. In other words, public diplomacy with the foreign public, politicians, and international organi- relates to several branches of knowledge and fields within zations to gain their support and to raise Kurdistan’s national a foreign policy and international communication (Gregory, profile internationally, eventually leading to Kurdistan’s 2011). Joseph Nye, an American political scholar, claims independence. that public diplomacy is a tool of “soft power” and is the best approach to achieving foreign policy goals, while hard power does not function as effectively (Renken, 2014). Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy Since September 11, the United States has been taking “Nation branding,” as a term, was first used in 1996, and it public diplomacy seriously (Hayden, 2012). The United is attributed to Simon Anholt, a British scholar and consul- States’s image became more negative and iniquitous from tant (Kaneva, 2011). Anholt determines nation branding the Arab and Muslim world’s perspective, particularly according to people’s perceptions of a country across the after the United States’s occupation of Iraq in 2003. following six areas of competence: “tourism, exports, gov- Nevertheless, the Kurds are one of the actors who wel- ernance, investment and immigration, culture and heritage, comed the American military operation to remove and people” (Renken, 2014, p. 7). Additional terms that rep- Saddam’s regime because the Kurds suffered grievously resent nation brandings include “national images, national under his regime and were subjected to ethnic cleansing, stereotypes, national identity, and national brand identity; chemical attacks, bombardments, and the demolition of and today these tend to be replaced by the term national their dwellings. branding” (Surowiec, 2016, p. 20). Surowiec also refers to The United States began to restore its image, particu- applying branding and marketing communication tech- larly in the Middle East, through a campaign called “the niques and to branding a nation to represent and promote the shared value.” The campaign utilized media power to nation as a brand. According to this concept, any country is change people’s perceptions. For example, the campaign viewed as a specific brand in people’s minds. Then, the established Sawa Radio in 2002 and the Al-Hurra TV chan- question of the benefits of branding a nation arises. Nation nel in 2005, both of which focused heavily on Iraq. branding competition has grown increasingly because a pos- Moreover, the U.S. embassy funded Nawa Radio, which itive national brand identity promotes tourism, immigration, was the first private, political radio station established in international investment, exports, and currency stability. Iraqi Kurdistan that focused on Kurdistan and broadcasted These developments also restore international credibility in the Kurdish language. The United States targeted the and investor confidence. Nation branding can also boost Kurds through a specific strategy, and the Kurds claim that international political influence; secure international part- they are friends with only America and Israel. This stated nerships; and advance nation building, particularly in the friendship is because of America’s intervention against the globalized economy, through “nourishing confidence, pride, Saddam regime in favor of the Kurds’ interests in 1991 and harmony, ambition, (and) national resolve” (Dinnie, 2015, because, recently, the United States immediately con- pp. 17-18). ducted airstrikes as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) As aforementioned, countries compete to raise their was about to take over Erbil, the capital city of the positions to a higher positive level and higher valuable Kurdistan region. brand ranking; to attract several aspects, such as people’s Under the Obama administration, public diplomacy sentiments, tourism, exports, and investments; and to efforts have improved (Nakamura, 2010). This administra- strengthen their profiles and positions in the international tion emphasized “the shared value,” which is “rooted in the space. A country’s power, political system, and economic U.S. ideal values: Freedom, Equality, Democracy and needs are crucial to its ability to take advantage of these Human Rights” (Gregory, 2011, p. 362). In this regard, social aspects. How can a small country win in this tough interna- media played a significant role in the Obama administra- tional competition? Širvinskytė (2016) argues that smaller, tion’s public diplomacy efforts and nation branding of the less developed, or emerging nations can play a major role in United States (Gregory, 2011; Harris, 2013), and Facebook is nation branding because the Internet has provided a signifi- a central, forceful tool implemented by the U.S. Consulate in cant opportunity to promote any brand. Erbil. 4 SAGE Open help to people displaced across Iraq and accommodating Social Media’s Contribution to Public Syrian refugees; and (e) promoting religious equality. These Diplomacy concepts represent the Kurds’ respect for human values and As a tool of public diplomacy, social media have significant desire to avoid building a nation based on religious and racial effects in this context. In this respect, Bjola, Jiang, and identity, as this basis for nation building has been creating Holmes (2015) suggest a model to describe and evaluate conflicts in Iraq for several decades. social media’s impacts on public diplomacy, and this model consists of a three-dimensional framework: “agenda-setting, Presence Expansion presence expansion, engagement and conversion generating” (pp. 7-9). The current research considers and utilizes this In both traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy, diplo- framework because these three dimensions largely describe mats always need to make their voice heard (Reynolds, 2002; the role of social media in a new public diplomacy context. Goof, 2013). In traditional diplomacy, diplomats’ participa- tion in cultural, educational, political, and trade events are the central means through which they can disseminate their Agenda-Setting comments and views. In this regard, Facebook greatly ampli- The first dimension of social media’s contribution is agenda- fies diplomats’ voices and gives them greater influence. setting theory, which is a significant theory for determining Thus, Facebook and other social media sites expand diplo- media’s influence, including social media’s influence, on matic efforts among the foreign public, officials, and activi- people’s perceptions. This theory focuses on the role of ties of nongovernmental organizations, which broadens media ownership and those who drive the media’s strategies relationships and partnerships to serve national interests and to choose and cover certain issues for the sake of predicted intentions. Accordingly, this approach can help Kurdish impacts on the target audience (Scheufele & Tewksbury, diplomacy achieve global support for many issues given that 2007; Weaver, 2007). From this standpoint, the task of public the Kurds complain about not receiving sufficient interna- diplomacy is to disseminate information about what should tional attention regarding some issue such as the acknowl- be cultivated among the foreign public. In public diplomacy, edgment of the Kurds’ right to have their own nation state the information provided via social media should meet the and the acknowledgment of the Anfal genocide operated by mutual interests of the diplomats, the foreign public, and the Saddam’s regime in 1998. If “presence expansion” is suc- institutions such that discussions are held via two-way com- cessful, the third Facebook dimensional impact of “generat- munication. In connection with this point, Facebook and ing conversational engagement” will be achieved. other social media function as a vital tool that allows diplo- mats to set agendas to foster a positive image of their coun- Engagement and Conversation Generating tries (nation branding) in the mind of the target audience. The following essential questions must be answered: What Facebook allows diplomats to engage in two-way and multi- are the themes and values does the United States focus on? directional communication to create dialogues with the for- What efforts should be made by the Kurdistan public diplo- eign public, which includes different stakeholders. This macy in the United States? Public diplomacy is only an interactive communication across Facebook greatly increases approach in the practice of foreign policy; thus, the use of the possibility of engaging a large target audience in a public public diplomacy is based on the countries’ objectives. This diplomacy program. In addition, it offers sustained conversa- requires applying political, economic, and communicative tions between diplomats and the foreign public; these advan- strategy sources in public diplomatic operations while tages provide a mutual understanding and support diplomats’ emphasizing core common values and interests within the ability to change their messages, if required, in light of the host country or within international society. audience’s response or to continue effective messages and Corresponding to U.S. public diplomacy, this research approaches. Together, these actions will affect foreign public aims to evaluate Kurdistan public diplomacy and to offer opinion and foster favorable opinions of a state’s image and some suggestions for Kurdistan public diplomacy. According national brand. to Kurdish political discourse, the proclamation of the inde- pendence of the Kurdistan region, as a national right, was the Research Questions main goal throughout World War I (WWI) and Iraq’s regimes. Based on the theoretical framework and research objectives, The agenda of Kurdistan’s public diplomacy focuses on the the following research questions are presented: following valuable actions: (a) exporting oil and natural gas to secure the world’s energy; (b) highlighting democratic Research Question 1 (RQ1): How do the U.S. Consulate practices, which seems unique among the countries in the in Erbil and the KRG Representation in Washington Middle East; (c) fighting terrorist groups through the Kurdish employ their Facebook accounts to expand their presence Peshmerga, who are appreciated internationally, especially and to build their relationships? for fighting ISIS successfully; (d) providing humanitarian Bali et al. 5 Table 1. Posts and Follows on the Facebook Accounts of the posts were identified according to terms related to the United States and the KRG. United States’s identity, freedom, equality, democracy, and human rights, and according to some actions planned Facebook account by the KRG, as follows: (a) exporting oil and natural gas Facebook account of of the KRG to secure the world’s energy; (b) highlighting democracy the U.S. Consulate Representation in General in Erbil the United States Total which seems unique among countries in the Middle East (c) successfully fighting terrorist groups such as ISIS F % F % % through the Kurdish Peshmerga, whose efforts are appre- Blogs 121 89.6 14 10.4 100 ciated internationally; (d) providing humanitarian aid to Follows 270,740 93.2 19,824 6.8 100 people displaced across Iraq and accommodating Syrian refugees; and (e) promoting religious equality. Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. Results Research Question 2 (RQ2): To what extent do the Examining the research questions, the current research found Facebook posts published by the U.S. Consulate in Erbil significant results, which are discussed in the following four and the KRG Representation in Washington generate dis- sections. cussion and engage people? Research Question 3 (RQ3): What are the agendas of the The United States and the KRG Public posts published on the Facebook accounts of the U.S. Consulate in Erbil and the KRG Representation in Diplomacy’s Use of Facebook to Present and Washington? In addition, to what extent do the contents of Build Relationships the posts reflect the agendas and identity of their foreign This section traces the first research question and examines policy? the use of Facebook to present and build relationships within Research Question 4 (RQ4): What are the values of the the public diplomacy efforts of the U.S. Consulate in Erbil posts published on the Facebook accounts of the U.S. and the KRG Representation office in Washington. Table 1 Consulate in Erbil and the KRG Representation in indicates that the U.S. Facebook published more posts (121 Washington? posts = 89.6%) than the KRG Facebook (14 blogs = 10.4%). This is a large difference in disseminating posts, which indi- cates that the KRG Representation office does not rely on Method Facebook to present its values and to set the KRG’s agendas in the United States. The above argument is based on the A quantitative content analysis was performed to explore the finding that the Facebook of the KRG Representation pub- research questions. Posts published on the Facebook accounts lished only 14 posts during 2 months, which is equivalent to of both the American Consulate in Erbil and the KRG less than one post per 4 days. Table 1 provides evidence that Representation in Washington over a 2-month period were the U.S. Consulate is more successful in building relation- selected as the sample. The data collection period was ships via Facebook. As the results show, through the data November and December 2016, which allows us to examine collection date, the number of U.S. Consulate followers, the agendas and the values of the blogs. A total of 135 posts reached 270,740, which represents 93.2% of the followers. were selected for the sample. Of these posts, 121 were on the By contrast, the Facebook of the KRG Representation had Facebook of the U.S. Consulate and 14 were on the Facebook only 19,824 followers, which represents 6.8% of the follow- of the KRG Representation office. The analysis categories ers. The data illustrate that the U.S. Consulate was more and coding procedure were identified based on the agendas effective in targeting the Kurdish people than was the and values of the posts; the number of likes, comments, and Kurdish office, particularly in terms of building relationships shares; and the language of the posts—English, Kurdish, or and creating allies within the public of the host country. For English and Kurdish. example, the number U.S. consulate Facebook followers The agendas of the posts were classified into nine cat- equaled 6% of the Kurdish population, whereas the number egories, which essentially represent the agendas of public of the followers of the Kurdish representation in the United diplomacy on Facebook: (a) informing the country’s own States was not comparable to the U.S population. Table 2 people in the host country, (b) informing the local people, indicates that the U.S. Consulate Facebook used both English (c) informing the local public about the different activities and Kurdish languages in the posts—Kurdish and English of the mission, (d) spreading the country’s culture, 77.9%, Kurdish 16.9%, and English 5.2%. These outcomes (e) informing the local public about the country’s policy, indicate that the United States considers respecting its lan- (f) commemorating international days, (g) creating dia- guage, which is a part of promoting American culture, and logue with the local public, (h) covering help programs using Kurdish language to target the Kurdish people, whereas provided, and (i) promoting investment. The values of the 6 SAGE Open Table 2. Language Used to Write the Posts of the United States platform and an effective network communication approach and the KRG. to help the diplomacy mission meet its goals in the public diplomacy area. Table 4 indicates that the majority of the Facebook account posts published by the Kurdish representation were not pre- Facebook account of of the KRG pared successfully; they were mostly texts without photos or the U.S. Consulate Representation General in Erbil in the United States photos without text—seven texts, three photos, and four text- photos. The U.S. Facebook, in comparison, published most of Language used F % F % their posts with both texts and photos—one text, two photos, and 118 text-photos. In relation to public diplomacy’s princi- Kurdish 20 16.9 — — ples, postings should be at a high technical level to engage English 6 5.2 14 100 and fascinate the foreign public. Such postings are filled with Kurdish and English 92 77.9 — — diplomatic missions representing political angles, cultural 118 14 100 events, and activities. In this respect, the U.S. Facebook Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. attracted their foreign users through the use of different lan- guages and effective text and photo posts. the Kurdish Representation office used only English in the The Agendas of the Posts Published on Facebook posts. Of course, arguably, it is not easy to advocate that the by the United States and KRG American people should learn the Kurdish language. Nevertheless, the Kurdish people in the United States should This section examines the third research question and evaluates also be targeted in their own language on the Facebook of the agenda-setting of posts disseminated by the two organiza- their representation office. tions. Table 5 indicates that the United States devoted 38 posts (32.2%) to informing the local public in the host country, whereas the KRG devoted only one blog (7.1%) to this pur- The United States and the KRG Public pose. This result shows that the United States targeted the Diplomacy’s Use of Facebook to Generate Kurdish people in its agenda-setting and that the U.S. Facebook Discussion and Involvement is much more active than the KRG Facebook. The KRG Table 3 answers the second research question, which ana- Facebook devoted four posts to informing the foreign public lyzed the role of the Facebook accounts of the representations about its own policy, while the U.S. Facebook devoted 14 posts of the United States and the KRG to generate discussion and to the same purpose. Informing Americans of the development engage people in the host country. The results indicate that the of democracy in Kurdistan and strengthening their coalition to U.S. consulate’s Facebook account received more comments fight terrorism is very important to the KRG. Although addi- and feedbacks—51,838 likes, 2,789 comments, and 712 tional events and news were published in the Kurdish local shares—than the Facebook account of the KRG Representation media, the KRG Facebook did not republish them. in Washington—61 likes, 100 comments, and two shares. The second area, aid programs provided for Kurdish peo- This result implies a large gap between the endeavors of the ple and the KRG, was covered by 24 posts of the U.S. two organizations, and the data express the United States’s Consulate Facebook, that is, 20.3% of the posts. By contrast, greater enterprise and success in using Facebook, compared the KRG Facebook devoted only three posts to that domain with those of the KRG, to engage the Kurdish people. The (21.4%). In addition, the U.S. Facebook created more posts score of the KRG Facebook shows that the Kurdish represen- about all areas except for “promoting investments.” These tation does not believe in employing Facebook as a unique data are illustrated in Table 5. Table 3. Likes, Comments, and Shares Across Facebook Accounts of the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil and the KRG Representation in Washington. Facebook account of the U.S. Facebook account of the KRG Consulate General in Erbil Representation in the United States F % F % Total % Likes 51,838 99.8 61 0.2 100 Comments 2,789 96.5 100 3.5 100 Shares 721 99.7 2 0.3 100 Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. Bali et al. 7 Table 4. Type of Posts—Text, Photo, and Text and Photo— Essentially, the U.S. Facebook produced 120 posts; simul- Across Facebook Accounts of the U.S. Consulate General in Erbil taneously, the KRG Facebook produced only 14 posts. These and the KRG Representation in Washington. results illustrate that the KRG Facebook did not publish any posts about crucial areas such as spreading the country’s cul- Facebook account ture, commemorating international days, creating dialogue Facebook account of of the KRG the U.S. Consulate Representation in the with the local public, and informing the local public about General in Erbil United States the different activities of the mission. Type of blogs F % F % Values of the Posts Published on the Facebook Text 1 0.8 7 50 Accounts of the United States and KRG Photo 2 1.6 3 21.4 Text and photo 118 97.6 4 28.6 This section analyzes the final research question, which 121 14 100 investigated the values of the posts on the Facebook accounts of the two selected actors. Table 6 indicates that Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. Table 5. Post Agendas on the Facebook Accounts of the United States and the KRG. Facebook of the U.S. Consulate Facebook of the KRG Representation General in Erbil in the United States Agendas F % F % Informing own people in the host country — 1 7.1 Informing local people 38 32.2 1 7.1 Informing local public about the different activities of 14 11.8 — the mission Spreading the country’s culture 9 7.6 — Informing local public about own policy 14 11.8 4 28.5 Commemorating international days 3 2.5 — Creating a dialogue with the local public 5 4.1 — Covering aid programs provided 24 20.3 3 21.4 Promoting investment — 3 21.4 Others — 2 14.2 Total 120 100 14 100 Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. Table 6. Values of the Posts on the Facebook Accounts of the United States and the KRG. Facebook account of the U.S. Consulate Facebook account of the KRG Representation General in Erbil in the United States Values F % F % Freedom 1 0.7 Equality 18 13.3 — Democracy 2 1.4 — Human rights 16 11.8 2 12.5 Exporting oil and natural gas Practicing democracy 2 1.4 — Fighting terrorist groups 14 11.6 4 25 Providing humanitarian aid 16 11.8 2 12.5 Promoting religious equality 5 3.7 — Promoting democracy 2 1.4 — Others 59 43.7 8 50 Total 135 100 16 100 Note. KRG = Kurdistan Regional Government. 8 SAGE Open the U.S. Facebook created 59 posts (49.1%) about “others,” Representation’s mismanagement of Facebook in promoting whereas the KRG Facebook created eight such posts the KRG as a brand. From this standpoint, we strongly rec- (57.1%). The category “others” represents general themes ommend that the KRG employ professional staff as public such as activities, historical places, meeting with local peo- diplomacy practitioners to expand its activities across the ple, weather, and local and global news. The U.S. Facebook United States and to cover all activities and updates on the gave priority to equality, with 18 posts (15%); human Facebook of the KRG Representation in the United States. rights, with 16 posts (13.3%); and humanitarian aid, with Considering the values on the posts to serve the KRG as 16 posts (13.3%). These themes represent American values. a brand, the values of practicing democracy and promoting The KRG Facebook, by contrast, disseminated only eight religious equality were not highlighted. In addition, the posts on the values presented in Table 6—four posts (25%) KRG did not prioritize the agendas of the themes particu- on fighting terrorist groups, two posts (12.5%) on humani- larly related to the people in the host country and the tarian aid, and two posts (12.5%) on human rights. Kurdish communities there. The tasks of building relation- Furthermore, Table 6 indicates that the U.S. Facebook pri- ships and expanding the network require intensive public oritized the United States’s ideal values—one post (0.7%) diplomacy (Bjola & Holmes, 2015; Goof, 2013; Park & on freedom, 18 posts (13.3%) on equality, two posts (1.4%) Lim, 2014). on democracy, and 16 posts (13.3%) on human rights, Interestingly, the U.S. Facebook’s use of the Kurdish lan- whereas the KRG Facebook did not offer any posts to pro- guage instead of Arabic can be analyzed through two per- mote the four values of promoting religious equality, high- spectives. First, the KRG appears to be important to the lighting democracy, exporting oil and natural gas, and United States, which will help the Kurds develop a symbiotic practicing democracy. relationship with the United States to secure support in build- ing a Kurdish statehood—if statehood is realized. Second, it validates the theoretical perspective claiming that public Conclusion diplomacy can be practiced by nonstate actors (d’Hooghe, An analysis was performed to compare the public diplomacy 2014; Harris, 2013; Sharp & Wiseman, 2012). In addition, and nation branding efforts of the U.S. Consulate in Erbil and this research has significantly proven that public diplomacy the KRG Representation in Washington on Facebook and to can be practiced between a state (the United States) and a identify how the United States communicates with the nonstate (the Kurdistan region) regardless of the balance of Kurdish people in Iraq and how the KRG Representation in their power in terms of experience, sources, and organiza- the United States uses Facebook to build relationships to tional structure, which are viewed as crucial elements in pub- serve the Kurdish statehood in the future. The results revealed lic diplomacy contexts (Gregory, 2011). that the United States employs Facebook more successfully than the KRG. The U.S. Facebook disseminated more posts Declaration of Conflicting Interests and received more likes and comments. In addition, more The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect foreign people became involved with the U.S. posts. to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Furthermore, the U.S. Facebook was followed by a larger number of people than the KRG Facebook. The results also Funding showed that the KRG did not consider Facebook as a major The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author- effective platform to pursue its agendas and to communicate ship, and/or publication of this article. with Americans or with the Kurdish communities in the United States. This argument was proven by the inadequate, Note ineffective attempts to post only 14 blogs within 2 months 1. In the following, the phrase “the U.S. Facebook” is used instead and with a small number of followers. Although numerous of “the Facebook account of the U.S. Consulate General in materials and news stories of the Kurdish media could have Erbil”; and the phrase “the KRG Facebook” is used instead of been reposted by the KRG Facebook to enhance Kurdish “the Facebook account of the Kurdistan Regional Government public diplomacy and to enrich the KRG image, KRG Representation in the U.S.” Facebook did not utilize these materials. In addition, the lack of postings on their Facebook revealed that the Kurdish mis- References sions in the United States are not active; otherwise, they Aneek, C. (2010). International relations today: Concepts would have published their activities on their Facebook. In and applications. New Delhi: Pearson Education India, spite of the few posts of the KRG Facebook in contrast to the Compositore: Arete Publishing. U.S. Facebook, the majority of the posts were either photos Bjola, C., & Holmes, M. (2015). Digital diplomacy: Theory and or texts—there were very few photo-text combinations. practice. London, England: Routledge. Furthermore, most of the texts were written only in English, Bjola, C., Jiang, L., & Holmes, M. (2015). Social media and while the U.S. Facebook used both Kurdish and English public diplomacy: A comparative analysis of the digital diplomatic strategies of the EU, US, and Japan in China. simultaneously. These weaknesses indicate the KRG Bali et al. 9 In C. Bkola & M. Holmes (Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory Renken, W. (2014). Social media use in public diplomacy: A case and practice (pp. 71-88). London, England: Routledge. study of the German missions’ Facebook use (Master’s thesis). Buckle, A. E. (2012). The new diplomacy: Devising a rela- University of Stirling, UK. tional model of public diplomacy. Pursuit—The Journal of Reynolds, S. (2002). France between the wars: Gender and poli- Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee, 3(2), tics. London, England: Routledge. Article 3. Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda set- Cooper, A. F., Heine, J., & Thakur, R. (Eds.). (2013). The Oxford ting, and priming: The evolution of three media effects models. handbook of modern diplomacy. Oxford, UK: Oxford Journal of Communication, 57, 9-20. University Press. Sharp, P., & Wiseman, G. (Eds.). (2012). American diplomacy. Cox, M., & Stokes, D. (2012). U.S. foreign policy. Oxford, UK: Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Oxford University Press. Širvinskytė, V. (2016). How the online presence of a tourist des- Dale, H. C. (2009). Public diplomacy 2.0: Where the U.S. government tination affects the country brand. The case of Lithuania meets “new media.” Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation. (Master’s thesis). University of Applied Dciences, Stralsund d’Hooghe, I. (2014). China’s public diplomacy. Boston, MA: in Germany. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Surowiec, P. (2016). Nation branding, public relations and soft Dinnie, K. (2015). Nation branding: Concepts, issues, practice. power: Corporatising Poland. New York, NY: Routledge. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Szondi, G. (2008). Public diplomacy and nation brand- Fisher, A. (2010). Mapping the great beyond: Identifying meaning- ing: Conceptual similarities and differences. Rotterdam: ful networks in public diplomacy. CPD Perspectives on Public Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” Diplomacy, 2, 1-87. Desk Top Publishing. Fitzpatrick, K. (2009). The future of U.S. public diplomacy: An Thakur, R. (2007). Asia–Pacific challenges for diplomacy. The uncertain fate. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, 9(1), 47-70. Gilboa, E. (2001). Diplomacy in the media age: Three models of Van Ham, P. (2008). Place branding: The state of the art. The uses and effects. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 12(2), 1-28. ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Goof, P. (2013). Cultural diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & Science, 616, 126-149. R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of modern diplomacy Weaver, D. H. (2007). Thoughts on agenda setting, framing, and (pp. 419-436). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. priming. Journal of Communication, 57, 142-147. Gregory, B. (2011). American public diplomacy: Enduring char- Wiseman, G. (2015). Isolate or engage: Adversarial states, US acteristics, elusive transformation. The Hague Journal of foreign policy, and public diplomacy. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Diplomacy, 6, 351-372. University Press. Harris, B. (2013). Diplomacy 2.0: The future of social media in nation branding. Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Author Biographies 4(1), Article 3. Ahmed Omar Bali is the head of the diplomacy and public rela- Hartig, F. (2015). Chinese public diplomacy: The rise of the tions department and a lecturer at the University of Human Confucius Institute. London, England: Routledge. Development in Iraqi Kurdistan. He holds a PhD in media and com- Hayden, C. (2012). The rhetoric of soft power: Public diplomacy in munication from Sheffield Hallam University in the United global contexts. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Kingdom. Iyer, V. (Ed.). (2002). Media ethics in Asia: Addressing the dilem- mas in the information age. Manila, Philippines: Asian Media Mahdi Sofi Karim is an assistant lecturer at the University of Human Information and Communication Centre. Development, Department of Diplomacy and Public Relations in Kaneva, N. (2011). Nation branding: Toward an agenda for critical Sulaimanyah, Iraqi Kurdistan. He received his MA in Teaching research. International Journal of Communication, 5, 117-141. English as a Second Language at Webster University in the United Nakamura, K. H. (2010). U.S. public diplomacy: Background and States with a GPA of 3.760. His academic strengths and interests current issues. Collingdale, PA. DIANE Publishing. include TESL, interpretation, translation, media and politics. Nicholas, S., O’Malley, T., & Williams, K. (2013). Reconstructing the past: History of the mass media 1890–2005. New York, Kardo Rached is a lecturer at the University of Human Development, NY: Routledge. Department of Diplomacy and Public Relations in Sulaimanyah, Park, S. J., & Lim, Y. S. (2014). Information networks and social Iraqi Kurdistan. He received his MA in Contemporary Middle East media use in public diplomacy: A comparative analysis of South Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. His research field is Korea and Japan. Asian Journal of Communication, 24, 79-98. non-state actors in the Middle East and their politics.

Journal

SAGE OpenSAGE

Published: Feb 23, 2018

Keywords: public diplomacy; Facebook; comparative analysis; U.S.; Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)

There are no references for this article.