Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

More delegation, more political control? Politicization of senior-level appointments in 18 European countries

More delegation, more political control? Politicization of senior-level appointments in 18... This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of appointments to increase political control over public bureaucracies with often substantial managerial and policy autonomy. Using data from a large-scale executive survey from central government ministries and agencies in 18 European countries, the article provides a comprehensive cross-national and cross-organizational analysis of the autonomy-politicization conundrum and the drivers of the politicization of senior-level appointments. We find that national patterns of politicization correspond fairly well to country families as defined by administrative traditions, with some traditions being more coherent than others. At the organizational level, we find no evidence of efforts by politicians to compensate for extended autonomy by politicizing senior-level appointments, yet we provide evidence of differential effects of both formal and informal organizational characteristics on patterns of politicization. Our analyses show that politicization of senior appointments is lower in organizations with agency status, higher organizational social capital, higher financial autonomy and more extensive use of management tools. The article thereby not only offers comprehensive evidence of cross-country differences in politicization; it also adds to the literature on sub-national variation, by fleshing out an organizational perspective to the study of politicized appointments in the European context. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Public Policy and Administration SAGE

More delegation, more political control? Politicization of senior-level appointments in 18 European countries

Loading next page...
 
/lp/sage/more-delegation-more-political-control-politicization-of-senior-level-JvAdW0eybP

References (52)

Publisher
SAGE
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2018
ISSN
0952-0767
eISSN
1749-4192
DOI
10.1177/0952076718776356
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of appointments to increase political control over public bureaucracies with often substantial managerial and policy autonomy. Using data from a large-scale executive survey from central government ministries and agencies in 18 European countries, the article provides a comprehensive cross-national and cross-organizational analysis of the autonomy-politicization conundrum and the drivers of the politicization of senior-level appointments. We find that national patterns of politicization correspond fairly well to country families as defined by administrative traditions, with some traditions being more coherent than others. At the organizational level, we find no evidence of efforts by politicians to compensate for extended autonomy by politicizing senior-level appointments, yet we provide evidence of differential effects of both formal and informal organizational characteristics on patterns of politicization. Our analyses show that politicization of senior appointments is lower in organizations with agency status, higher organizational social capital, higher financial autonomy and more extensive use of management tools. The article thereby not only offers comprehensive evidence of cross-country differences in politicization; it also adds to the literature on sub-national variation, by fleshing out an organizational perspective to the study of politicized appointments in the European context.

Journal

Public Policy and AdministrationSAGE

Published: Jan 1, 2020

There are no references for this article.