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Critical Success Factors for Neutralization of Airborne Threats:

Critical Success Factors for Neutralization of Airborne Threats: Decisions regarding neutralizing airborne threats in the combat environment require comprehensive knowledge of resources at hand and enemy intentions. The complexity of the situation has resulted in the emergence of various models encompassing important factors of threat neutralization. Various characteristics of airborne threats considered important for their assessment have already been identified in previous literature, which include speed, distance, approach angle, maneuverability, and so on. Due to the possible extent of loss to critical assets, literature has emphasized on identifying as many useful characteristics of threats as possible. This study is also a step in this direction to improve the weapon assignment for threat neutralization. Weapon assignment based on a well-calculated threat index is a key to success in military conflicts. The purpose of this article is to identify new factors through the involvement of experts. In this study, a set of factors has been identified through a survey of relevant literature and semi-structured interviews followed by its refinement through a three-round Delphi study. The results suggest that airborne threats are considered different from other threats due to their lethality and consequences. The top-level decision-makers require a comprehensive understanding of the criticality of the situation and the effects of poor decisions. Besides other factors, weapon stock, supply chain information, and analysis of vulnerable assets/points in threat neutralization are critical to accomplish higher efficiency. The shortlisted factors yield a foundation of a comprehensive framework for decision making in a highly dynamic environment of air defense. Keywords airborne threats, air defense, threat evaluation, threat neutralization, Delphi study, decision factors, vulnerable assets (Bayrak & Polat, 2013), and so on. But the objective of this Introduction study is to identify factors which may be used as an input to Air defense (AD) means safeguarding the country’s territorial any technique used or implemented. boundaries and air space against the enemy’s threats mostly Protection of VA/VPs effectively is a vital key perfor- through the use of fighter aircraft and ground-based AD sys- mance indicator of threat neutralization (TN) deployed in an tems (Delaney, 1990). The prime objective of AD is to detect AD zone (Bayrak & Polat, 2013; Kharal, 2010). The priority and deny invaders through effective and efficient resource of targets for opposing forces is based on their importance, utilization (Naseem et al., 2017). Decisions to neutralize tar- value, and mobility. Therefore, careful planning and execu- gets in a dynamic hostile environment are assisted by various tion is required to utilize and protect these VAs/VPs effec- optimization algorithm implemented through decision sup- tively and efficiently (Kirby & Capey, 1997). The critical port systems (DSS; Mardani et al., 2015; Roux & Van Vuuren, factors for making decisions to counter the aerial threats 2007). Improper decision making has severe consequences include threat evaluation (TE) and TN with the available which not only result in damage to vulnerable assets/points resources (Azimirad & Haddadnia, 2015; Bell et al., 2011; (VA/VPs) but also loss of costly ammunition (Azimirad & Roux & Van Vuuren, 2007; Schwenn et al., 2015). TE is con- Haddadnia, 2015). In the literature, various techniques have sidered as one of the key components of TN and selection of been proposed for optimal decision making, including game theory (Shan & Zhuang, 2013), Bayesian network and fuzzy National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), College of logic (Johansson & Falkman, 2008), Morkov survivability E&ME, Rawalpindi, Pakistan model (Erlandsson & Niklasson, 2014), two-integer linear Corresponding Author: programming (Karasakal, 2008), Gray Technique for Order Yasir Ahmad, Department of Engineering Management, National of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), College of E&ME, method (Yun-feng et al., 2011), genetic algorithm, integer Rawalpindi, Pakistan. programming, greedy algorithm, brute-force algorithm Email: yasir.ahmad@ceme.nust.edu.pk Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). 2 SAGE Open Table 1. Existing Models for TN. environment (Allouche, 2005). It becomes extremely diffi- cult to precisely ascertain the exact destination or target with Models Reference the maneuverability of threat (Erlandsson & Niklasson, 3D Stable Marriage Algorithm Naseem et al. (2017) 2013; Phillips-Wren et al., 2009). Threat index (TI) is calcu- Artificial Intelligence in Military Goztepe et al. (2015) lated by incorporating a maximum of TE factors for neutral- Decision-Making Process ization of prioritized threats (Azimirad & Haddadnia, 2015; Agent-based Modeling for Schwenn et al. (2015) Malik, 2012). Defense Acquisition System The second stage of TN is WA accomplished in two steps, Mission Critical Expert System Bloom and Chung (2001) initially the weapon selection (WS) and then WA (Malik, Threat Stabilization & Kohonen Allouche (2005) 2012). The decision regarding WS is made by evaluating Neural Networks various factors, some of which include profile match to Note. TN = threat neutralization. threat type, capability, kill probability, and range to neutral- ize the threat. WA is accomplished under constrained envi- ronment by employing multiple sources of information. appropriate weapons promptly is the most crucial challenge During time-constrained situations, decision-makers are for decision-makers (Liebhaber & Feher, 2002; Naseem assisted by using fuzzy decision-making techniques to make et al., 2017). efficient and effective decisions (Liebhaber & Feher, 2002). TE is based on the critical information of intruder’s Appropriate weapon is assigned to a threat based on TI and approach (direction and speed) and type of weapon (fighter characteristics of weapon (Azimirad & Haddadnia, 2015; aircraft, missile, or drone) so as an effective response may be Malik, 2012; Naeem & Masood, 2010). generated. The defender must keep contingent alternatives With the advancement in weapons technology, TN has and solutions for unexpected scenarios (Dahlbom & Helldin, become a challenging task for decision-makers. To counter 2013; Nasaruddin & Latif, 2013). With advancements in modern threats, solutions also need to incorporate sophisti- technology, AD decision-makers (including commanders cated advanced techniques for responding in time-critical and operators) are assisted with modern equipment yet the situations. Dynamic decision support-based optimal TE and whole process of TN is intrinsically risky, cumbersome, and defensive resource scheduling algorithms have gained demanding (Roux & Van Vuuren, 2007). Eventually, weapon importance due to effective and efficient results. Threat assignment (WA) decisions are based on TE carried out by Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) based on such humans, assisted by technology to some extent (Deng et al., algorithms assures low probability of errors (Naeem et al., 2010; Riveiro et al., 2013). The decision-makers base their 2009). Although several factors for TEWA have been identi- decisions on available information, understanding of objec- fied in previous studies (Azimirad & Haddadnia, 2015; tives, prevalent strategic situation, and involved risks Dahlbom & Helldin, 2013; Schwenn et al., 2015), yet there (Schwarber, 2005). TN efficiency in AD sector is not an eas- exists a room for inclusion and integration of additional fac- ily achievable task (Azimirad & Haddadnia, 2015). Scholars tors for better results. Factors such as cost and availability of and practitioners have focused on different aspects and pro- counter weapons and ammunition have been discussed in posed different TN models (Table 1). Search for a compre- previous studies (Bayrak & Polat, 2013; Govindan et al., hensive model is a continuous process. This study is also an 2015; Xiaofeng & Shifei, 2012; Zhang et al., 2015), but inte- endeavor to introduce important factors for further improve- grating these factors in TEWA decision-making process ment of existing TN models for effectivity and efficiency. remains an area of interest to achieve efficiency (Naseem TN is performed in a complex time constraint environ- et al., 2017). Although the cost of safeguarding an important ment during conflicts. The primary goal of TN is to profi- VA/VP may not be given much consideration for wealthy ciently evaluate the threat and subsequently assign weapons nations but for countries with meager resources, this factor keeping in view the objectives, intent, and capabilities of gains considerable importance (Naseem et al., 2017). the enemy’s attack (Hausken & Zhuang, 2012). It com- Countering the airborne threat has become a challenging prises two phases: TE and WA. TE is undertaken in three task due to rapid advancements in technology (Sahoo, 2016). stages: (a) threat perception (TP), (b) evaluation, and (c) Efforts are made for early detection of threat with respect to prioritization. TP is based on various factors, which include its make and type so as its neutralization may be accom- radar-cross section, height, speed, thermal signature, attack plished through timely WA. Effective radar and weapon approach, heat signatures, dive angle, and maneuvering deployment (WD) plan can only be made once VA/VPs are capability of threat. TE is a complex task which is accom- determined and prioritized during the peacetime (Malik, plished by catering to multiple factors including distance, 2012; Naeem & Masood, 2010). WD, in general, is scarcely speed, altitude, heading, height, formation, type, and carry- been discussed in the literature due to confidentiality issues ing weapons (Govindan et al., 2015; Naseem et al., 2017). (Naseem et al., 2017). It is well recognized that the counter- Threat maneuvering further adds complexity in evaluation, measures based on the early preparation can decrease the loss making it cumbersome and complex task in time constraint Naseem and Ahmad 3 Literature Review Semi-structured Delphi Study Interviews •List of citical •List of critical •Significant factors for TN- factors perceived factors for TN- DM by professionals DM Figure 1. Research process. Note. TN = threat neutralization; DM = decision making. to a defender and increase the cost-effectiveness (Paulson the articles with more citations were analyzed. While analyz- et al., 2016). It is generally not possible to determine the ing these articles, approximately seven additional references exact cost of defending VA/VP in terms of monetary value were added to the list by checking the reference sections of due to intangible factors of security and safety of life and cited articles. Thus, a total of 46 articles were reviewed for infrastructure (Yıldırım et al., 2009). Every country makes the study. endeavors to configure and design its AD system so as mini- mum loss of life and property is assured with the security of Research Method VA/VPs at least cost (Hausken & Zhuang, 2012). TN sys- tems have remained in discussion by practitioners and acade- The methodology to find the TN factors consists of three micians but a comprehensive model to cater for all factors steps: has remained a utopia. The need to incorporate more factors exists for improvement in the decision-making process for 1. Identifying TN factors for decision making (DM) TN systems and this study attempts to fill this gap by identi- through literature review and developing the first fication and verification of TN factors through interviews version of the conceptual framework. and Delphi study. 2. Refining the first version of the conceptual frame- work through inputs and opinions by experts with significant experience in the field of AD using semi- Selection of Literature structured interviews. A systematic search strategy was used to find the maximum 3. Conducting three-round Delphi study. studies that have already been done in the last many years directly or indirectly related to TN systems in particular and The research process (Figure 1) for the study follows the AD systems in general. While searching the literature, it has method used by Frinsdorf et al. (2014) to study critical fac- been observed that most of the theories for TN have been tors for efficiency in a military environment. proposed from the 1980s onwards. Therefore, it was decided to conduct research from 1980 to 2019. The various biblio- Step 1: Identification of TN Factors graphic databases were searched including ISI, ProQuest, JSTOR, and Scopus. For the collection of literature, journal TN is a dynamic problem because of the diversity of sce- publications by famous publishing houses including Sage, narios, constraints, and evaluation criteria. The prior research ScienceDirect, Elsevier, Emerald, Wiley Online Library, on the subject has been consulted to generate an exhaustive Springer, and Oxford Journals were consulted. To find the list of factors used for decision making. The review of rele- maximum relevant studies, selected conference proceedings vant literature resulted in a total of 21 factors broadly catego- were also reviewed. The specific keywords for searching TN rized in TE, WS, and WA (Table 2). critical factors included “threat neutralization,” “military studies,” “weapon deployment,” “weapon assignment,” Step 2: Interviews With AD Experts “threat evaluation,” “criticality of VA/VPs,” “weapon selec- tion,” “threat perception,” “logistics,” “air defense,” and Semi-structured interviews with experts having extensive “logistics.” To narrow the scope of the literature search, experience were arranged to discuss the applicability of fac- Boolean operator “AND” was used in finding the relevant tors extracted from literature and identify other factors con- studies in the search process. The literature from peer- sidered important based on their experience in the field. reviewed journals and conferences in the English language Because this study has potential to help decision making at were considered. Primarily a total of 63 articles were col- the strategic level, efforts were made to select experts for lected during the search process, with 39 articles identified interviews having requisite experience of working at strate- as potentially relevant to the subject of critical factors of TN. gic, tactical, and operational levels to have wholesome point All 39 relevant articles were acquired in full length. Initially, of view. These face-to-face interviews helped to establish 4 SAGE Open Table 2. Factors Extracted From Literature. Table 3. Summary of Interviewees’ Profile. S. no. Paradigms TN factors Worked as AD Experience at commander 1. Threat Height of the threat experience strategic level (tactical/ Evaluation 2. Radar cross-section Interviewees (years) (years) operational) 3. Dive angle Interviewee A 20 2 Yes 4. Maneuvering capability Interviewee B 24 4 Yes 5. Attack approach Interviewee C 23 2 Yes 6. Thermal images Interviewee D 21 4 Yes 7. Heat signature Interviewee E 24 4 Yes 8. Identification of friend and foe Interviewee F 25 3 Yes 9. Speed Interviewee G 19 3 No 10. Threat lethality from knowledge base Interviewee H 11 0 No 11. Formation 12. Distance Note. AD = air defense. 13. Threat type 14. Threat carrying weapons concern about appropriate weapon’s availability in inventory 15. Weapon Profile match to threat type Selection 16. Capability and its supply from depot to the required place in a combat 17. Kill probability situation. Interviewees A and B emphasized on formulating a 18. Range to neutralize threat viable strategy in peacetime to safeguard VA/VPs in war sce- 19. Weapon Weapon is assigned to a threat based nario as inappropriate contingency planning and improper Assignment on TE categorization of VA/VP result in massive damage. 20. Weapon with highest kill probability There was consensus among interviewees that criticality is assigned first of VA/VPs is a significant parameter for effective WD. This 21. Weapon is assigned first to a threat dimension consists of various factors as extracted from lit- with highest TI (when threat is erature but interviewees (E and G) emphasized on additional more than one) factors like civil infrastructure, power grids, and public Note. TN = threat neutralization; TE = threat evaluation; TI = threat buildings. Interviewees D, E, and G pointed out that previous index. research has mostly focused on TE and WA and less attention has been given to WD which is an important area to achieve synchronous communication, which is an instant communi- success in TN. Interviewees A, B, C, D, and F supported the qué between interviewees and interviewers offering clarity factors of TP and TE previously identified through literature and reliability (Conway et al., 1996; Opdenakker, 2006). The review, but they also added two more factors (potency of interview questions included information about VA/VPs, threat and expected damage to an asset if the threat is not WD, TP, TE, WS, and WA. The interview questionnaire was neutralized). Interviewees E and H highlighted that WS is developed through consensus of a panel of three experts (not more complex than WA and must be given more importance part of interviewees’ panel later on) selected on their experi- to achieve success. These interviewees emphasized that WS ence. The experience-based interview questions generate has a critical link with weapons’ inventory and supply infor- the higher levels of validity (Pulakos & Schmitt, 1995). A mation for optimum and cost-effective TN solutions. Their total of eight experts were selected for interviews initially input resulted in adding two more factors to WS list (weap- with profiles shown in Table 3. The experience of experts ons’ inventory and supply chain). The interviewees A, D, and ranged from 11 to 25 years with six out of eight interview- F endorsed the concept of linking weapons’ inventory and ees had worked as commanders at different tiers. Although supply with the decision-making process of TN. These fac- the interviewees G and H did not work as commanders, tors gain more importance in resource constraint environ- they were selected due to being foreign qualified with cred- ment (especially time). Interviewee E stated that the national ible research publications in the relevant field. Both have defense matters are not valued in monetary terms, hence remained part of a Research & Development department in minimum consideration is given to cost-effective solutions an AD organization. under threat. Interviewees A, D, E, G, and H attributed the Initially, the interviewees were asked to elaborate TN in mission failures to poor resource selection of weapons and/ general. The interviewees D, E, and H referred to the specific or non-availability of the appropriate ones in a combat situa- definition of TN as accomplishing mission without any con- tion. The interviewees agreed that proper planning in the sideration of cost (i.e., no matter how much cost is incurred identification of critical VA/VPs and WD is critical to achiev- to neutralize the threat). However, all other interviewees ing success in TN. The interviewees also pointed out that agreed that cost-effectiveness must be considered for WA in significant factors related to cost-effectiveness, WD, and neutralizing threats. The interviewees A and C raised the VA/VPs are missing in existing models of TN in AD sector. Naseem and Ahmad 5 Table 4. TN Factors Extracted Through Semi-Structured Lopez-Catalan & Bañuls, 2017). The Delphi process involves Interviews. anonymous and controlled feedback of a selected panel of experts (Ameyaw et al., 2016). The factors of TN identified S. no. Paradigms TN factors earlier in this study became an input to this Delphi process. 1. Threat Elevation Evaluation 2. Potency of threat Selection of experts for Delphi Study. There is little agreement 3. Expected damage to an asset if a in the literature about the size of an expert panel (Keeney threat is not neutralized et al., 2001). Studies have used different number of experts in 4. Criticality of Civil infrastructure Delphi technique ranging from 8 to 40 (Sitlington & Coetzer, VA/VPs 5. Power grids 2015). The number of experts depends on numerous factors, 6. Important bridges such as scope of the problem, the time frame of research, the 7. Oil refineries volume of targeted data, available resources in terms of time, 8. Ammunition depot money, and number of available experts in the field (Turoff & 9. Strategic asset/location Linstone, 1975). The unbiased and accurate selection of 10. Military infrastructure expert panelist is one of the most significant aspects of suc- 11. Vulnerability value cessful Delphi studies (Chan et al., 2001) so special attention 12. Perceivable threat value was given in choosing the experts. The chosen experts must 13. Weapon Resource check fulfill certain requirements, such as professional qualifica- Deployment 14. Weapon value tions, working experience, working appointments, and rele- 15. Terrain vant publications (Hallowell, 2008). This study has used 16. Suitability expert evaluation system as proposed by Hallowell and Gam- 17. Supply from the closest depot 18. Quantity in inventory batese (2010). Identification of experts was made using 19. Weapon Demand of weapons snowball sampling technique. The criteria included holding Selection 20. Quantity of functional weapons/ of decision-making position in AD sector, qualification in the ammunition in inventory requisite field, and academic contribution in the form of arti- 21. Supply from the depot (in cles, book chapters, or editorials. A total of 24 experts were warfare situations) shortlisted according to the criteria and contacted through 22. Competency of weapon personal calls and emails. Out of these identified experts, 23. Inventory constraint eight experts gave their consent for participation in the study. 24. Cost of weapons Note. TN = threat neutralization; VA/VP = vulnerable assets/points. Number of rounds/iterations. The Delphi study is generally conducted in multiple rounds. There are two main reasons for it: (a) reaching consensus by decreasing variance and (b) The input by interviewees resulted in adding more factors improving precision. The panel experts reach the consensus related to cost-effectiveness in TN models. In the end, a list through anonymous and the controlled feedback process of factors related to TN decision-making process was com- (Hallowell & Gambatese, 2010). No consent on the optimal piled based on literature survey and interviews. The factors number of rounds could be found in previous studies. The extracted from the literature were shared with interviewees researchers have conducted various number of rounds based before interviews for their information and analysis. on the required level of consensus ranging from 2 to 6 Additional factors considered important by experts were cat- (Campos-Climent et al., 2012; Turoff & Linstone, 1975). In egorized and presented in Table 4. Moreover, it was dis- this study, the Delphi method is conducted in two rounds of cussed that the factors of TP should be separately analyzed. data collection and a third round to cross-validate the results. In TP and TE, four factors are the same, while four factors In the first round, open-ended questions were asked to vali- (identified from literature) were moved from TE to TP. In the date the already identified TN factors (through literature next step, Delphi study was performed to finalize and priori- review and interviews) and making the list comprehensive tize the TN factors. by adding additional factors based on the experience of experts. In the second round, experts were asked to rate the Step 3: Delphi Study factors on a Likert-type scale (1–5). In the third round, experts were asked to evaluate the ratings after randomizing The Delphi technique is an analytical technique based on the the factors. judgment of a group of experts with its origin from defense industry (Loo, 2002). The experts’ opinions are carried out in successive, anonymous rounds to achieve a consensus First-round Delphi study. In this first round, an open-ended (Turoff & Linstone, 1975). Many researchers have used this questionnaire was sent to experts and asked to verify the list method specifically for the framework development, deci- of critical factors relating to VA/VPs, WD, TE, and WA and sion making and forecasting, and so on (Chan et al., 2001; write additional factors based on their experience and 6 SAGE Open understanding with brief rationale. The experts completed method. The results not only validate the previous research the first round within 2 weeks resulted in a total of 49 factors but also add more factors to be considered for making deci- critical to TN in AD environment as shown in Table 5. This sion regarding TN. The paradigms related to the traditional round helped to expand the number of factors considered concept of mission success including TE, WD, criticality of essential by the panel of experts in Step 2. VA/VPs, WS, and WA for TN were acknowledged by the The redundancy was removed by eliminating the similar interviewees and panel experts. The most important factors factors. Direction of threat factor was removed and only the include “radar-cross section” in TP and TE, “military infra- dive angle of threat was retained in the list. Similarly, threat structure” in the criticality of VA/VPs, “perceivable threat type (100%) and potency of threat (75%) were found to be value” in WD, “profile match to threat type” in WS, and similar and so the potency of threat factor was removed. The “weapon is assigned to a threat based on TE” in WA. The updated list of factors was prepared and shared with the Delphi process helped in the validation of these factors and panel of experts in the second round with the rationale for provided a ranking of these critical factors for making a TN elimination of factors. strategy. The factor of “radar-cross section” is recognized as one of Second-round Delphi study. In the second round of Delphi the most important factors in TE which is critical to identify study, importance rating of factors was carried out by experts and locate the threat. The wrong perception and/or evalua- using 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 to 5 (1 = not at all tion of a threat cause worst-case scenario (Dahlbom & important, 2 = slightly important, 3 = fairly important, 4 = Helldin, 2013; Riveiro et al., 2013). Other important factors quite important, 5 = very important) for the updated list of of TP and TE for getting accurate information of threat TN factors prepared after first Round. In Delphi studies, include “attack approach,” “dive angle,” “height of threat,” there is no universally defined or agreed cut-off point for the and “maneuvering capability.” The panel of experts also consensus. The applicable measure is to use the mean score ranked the “identification of friend and foe” high. Similarly, as a cut-off point (Choi & Sirakaya, 2006). The average the factors of “speed,” “height,” “distance,” “type,” “forma- score of all factors is 3.5 and therefore it is adopted as a cut- tion,” “carrying weapons,” and “threat lethality” are signifi- off point. After this second round, 41 TN factors having the cant in TE. These factors are important for TI to prioritize mean scores equal to or more than 3.5 (overall mean) were threats. This reinforces the finding of the literature review selected to be included in the final third round for re-evalua- that the threats are prioritized based on TE (Malik, 2012; tion as shown in Table 6. Naeem & Masood, 2010). The interviewees highlighted the criticality of VA/VPs as Third-round Delphi study. To proceed further, the results of an important paradigm. This factor is considered vital for its second round were shared with the panel of experts. They contribution toward WD affecting whole TN process. The were asked to review their previous rating and provide the study also ranks different VA/VPs (military infrastructure, rating again on the same Likert-type scale. Experts recon- ammunition depot, civil infrastructure, power grids, oil refin- sidered their evaluation for a few factors and adjusted their eries, important bridges, etc.) for their criticality and impor- ratings resulted in slightly higher mean scores than the last tance. The study highlights various critical factors in WS and round. Most of the rankings of TN factors remained stable WA which include “profile match to threat type,” “range to from second to third round as shown in Table 7. To find out neutralize threat,” “kill probability,” “capability,” “quantity the inter-group comparison, a non-parametric method of in inventory,” and “supply from depot.” Deployed AD sys- correlation analysis (Spearman rank correlation coefficient) tem needs to consider the interdependencies of these factors is used. The value of Spearman’s rank correlation coeffi- so as a response to incoming threats may be made depending cient beyond the critical value at a certain significance level on the available resources. (e.g., say .01, .02, or .05) shows that there is a harmony between the responses of different groups. This method is Conclusion used to calculate the degree of consensus between the rat- ings achieved in second and third rounds. A high number In the rapidly changing world of technology, the concept of reflects a high degree of consensus (Von der Gracht, 2012). TN in AD sector is evolving continuously, thus extending Computed values show a significant relationship and a high from a traditional concept to more agile and rapid response degree of consensus between the ranking of second and considering the orientation of WD and criticality of VA/ third rounds. VPs. TN, in wartime, is a crucial and time-critical activity and there is a dearth of studies exclusively in the field. Although previous studies have suggested various models, Discussion findings of this study provide information relating to addi- The purpose of this study was to further the research related tional factors which if incorporated in the model will to decision factors for efficient and effective TN. The study enhance the effectivity of model. This study investigates TN used the input of experts through interviews and Delphi efficiency issues in the AD environment via semi-structured Naseem and Ahmad 7 Table 5. List of TN Factors (Round 1 Delphi Study). S. no. Paradigms TN factors Frequency Percentagee 1. Threat Height of the threat 8 100 Perception 2. Radar cross-section 8 100 3. Dive angle 7 87.5 4. Maneuvering capability 7 87.5 5. Attack approach 8 100 6. Thermal images 8 100 7. Heat signature 6 75 8. Identification of friend and foe 7 87.5 9. Threat Speed 8 100 Evaluation 10. Height 8 100 11. Elevation 7 87.5 12. Dive angle 8 100 13. Potency of threat 6 75 14. Expected damage to an asset if the threat is not neutralized 5 62.5 15. Radar cross-section 8 100 16. Maneuvering capability 8 100 17. Threat lethality from knowledge base 7 87.5 18. Formation 7 87.5 19. Distance 8 100 20. Threat type 8 100 21. Threat carrying weapons 8 100 22. Criticality of Civil infrastructure 8 100 VA/VPs 23. Power grids 8 100 24. Important bridges 8 100 25. Oil refineries 7 87.5 26. Ammunition depot 8 100 27. Strategic asset/location 7 87.5 28. Military infrastructure 8 100 29. Weapon Vulnerability value 8 100 Deployment 30. Perceivable threat value 8 100 31. Resource check 6 75 32. Weapon value 7 87.5 33. Terrain 7 87.5 34. Suitability 8 100 35. Supply from the closest depot 6 75 36. Quantity in inventory 7 87.5 37. Weapon Profile match to threat type 8 100 Selection 38. Capability 7 87.5 39. Kill probability 7 87.5 40. Range to neutralize threat 8 100 41. Demand of weapons 6 75 42. Quantity of functional weapons/ammunition in inventory 7 87.5 43. Supply from the depot (in warfare situations) 6 75 44. Competency of weapon 7 87.5 45. Inventory constraint 8 100 46. Cost of weapon 6 75 47. Weapon Weapon is assigned to a threat based on TE 7 87.5 Assignment 48. Weapon with highest kill probability is assigned first 8 100 49. Weapon is assigned first to a threat with highest TI (in case of more threats) 7 87.5 Note. TN = threat neutralization; VA/VP = vulnerable assets/vulnerable points; TE = threat evaluation; TI = threat index. 8 SAGE Open Table 6. List of TN Factors (Round 1 Delphi Study). S. no. Paradigms TN factors M Median Mode SD Rank 1. Threat Radar cross-section 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 1 Perception 2. Dive angle 4.88 5.00 5.00 0.35 2 3. Attack approach 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 3 4. Height of the threat 4.25 4.00 4.00 0.71 4 5. Heat signature 4.13 4.00 4.00 0.83 5 6. Thermal images 3.75 4.00 4.00 1.04 6 7. Maneuvering capability 3.63 3.50 3.00 0.74 7 8. Identification of friend and foe 3.56 3.50 3.00 0.93 8 1. Threat Radar cross-section 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 1 Evaluation 2. Speed 4.88 5.00 5.00 0.35 2 3. Height 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 3 4. Threat type 4.25 4.50 5.00 0.89 4 5. Dive angle 4.38 4.50 5.00 0.74 5 6. Distance 4.13 4.00 4.00 0.64 6 7. Formation 4.00 4.00 3.00 0.93 7 8. Threat carrying weapons 3.75 4.00 4.00 0.71 9 9. Maneuvering capability 3.56 3.50 3.00 0.93 10 10. Threat lethality from knowledge base 3.56 3.50 4.00 1.06 11 1. Criticality of Civil infrastructure 4.25 4.00 4.00 0.71 4 VA/VPs 2. Power grids 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 3 3. Oil refineries 3.75 4.00 4.00 1.04 7 4. Ammunition depot 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 2 5. Important bridges 4.00 4.00 3.00 0.93 6 6. Military infrastructure 4.88 5.00 5.00 0.35 1 7. Strategic asset/location 3.88 4.00 4.00 0.99 5 1. Weapon Vulnerability value 4.88 5.00 5.00 0.35 1 Deployment 2. Perceivable threat value 4.38 4.50 5.00 0.74 3 3. Weapon value 4.63 5.00 5.00 0.52 2 4. Terrain 3.88 4.00 4.00 0.99 7 5. Suitability 4.0 4.00 4.00 0.76 6 6. Quantity in inventory 4.25 4.00 5.00 0.71 4 7. Supply from the closest depot 4.13 4.00 4.00 0.84 5 1. Weapon Range to neutralize threat 4.88 5.00 5.00 0.35 1 Selection 2. Profile match to threat type 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 2 3. Kill probability 4.38 4.50 5.00 0.74 3 4. Quantity of functional weapons/ammunition in inventory 4.13 4.00 4.00 0.83 4 5. Capability 4.0 4.00 4.00 0.76 5 6. Supply from the depot (in warfare situations) 3.88 4.00 3.00 0.83 6 1. Weapon Weapon is assigned to a threat based on TE 4.63 5.00 5.00 0.52 1 Assignment 2. Weapon is assigned first to a threat with highest TI 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 2 (when threat is more than one) 3. Weapon with highest kill probability is assigned first 4.25 4.00 4.00 0.71 3 Note. TN = threat neutralization; VA/VP = vulnerable assets/vulnerable points; TE = threat evaluation; TI = threat index. interviews and the Delphi study. These results show that it is could have been used for the formulation of a model based no longer sufficient to simply focus on TE and WA factors to on results. The other limitation is related to validation which achieve efficiency and effectiveness in TN. Rather, it is also could only be possible if the model is implemented in AD important to pay attention to the criticality of VA/VPs and system. Nevertheless, this study provides a useful reference WD. Indeed, efforts are required to develop an efficient and for the improvement of decision making in AD sector. effective TN model based on the identified factors to Identification of TN factors for DSS has been carried out increase the success rate with the best utilization of avail- through the involvement of experts in the study. In future, able resources. The limitations of the study are related to DSS based on optimization algorithms may be tested using data and validation. The empirical data for the study was not identified factors and simulation results may help to elimi- available due to the sensitive nature of information, which nate redundant factors. Naseem and Ahmad 9 Table 7. Analysis of Delphi Round 3. Round 2 Round 3 S. no. TN factors M Rank M Rank Median Mode SD Threat Perception 1. Radar cross-section 5.00 1 5.00 1 5.00 5.00 0.00 2. Dive angle 4.88 2 4.38 3 4.00 4.00 0.51 3. Attack approach 4.50 3 4.75 2 5.00 5.00 0.46 4. Height of the threat 4.25 4 4.25 4 4.00 4.00 0.70 5. Heat signature 4.13 5 4.13 5 4.00 4.00 0.83 6. Thermal images 3.75 6 3.63 7 3.50 3.00 0.74 7. Maneuvering capability 3.63 7 3.75 6 4.00 4.00 0.71 8. Identification of friend and foe 3.56 8 3.63 8 3.50 3.00 0.744 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) = .929 Critical value = .929, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, .929 = .929 Threat Evaluation 1. Radar cross-section 5.00 1 5.00 1 5.00 5.00 0.00 2. Speed 4.88 2 4.88 2 500 5.00 0.35 3. Height 4.50 3 4.50 3 4.50 4.00 0.53 4. Threat type 4.25 4 4.13 6 4.00 4.00 0.64 5. Dive angle 4.38 5 4.25 4 4.50 5.00 0.88 6. Distance 4.13 6 4.38 5 4.50 5.00 0.74 7. Formation 4.00 7 4.00 7 4.00 3.00 0.93 8. Threat carrying weapons 3.75 8 3.88 8 4.00 4.00 0.99 9. Maneuvering capability 3.56 9 3.75 10 4.00 4.00 0.71 10. Threat lethality from knowledge base 3.56 10 3.63 11 3.50 3.00 0.744 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) = .964 Critical value = .755, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, .964 > .755 Criticality of VA/VP 1. Civil infrastructure 4.25 4 4.38 3 4.50 5.00 0.74 2. Power grids 4.50 3 4.13 4 4.00 4.00 0.83 3. Oil refineries 3.75 5 3.75 6 4.00 4.00 1.04 4. Ammunition depot 4.50 2 4.25 2 4.00 4.00 0.71 5. Important bridges 4.00 6 4.00 5 4.00 4.00 0.76 6. Military infrastructure 4.88 1 4.88 1 5.00 5.00 0.35 7. Strategic asset/location 3.88 7 4.00 7 4.00 3.00 0.93 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) = .786 Critical value = .786, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, .786 = .786 Weapon Deployment 1. Vulnerability value 4.88 1 4.75 2 5.00 5.00 0.46 2. Perceivable threat value 4.38 3 5.00 1 5.00 5.00 0.00 3. Weapon value 4.63 2 4.50 3 4.50 4.00 0.53 4. Terrain 3.88 7 3.88 7 4.00 4.00 0.99 5. Suitability 4.0 6 4.0 6 4.00 4.00 0.76 6. Quantity in inventory 4.25 4 4.25 4 4.50 4.00 0.71 7. Supply from closest depot 4.13 5 4.13 5 3.75 4.00 0.74 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) = .971 Critical value = .788, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, .971 > .788 Weapon Selection 1. Range to neutralize threat 4.88 1 4.50 2 4.50 4.00 0.53 2. Profile match to threat type 4.50 2 4.88 1 5.00 5.00 0.35 3. Kill probability 4.38 3 4.38 3 4.50 5.00 0.74 4. Quantity in inventory 4.13 4 4.00 5 4.00 4.00 0.76 5. Capability 4.0 5 4.13 4 4.00 4.00 0.83 6. Supply from depot (in warfare situations) 3.88 6 3.88 6 4.00 3.00 0.83 (continued) 10 SAGE Open Table 7. (continued) Round 2 Round 3 S. no. TN factors M Rank M Rank Median Mode SD Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho)= .886 Critical value = .886, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, .886 = .886 Weapon Assignment 1. Weapon is assigned to a threat based on TE 4.63 1 4.63 1 5.00 5.00 0.52 2. Weapon is assigned first to a threat with highest TI (when 4.50 2 4.50 2 4.50 4.00 0.53 threat is more than one) 3. Weapon with highest kill probability is assigned first 4.25 3 4.25 3 4.00 4.00 0.71 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) = 1.00 Critical value = 1.00, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, 1.00 = 1.00 Note. TN = threat neutralization; VA/VP = vulnerable assets/vulnerable points; TE = threat evaluation; TI = threat index. Chan, A. P. C., Yung, E. H. K., Lam, P. T. I., Tam, C. M., & Cheung, Declaration of Conflicting Interests S. O. (2001). 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Critical Success Factors for Neutralization of Airborne Threats:

Naseem, Afshan; Ahmad, Yasir
SAGE Open , Volume 10 (3): 1 – Sep 30, 2020
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Abstract

Decisions regarding neutralizing airborne threats in the combat environment require comprehensive knowledge of resources at hand and enemy intentions. The complexity of the situation has resulted in the emergence of various models encompassing important factors of threat neutralization. Various characteristics of airborne threats considered important for their assessment have already been identified in previous literature, which include speed, distance, approach angle, maneuverability, and so on. Due to the possible extent of loss to critical assets, literature has emphasized on identifying as many useful characteristics of threats as possible. This study is also a step in this direction to improve the weapon assignment for threat neutralization. Weapon assignment based on a well-calculated threat index is a key to success in military conflicts. The purpose of this article is to identify new factors through the involvement of experts. In this study, a set of factors has been identified through a survey of relevant literature and semi-structured interviews followed by its refinement through a three-round Delphi study. The results suggest that airborne threats are considered different from other threats due to their lethality and consequences. The top-level decision-makers require a comprehensive understanding of the criticality of the situation and the effects of poor decisions. Besides other factors, weapon stock, supply chain information, and analysis of vulnerable assets/points in threat neutralization are critical to accomplish higher efficiency. The shortlisted factors yield a foundation of a comprehensive framework for decision making in a highly dynamic environment of air defense. Keywords airborne threats, air defense, threat evaluation, threat neutralization, Delphi study, decision factors, vulnerable assets (Bayrak & Polat, 2013), and so on. But the objective of this Introduction study is to identify factors which may be used as an input to Air defense (AD) means safeguarding the country’s territorial any technique used or implemented. boundaries and air space against the enemy’s threats mostly Protection of VA/VPs effectively is a vital key perfor- through the use of fighter aircraft and ground-based AD sys- mance indicator of threat neutralization (TN) deployed in an tems (Delaney, 1990). The prime objective of AD is to detect AD zone (Bayrak & Polat, 2013; Kharal, 2010). The priority and deny invaders through effective and efficient resource of targets for opposing forces is based on their importance, utilization (Naseem et al., 2017). Decisions to neutralize tar- value, and mobility. Therefore, careful planning and execu- gets in a dynamic hostile environment are assisted by various tion is required to utilize and protect these VAs/VPs effec- optimization algorithm implemented through decision sup- tively and efficiently (Kirby & Capey, 1997). The critical port systems (DSS; Mardani et al., 2015; Roux & Van Vuuren, factors for making decisions to counter the aerial threats 2007). Improper decision making has severe consequences include threat evaluation (TE) and TN with the available which not only result in damage to vulnerable assets/points resources (Azimirad & Haddadnia, 2015; Bell et al., 2011; (VA/VPs) but also loss of costly ammunition (Azimirad & Roux & Van Vuuren, 2007; Schwenn et al., 2015). TE is con- Haddadnia, 2015). In the literature, various techniques have sidered as one of the key components of TN and selection of been proposed for optimal decision making, including game theory (Shan & Zhuang, 2013), Bayesian network and fuzzy National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), College of logic (Johansson & Falkman, 2008), Morkov survivability E&ME, Rawalpindi, Pakistan model (Erlandsson & Niklasson, 2014), two-integer linear Corresponding Author: programming (Karasakal, 2008), Gray Technique for Order Yasir Ahmad, Department of Engineering Management, National of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), College of E&ME, method (Yun-feng et al., 2011), genetic algorithm, integer Rawalpindi, Pakistan. programming, greedy algorithm, brute-force algorithm Email: yasir.ahmad@ceme.nust.edu.pk Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). 2 SAGE Open Table 1. Existing Models for TN. environment (Allouche, 2005). It becomes extremely diffi- cult to precisely ascertain the exact destination or target with Models Reference the maneuverability of threat (Erlandsson & Niklasson, 3D Stable Marriage Algorithm Naseem et al. (2017) 2013; Phillips-Wren et al., 2009). Threat index (TI) is calcu- Artificial Intelligence in Military Goztepe et al. (2015) lated by incorporating a maximum of TE factors for neutral- Decision-Making Process ization of prioritized threats (Azimirad & Haddadnia, 2015; Agent-based Modeling for Schwenn et al. (2015) Malik, 2012). Defense Acquisition System The second stage of TN is WA accomplished in two steps, Mission Critical Expert System Bloom and Chung (2001) initially the weapon selection (WS) and then WA (Malik, Threat Stabilization & Kohonen Allouche (2005) 2012). The decision regarding WS is made by evaluating Neural Networks various factors, some of which include profile match to Note. TN = threat neutralization. threat type, capability, kill probability, and range to neutral- ize the threat. WA is accomplished under constrained envi- ronment by employing multiple sources of information. appropriate weapons promptly is the most crucial challenge During time-constrained situations, decision-makers are for decision-makers (Liebhaber & Feher, 2002; Naseem assisted by using fuzzy decision-making techniques to make et al., 2017). efficient and effective decisions (Liebhaber & Feher, 2002). TE is based on the critical information of intruder’s Appropriate weapon is assigned to a threat based on TI and approach (direction and speed) and type of weapon (fighter characteristics of weapon (Azimirad & Haddadnia, 2015; aircraft, missile, or drone) so as an effective response may be Malik, 2012; Naeem & Masood, 2010). generated. The defender must keep contingent alternatives With the advancement in weapons technology, TN has and solutions for unexpected scenarios (Dahlbom & Helldin, become a challenging task for decision-makers. To counter 2013; Nasaruddin & Latif, 2013). With advancements in modern threats, solutions also need to incorporate sophisti- technology, AD decision-makers (including commanders cated advanced techniques for responding in time-critical and operators) are assisted with modern equipment yet the situations. Dynamic decision support-based optimal TE and whole process of TN is intrinsically risky, cumbersome, and defensive resource scheduling algorithms have gained demanding (Roux & Van Vuuren, 2007). Eventually, weapon importance due to effective and efficient results. Threat assignment (WA) decisions are based on TE carried out by Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) based on such humans, assisted by technology to some extent (Deng et al., algorithms assures low probability of errors (Naeem et al., 2010; Riveiro et al., 2013). The decision-makers base their 2009). Although several factors for TEWA have been identi- decisions on available information, understanding of objec- fied in previous studies (Azimirad & Haddadnia, 2015; tives, prevalent strategic situation, and involved risks Dahlbom & Helldin, 2013; Schwenn et al., 2015), yet there (Schwarber, 2005). TN efficiency in AD sector is not an eas- exists a room for inclusion and integration of additional fac- ily achievable task (Azimirad & Haddadnia, 2015). Scholars tors for better results. Factors such as cost and availability of and practitioners have focused on different aspects and pro- counter weapons and ammunition have been discussed in posed different TN models (Table 1). Search for a compre- previous studies (Bayrak & Polat, 2013; Govindan et al., hensive model is a continuous process. This study is also an 2015; Xiaofeng & Shifei, 2012; Zhang et al., 2015), but inte- endeavor to introduce important factors for further improve- grating these factors in TEWA decision-making process ment of existing TN models for effectivity and efficiency. remains an area of interest to achieve efficiency (Naseem TN is performed in a complex time constraint environ- et al., 2017). Although the cost of safeguarding an important ment during conflicts. The primary goal of TN is to profi- VA/VP may not be given much consideration for wealthy ciently evaluate the threat and subsequently assign weapons nations but for countries with meager resources, this factor keeping in view the objectives, intent, and capabilities of gains considerable importance (Naseem et al., 2017). the enemy’s attack (Hausken & Zhuang, 2012). It com- Countering the airborne threat has become a challenging prises two phases: TE and WA. TE is undertaken in three task due to rapid advancements in technology (Sahoo, 2016). stages: (a) threat perception (TP), (b) evaluation, and (c) Efforts are made for early detection of threat with respect to prioritization. TP is based on various factors, which include its make and type so as its neutralization may be accom- radar-cross section, height, speed, thermal signature, attack plished through timely WA. Effective radar and weapon approach, heat signatures, dive angle, and maneuvering deployment (WD) plan can only be made once VA/VPs are capability of threat. TE is a complex task which is accom- determined and prioritized during the peacetime (Malik, plished by catering to multiple factors including distance, 2012; Naeem & Masood, 2010). WD, in general, is scarcely speed, altitude, heading, height, formation, type, and carry- been discussed in the literature due to confidentiality issues ing weapons (Govindan et al., 2015; Naseem et al., 2017). (Naseem et al., 2017). It is well recognized that the counter- Threat maneuvering further adds complexity in evaluation, measures based on the early preparation can decrease the loss making it cumbersome and complex task in time constraint Naseem and Ahmad 3 Literature Review Semi-structured Delphi Study Interviews •List of citical •List of critical •Significant factors for TN- factors perceived factors for TN- DM by professionals DM Figure 1. Research process. Note. TN = threat neutralization; DM = decision making. to a defender and increase the cost-effectiveness (Paulson the articles with more citations were analyzed. While analyz- et al., 2016). It is generally not possible to determine the ing these articles, approximately seven additional references exact cost of defending VA/VP in terms of monetary value were added to the list by checking the reference sections of due to intangible factors of security and safety of life and cited articles. Thus, a total of 46 articles were reviewed for infrastructure (Yıldırım et al., 2009). Every country makes the study. endeavors to configure and design its AD system so as mini- mum loss of life and property is assured with the security of Research Method VA/VPs at least cost (Hausken & Zhuang, 2012). TN sys- tems have remained in discussion by practitioners and acade- The methodology to find the TN factors consists of three micians but a comprehensive model to cater for all factors steps: has remained a utopia. The need to incorporate more factors exists for improvement in the decision-making process for 1. Identifying TN factors for decision making (DM) TN systems and this study attempts to fill this gap by identi- through literature review and developing the first fication and verification of TN factors through interviews version of the conceptual framework. and Delphi study. 2. Refining the first version of the conceptual frame- work through inputs and opinions by experts with significant experience in the field of AD using semi- Selection of Literature structured interviews. A systematic search strategy was used to find the maximum 3. Conducting three-round Delphi study. studies that have already been done in the last many years directly or indirectly related to TN systems in particular and The research process (Figure 1) for the study follows the AD systems in general. While searching the literature, it has method used by Frinsdorf et al. (2014) to study critical fac- been observed that most of the theories for TN have been tors for efficiency in a military environment. proposed from the 1980s onwards. Therefore, it was decided to conduct research from 1980 to 2019. The various biblio- Step 1: Identification of TN Factors graphic databases were searched including ISI, ProQuest, JSTOR, and Scopus. For the collection of literature, journal TN is a dynamic problem because of the diversity of sce- publications by famous publishing houses including Sage, narios, constraints, and evaluation criteria. The prior research ScienceDirect, Elsevier, Emerald, Wiley Online Library, on the subject has been consulted to generate an exhaustive Springer, and Oxford Journals were consulted. To find the list of factors used for decision making. The review of rele- maximum relevant studies, selected conference proceedings vant literature resulted in a total of 21 factors broadly catego- were also reviewed. The specific keywords for searching TN rized in TE, WS, and WA (Table 2). critical factors included “threat neutralization,” “military studies,” “weapon deployment,” “weapon assignment,” Step 2: Interviews With AD Experts “threat evaluation,” “criticality of VA/VPs,” “weapon selec- tion,” “threat perception,” “logistics,” “air defense,” and Semi-structured interviews with experts having extensive “logistics.” To narrow the scope of the literature search, experience were arranged to discuss the applicability of fac- Boolean operator “AND” was used in finding the relevant tors extracted from literature and identify other factors con- studies in the search process. The literature from peer- sidered important based on their experience in the field. reviewed journals and conferences in the English language Because this study has potential to help decision making at were considered. Primarily a total of 63 articles were col- the strategic level, efforts were made to select experts for lected during the search process, with 39 articles identified interviews having requisite experience of working at strate- as potentially relevant to the subject of critical factors of TN. gic, tactical, and operational levels to have wholesome point All 39 relevant articles were acquired in full length. Initially, of view. These face-to-face interviews helped to establish 4 SAGE Open Table 2. Factors Extracted From Literature. Table 3. Summary of Interviewees’ Profile. S. no. Paradigms TN factors Worked as AD Experience at commander 1. Threat Height of the threat experience strategic level (tactical/ Evaluation 2. Radar cross-section Interviewees (years) (years) operational) 3. Dive angle Interviewee A 20 2 Yes 4. Maneuvering capability Interviewee B 24 4 Yes 5. Attack approach Interviewee C 23 2 Yes 6. Thermal images Interviewee D 21 4 Yes 7. Heat signature Interviewee E 24 4 Yes 8. Identification of friend and foe Interviewee F 25 3 Yes 9. Speed Interviewee G 19 3 No 10. Threat lethality from knowledge base Interviewee H 11 0 No 11. Formation 12. Distance Note. AD = air defense. 13. Threat type 14. Threat carrying weapons concern about appropriate weapon’s availability in inventory 15. Weapon Profile match to threat type Selection 16. Capability and its supply from depot to the required place in a combat 17. Kill probability situation. Interviewees A and B emphasized on formulating a 18. Range to neutralize threat viable strategy in peacetime to safeguard VA/VPs in war sce- 19. Weapon Weapon is assigned to a threat based nario as inappropriate contingency planning and improper Assignment on TE categorization of VA/VP result in massive damage. 20. Weapon with highest kill probability There was consensus among interviewees that criticality is assigned first of VA/VPs is a significant parameter for effective WD. This 21. Weapon is assigned first to a threat dimension consists of various factors as extracted from lit- with highest TI (when threat is erature but interviewees (E and G) emphasized on additional more than one) factors like civil infrastructure, power grids, and public Note. TN = threat neutralization; TE = threat evaluation; TI = threat buildings. Interviewees D, E, and G pointed out that previous index. research has mostly focused on TE and WA and less attention has been given to WD which is an important area to achieve synchronous communication, which is an instant communi- success in TN. Interviewees A, B, C, D, and F supported the qué between interviewees and interviewers offering clarity factors of TP and TE previously identified through literature and reliability (Conway et al., 1996; Opdenakker, 2006). The review, but they also added two more factors (potency of interview questions included information about VA/VPs, threat and expected damage to an asset if the threat is not WD, TP, TE, WS, and WA. The interview questionnaire was neutralized). Interviewees E and H highlighted that WS is developed through consensus of a panel of three experts (not more complex than WA and must be given more importance part of interviewees’ panel later on) selected on their experi- to achieve success. These interviewees emphasized that WS ence. The experience-based interview questions generate has a critical link with weapons’ inventory and supply infor- the higher levels of validity (Pulakos & Schmitt, 1995). A mation for optimum and cost-effective TN solutions. Their total of eight experts were selected for interviews initially input resulted in adding two more factors to WS list (weap- with profiles shown in Table 3. The experience of experts ons’ inventory and supply chain). The interviewees A, D, and ranged from 11 to 25 years with six out of eight interview- F endorsed the concept of linking weapons’ inventory and ees had worked as commanders at different tiers. Although supply with the decision-making process of TN. These fac- the interviewees G and H did not work as commanders, tors gain more importance in resource constraint environ- they were selected due to being foreign qualified with cred- ment (especially time). Interviewee E stated that the national ible research publications in the relevant field. Both have defense matters are not valued in monetary terms, hence remained part of a Research & Development department in minimum consideration is given to cost-effective solutions an AD organization. under threat. Interviewees A, D, E, G, and H attributed the Initially, the interviewees were asked to elaborate TN in mission failures to poor resource selection of weapons and/ general. The interviewees D, E, and H referred to the specific or non-availability of the appropriate ones in a combat situa- definition of TN as accomplishing mission without any con- tion. The interviewees agreed that proper planning in the sideration of cost (i.e., no matter how much cost is incurred identification of critical VA/VPs and WD is critical to achiev- to neutralize the threat). However, all other interviewees ing success in TN. The interviewees also pointed out that agreed that cost-effectiveness must be considered for WA in significant factors related to cost-effectiveness, WD, and neutralizing threats. The interviewees A and C raised the VA/VPs are missing in existing models of TN in AD sector. Naseem and Ahmad 5 Table 4. TN Factors Extracted Through Semi-Structured Lopez-Catalan & Bañuls, 2017). The Delphi process involves Interviews. anonymous and controlled feedback of a selected panel of experts (Ameyaw et al., 2016). The factors of TN identified S. no. Paradigms TN factors earlier in this study became an input to this Delphi process. 1. Threat Elevation Evaluation 2. Potency of threat Selection of experts for Delphi Study. There is little agreement 3. Expected damage to an asset if a in the literature about the size of an expert panel (Keeney threat is not neutralized et al., 2001). Studies have used different number of experts in 4. Criticality of Civil infrastructure Delphi technique ranging from 8 to 40 (Sitlington & Coetzer, VA/VPs 5. Power grids 2015). The number of experts depends on numerous factors, 6. Important bridges such as scope of the problem, the time frame of research, the 7. Oil refineries volume of targeted data, available resources in terms of time, 8. Ammunition depot money, and number of available experts in the field (Turoff & 9. Strategic asset/location Linstone, 1975). The unbiased and accurate selection of 10. Military infrastructure expert panelist is one of the most significant aspects of suc- 11. Vulnerability value cessful Delphi studies (Chan et al., 2001) so special attention 12. Perceivable threat value was given in choosing the experts. The chosen experts must 13. Weapon Resource check fulfill certain requirements, such as professional qualifica- Deployment 14. Weapon value tions, working experience, working appointments, and rele- 15. Terrain vant publications (Hallowell, 2008). This study has used 16. Suitability expert evaluation system as proposed by Hallowell and Gam- 17. Supply from the closest depot 18. Quantity in inventory batese (2010). Identification of experts was made using 19. Weapon Demand of weapons snowball sampling technique. The criteria included holding Selection 20. Quantity of functional weapons/ of decision-making position in AD sector, qualification in the ammunition in inventory requisite field, and academic contribution in the form of arti- 21. Supply from the depot (in cles, book chapters, or editorials. A total of 24 experts were warfare situations) shortlisted according to the criteria and contacted through 22. Competency of weapon personal calls and emails. Out of these identified experts, 23. Inventory constraint eight experts gave their consent for participation in the study. 24. Cost of weapons Note. TN = threat neutralization; VA/VP = vulnerable assets/points. Number of rounds/iterations. The Delphi study is generally conducted in multiple rounds. There are two main reasons for it: (a) reaching consensus by decreasing variance and (b) The input by interviewees resulted in adding more factors improving precision. The panel experts reach the consensus related to cost-effectiveness in TN models. In the end, a list through anonymous and the controlled feedback process of factors related to TN decision-making process was com- (Hallowell & Gambatese, 2010). No consent on the optimal piled based on literature survey and interviews. The factors number of rounds could be found in previous studies. The extracted from the literature were shared with interviewees researchers have conducted various number of rounds based before interviews for their information and analysis. on the required level of consensus ranging from 2 to 6 Additional factors considered important by experts were cat- (Campos-Climent et al., 2012; Turoff & Linstone, 1975). In egorized and presented in Table 4. Moreover, it was dis- this study, the Delphi method is conducted in two rounds of cussed that the factors of TP should be separately analyzed. data collection and a third round to cross-validate the results. In TP and TE, four factors are the same, while four factors In the first round, open-ended questions were asked to vali- (identified from literature) were moved from TE to TP. In the date the already identified TN factors (through literature next step, Delphi study was performed to finalize and priori- review and interviews) and making the list comprehensive tize the TN factors. by adding additional factors based on the experience of experts. In the second round, experts were asked to rate the Step 3: Delphi Study factors on a Likert-type scale (1–5). In the third round, experts were asked to evaluate the ratings after randomizing The Delphi technique is an analytical technique based on the the factors. judgment of a group of experts with its origin from defense industry (Loo, 2002). The experts’ opinions are carried out in successive, anonymous rounds to achieve a consensus First-round Delphi study. In this first round, an open-ended (Turoff & Linstone, 1975). Many researchers have used this questionnaire was sent to experts and asked to verify the list method specifically for the framework development, deci- of critical factors relating to VA/VPs, WD, TE, and WA and sion making and forecasting, and so on (Chan et al., 2001; write additional factors based on their experience and 6 SAGE Open understanding with brief rationale. The experts completed method. The results not only validate the previous research the first round within 2 weeks resulted in a total of 49 factors but also add more factors to be considered for making deci- critical to TN in AD environment as shown in Table 5. This sion regarding TN. The paradigms related to the traditional round helped to expand the number of factors considered concept of mission success including TE, WD, criticality of essential by the panel of experts in Step 2. VA/VPs, WS, and WA for TN were acknowledged by the The redundancy was removed by eliminating the similar interviewees and panel experts. The most important factors factors. Direction of threat factor was removed and only the include “radar-cross section” in TP and TE, “military infra- dive angle of threat was retained in the list. Similarly, threat structure” in the criticality of VA/VPs, “perceivable threat type (100%) and potency of threat (75%) were found to be value” in WD, “profile match to threat type” in WS, and similar and so the potency of threat factor was removed. The “weapon is assigned to a threat based on TE” in WA. The updated list of factors was prepared and shared with the Delphi process helped in the validation of these factors and panel of experts in the second round with the rationale for provided a ranking of these critical factors for making a TN elimination of factors. strategy. The factor of “radar-cross section” is recognized as one of Second-round Delphi study. In the second round of Delphi the most important factors in TE which is critical to identify study, importance rating of factors was carried out by experts and locate the threat. The wrong perception and/or evalua- using 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 to 5 (1 = not at all tion of a threat cause worst-case scenario (Dahlbom & important, 2 = slightly important, 3 = fairly important, 4 = Helldin, 2013; Riveiro et al., 2013). Other important factors quite important, 5 = very important) for the updated list of of TP and TE for getting accurate information of threat TN factors prepared after first Round. In Delphi studies, include “attack approach,” “dive angle,” “height of threat,” there is no universally defined or agreed cut-off point for the and “maneuvering capability.” The panel of experts also consensus. The applicable measure is to use the mean score ranked the “identification of friend and foe” high. Similarly, as a cut-off point (Choi & Sirakaya, 2006). The average the factors of “speed,” “height,” “distance,” “type,” “forma- score of all factors is 3.5 and therefore it is adopted as a cut- tion,” “carrying weapons,” and “threat lethality” are signifi- off point. After this second round, 41 TN factors having the cant in TE. These factors are important for TI to prioritize mean scores equal to or more than 3.5 (overall mean) were threats. This reinforces the finding of the literature review selected to be included in the final third round for re-evalua- that the threats are prioritized based on TE (Malik, 2012; tion as shown in Table 6. Naeem & Masood, 2010). The interviewees highlighted the criticality of VA/VPs as Third-round Delphi study. To proceed further, the results of an important paradigm. This factor is considered vital for its second round were shared with the panel of experts. They contribution toward WD affecting whole TN process. The were asked to review their previous rating and provide the study also ranks different VA/VPs (military infrastructure, rating again on the same Likert-type scale. Experts recon- ammunition depot, civil infrastructure, power grids, oil refin- sidered their evaluation for a few factors and adjusted their eries, important bridges, etc.) for their criticality and impor- ratings resulted in slightly higher mean scores than the last tance. The study highlights various critical factors in WS and round. Most of the rankings of TN factors remained stable WA which include “profile match to threat type,” “range to from second to third round as shown in Table 7. To find out neutralize threat,” “kill probability,” “capability,” “quantity the inter-group comparison, a non-parametric method of in inventory,” and “supply from depot.” Deployed AD sys- correlation analysis (Spearman rank correlation coefficient) tem needs to consider the interdependencies of these factors is used. The value of Spearman’s rank correlation coeffi- so as a response to incoming threats may be made depending cient beyond the critical value at a certain significance level on the available resources. (e.g., say .01, .02, or .05) shows that there is a harmony between the responses of different groups. This method is Conclusion used to calculate the degree of consensus between the rat- ings achieved in second and third rounds. A high number In the rapidly changing world of technology, the concept of reflects a high degree of consensus (Von der Gracht, 2012). TN in AD sector is evolving continuously, thus extending Computed values show a significant relationship and a high from a traditional concept to more agile and rapid response degree of consensus between the ranking of second and considering the orientation of WD and criticality of VA/ third rounds. VPs. TN, in wartime, is a crucial and time-critical activity and there is a dearth of studies exclusively in the field. Although previous studies have suggested various models, Discussion findings of this study provide information relating to addi- The purpose of this study was to further the research related tional factors which if incorporated in the model will to decision factors for efficient and effective TN. The study enhance the effectivity of model. This study investigates TN used the input of experts through interviews and Delphi efficiency issues in the AD environment via semi-structured Naseem and Ahmad 7 Table 5. List of TN Factors (Round 1 Delphi Study). S. no. Paradigms TN factors Frequency Percentagee 1. Threat Height of the threat 8 100 Perception 2. Radar cross-section 8 100 3. Dive angle 7 87.5 4. Maneuvering capability 7 87.5 5. Attack approach 8 100 6. Thermal images 8 100 7. Heat signature 6 75 8. Identification of friend and foe 7 87.5 9. Threat Speed 8 100 Evaluation 10. Height 8 100 11. Elevation 7 87.5 12. Dive angle 8 100 13. Potency of threat 6 75 14. Expected damage to an asset if the threat is not neutralized 5 62.5 15. Radar cross-section 8 100 16. Maneuvering capability 8 100 17. Threat lethality from knowledge base 7 87.5 18. Formation 7 87.5 19. Distance 8 100 20. Threat type 8 100 21. Threat carrying weapons 8 100 22. Criticality of Civil infrastructure 8 100 VA/VPs 23. Power grids 8 100 24. Important bridges 8 100 25. Oil refineries 7 87.5 26. Ammunition depot 8 100 27. Strategic asset/location 7 87.5 28. Military infrastructure 8 100 29. Weapon Vulnerability value 8 100 Deployment 30. Perceivable threat value 8 100 31. Resource check 6 75 32. Weapon value 7 87.5 33. Terrain 7 87.5 34. Suitability 8 100 35. Supply from the closest depot 6 75 36. Quantity in inventory 7 87.5 37. Weapon Profile match to threat type 8 100 Selection 38. Capability 7 87.5 39. Kill probability 7 87.5 40. Range to neutralize threat 8 100 41. Demand of weapons 6 75 42. Quantity of functional weapons/ammunition in inventory 7 87.5 43. Supply from the depot (in warfare situations) 6 75 44. Competency of weapon 7 87.5 45. Inventory constraint 8 100 46. Cost of weapon 6 75 47. Weapon Weapon is assigned to a threat based on TE 7 87.5 Assignment 48. Weapon with highest kill probability is assigned first 8 100 49. Weapon is assigned first to a threat with highest TI (in case of more threats) 7 87.5 Note. TN = threat neutralization; VA/VP = vulnerable assets/vulnerable points; TE = threat evaluation; TI = threat index. 8 SAGE Open Table 6. List of TN Factors (Round 1 Delphi Study). S. no. Paradigms TN factors M Median Mode SD Rank 1. Threat Radar cross-section 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 1 Perception 2. Dive angle 4.88 5.00 5.00 0.35 2 3. Attack approach 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 3 4. Height of the threat 4.25 4.00 4.00 0.71 4 5. Heat signature 4.13 4.00 4.00 0.83 5 6. Thermal images 3.75 4.00 4.00 1.04 6 7. Maneuvering capability 3.63 3.50 3.00 0.74 7 8. Identification of friend and foe 3.56 3.50 3.00 0.93 8 1. Threat Radar cross-section 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 1 Evaluation 2. Speed 4.88 5.00 5.00 0.35 2 3. Height 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 3 4. Threat type 4.25 4.50 5.00 0.89 4 5. Dive angle 4.38 4.50 5.00 0.74 5 6. Distance 4.13 4.00 4.00 0.64 6 7. Formation 4.00 4.00 3.00 0.93 7 8. Threat carrying weapons 3.75 4.00 4.00 0.71 9 9. Maneuvering capability 3.56 3.50 3.00 0.93 10 10. Threat lethality from knowledge base 3.56 3.50 4.00 1.06 11 1. Criticality of Civil infrastructure 4.25 4.00 4.00 0.71 4 VA/VPs 2. Power grids 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 3 3. Oil refineries 3.75 4.00 4.00 1.04 7 4. Ammunition depot 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 2 5. Important bridges 4.00 4.00 3.00 0.93 6 6. Military infrastructure 4.88 5.00 5.00 0.35 1 7. Strategic asset/location 3.88 4.00 4.00 0.99 5 1. Weapon Vulnerability value 4.88 5.00 5.00 0.35 1 Deployment 2. Perceivable threat value 4.38 4.50 5.00 0.74 3 3. Weapon value 4.63 5.00 5.00 0.52 2 4. Terrain 3.88 4.00 4.00 0.99 7 5. Suitability 4.0 4.00 4.00 0.76 6 6. Quantity in inventory 4.25 4.00 5.00 0.71 4 7. Supply from the closest depot 4.13 4.00 4.00 0.84 5 1. Weapon Range to neutralize threat 4.88 5.00 5.00 0.35 1 Selection 2. Profile match to threat type 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 2 3. Kill probability 4.38 4.50 5.00 0.74 3 4. Quantity of functional weapons/ammunition in inventory 4.13 4.00 4.00 0.83 4 5. Capability 4.0 4.00 4.00 0.76 5 6. Supply from the depot (in warfare situations) 3.88 4.00 3.00 0.83 6 1. Weapon Weapon is assigned to a threat based on TE 4.63 5.00 5.00 0.52 1 Assignment 2. Weapon is assigned first to a threat with highest TI 4.50 4.50 4.00 0.53 2 (when threat is more than one) 3. Weapon with highest kill probability is assigned first 4.25 4.00 4.00 0.71 3 Note. TN = threat neutralization; VA/VP = vulnerable assets/vulnerable points; TE = threat evaluation; TI = threat index. interviews and the Delphi study. These results show that it is could have been used for the formulation of a model based no longer sufficient to simply focus on TE and WA factors to on results. The other limitation is related to validation which achieve efficiency and effectiveness in TN. Rather, it is also could only be possible if the model is implemented in AD important to pay attention to the criticality of VA/VPs and system. Nevertheless, this study provides a useful reference WD. Indeed, efforts are required to develop an efficient and for the improvement of decision making in AD sector. effective TN model based on the identified factors to Identification of TN factors for DSS has been carried out increase the success rate with the best utilization of avail- through the involvement of experts in the study. In future, able resources. The limitations of the study are related to DSS based on optimization algorithms may be tested using data and validation. The empirical data for the study was not identified factors and simulation results may help to elimi- available due to the sensitive nature of information, which nate redundant factors. Naseem and Ahmad 9 Table 7. Analysis of Delphi Round 3. Round 2 Round 3 S. no. TN factors M Rank M Rank Median Mode SD Threat Perception 1. Radar cross-section 5.00 1 5.00 1 5.00 5.00 0.00 2. Dive angle 4.88 2 4.38 3 4.00 4.00 0.51 3. Attack approach 4.50 3 4.75 2 5.00 5.00 0.46 4. Height of the threat 4.25 4 4.25 4 4.00 4.00 0.70 5. Heat signature 4.13 5 4.13 5 4.00 4.00 0.83 6. Thermal images 3.75 6 3.63 7 3.50 3.00 0.74 7. Maneuvering capability 3.63 7 3.75 6 4.00 4.00 0.71 8. Identification of friend and foe 3.56 8 3.63 8 3.50 3.00 0.744 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) = .929 Critical value = .929, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, .929 = .929 Threat Evaluation 1. Radar cross-section 5.00 1 5.00 1 5.00 5.00 0.00 2. Speed 4.88 2 4.88 2 500 5.00 0.35 3. Height 4.50 3 4.50 3 4.50 4.00 0.53 4. Threat type 4.25 4 4.13 6 4.00 4.00 0.64 5. Dive angle 4.38 5 4.25 4 4.50 5.00 0.88 6. Distance 4.13 6 4.38 5 4.50 5.00 0.74 7. Formation 4.00 7 4.00 7 4.00 3.00 0.93 8. Threat carrying weapons 3.75 8 3.88 8 4.00 4.00 0.99 9. Maneuvering capability 3.56 9 3.75 10 4.00 4.00 0.71 10. Threat lethality from knowledge base 3.56 10 3.63 11 3.50 3.00 0.744 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) = .964 Critical value = .755, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, .964 > .755 Criticality of VA/VP 1. Civil infrastructure 4.25 4 4.38 3 4.50 5.00 0.74 2. Power grids 4.50 3 4.13 4 4.00 4.00 0.83 3. Oil refineries 3.75 5 3.75 6 4.00 4.00 1.04 4. Ammunition depot 4.50 2 4.25 2 4.00 4.00 0.71 5. Important bridges 4.00 6 4.00 5 4.00 4.00 0.76 6. Military infrastructure 4.88 1 4.88 1 5.00 5.00 0.35 7. Strategic asset/location 3.88 7 4.00 7 4.00 3.00 0.93 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) = .786 Critical value = .786, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, .786 = .786 Weapon Deployment 1. Vulnerability value 4.88 1 4.75 2 5.00 5.00 0.46 2. Perceivable threat value 4.38 3 5.00 1 5.00 5.00 0.00 3. Weapon value 4.63 2 4.50 3 4.50 4.00 0.53 4. Terrain 3.88 7 3.88 7 4.00 4.00 0.99 5. Suitability 4.0 6 4.0 6 4.00 4.00 0.76 6. Quantity in inventory 4.25 4 4.25 4 4.50 4.00 0.71 7. Supply from closest depot 4.13 5 4.13 5 3.75 4.00 0.74 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) = .971 Critical value = .788, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, .971 > .788 Weapon Selection 1. Range to neutralize threat 4.88 1 4.50 2 4.50 4.00 0.53 2. Profile match to threat type 4.50 2 4.88 1 5.00 5.00 0.35 3. Kill probability 4.38 3 4.38 3 4.50 5.00 0.74 4. Quantity in inventory 4.13 4 4.00 5 4.00 4.00 0.76 5. Capability 4.0 5 4.13 4 4.00 4.00 0.83 6. Supply from depot (in warfare situations) 3.88 6 3.88 6 4.00 3.00 0.83 (continued) 10 SAGE Open Table 7. (continued) Round 2 Round 3 S. no. TN factors M Rank M Rank Median Mode SD Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho)= .886 Critical value = .886, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, .886 = .886 Weapon Assignment 1. Weapon is assigned to a threat based on TE 4.63 1 4.63 1 5.00 5.00 0.52 2. Weapon is assigned first to a threat with highest TI (when 4.50 2 4.50 2 4.50 4.00 0.53 threat is more than one) 3. Weapon with highest kill probability is assigned first 4.25 3 4.25 3 4.00 4.00 0.71 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (rho) = 1.00 Critical value = 1.00, p-value = .01 (significance level) so, 1.00 = 1.00 Note. TN = threat neutralization; VA/VP = vulnerable assets/vulnerable points; TE = threat evaluation; TI = threat index. Chan, A. P. C., Yung, E. H. K., Lam, P. T. I., Tam, C. M., & Cheung, Declaration of Conflicting Interests S. O. (2001). 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Journal

SAGE Open – SAGE

Published: Sep 30, 2020

Keywords: airborne threats; air defense; threat evaluation; threat neutralization; Delphi study; decision factors; vulnerable assets

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