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The Paradox of Power Reconsidered: A Theory of Political Regimes in Africa

The Paradox of Power Reconsidered: A Theory of Political Regimes in Africa A typical pattern of wealth redistribution seems to prevail, in some African countries, between rich and poor ethno-regional groups. A contract-theoretic model is presented for shedding some light on this phenomenon. The government promises a transfer to its potential opponent in return for not engaging in a civil war. The latter may break out because of the imperfect credibility of the government's commitment. This increases the cost of the required transfer of wealth, and may make it unfeasible. The model determines whether a military regime or a redistributive state prevails in a peaceful equilibrium. This depends on two parameters: (i) the relative fighting efficiency and (ii) the relative productivity of the two groups. The social cost of the different regimes is then compared, and their implications for aid policy are discussed. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of African Economies Oxford University Press

The Paradox of Power Reconsidered: A Theory of Political Regimes in Africa

Journal of African Economies , Volume 15 (1) – Mar 1, 2006

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References (40)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Centre for the Study of African Economies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
ISSN
0963-8024
eISSN
1464-3723
DOI
10.1093/jae/eji018
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

A typical pattern of wealth redistribution seems to prevail, in some African countries, between rich and poor ethno-regional groups. A contract-theoretic model is presented for shedding some light on this phenomenon. The government promises a transfer to its potential opponent in return for not engaging in a civil war. The latter may break out because of the imperfect credibility of the government's commitment. This increases the cost of the required transfer of wealth, and may make it unfeasible. The model determines whether a military regime or a redistributive state prevails in a peaceful equilibrium. This depends on two parameters: (i) the relative fighting efficiency and (ii) the relative productivity of the two groups. The social cost of the different regimes is then compared, and their implications for aid policy are discussed.

Journal

Journal of African EconomiesOxford University Press

Published: Mar 1, 2006

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