Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
T. Addison, M. Murshed, L. Helland, Halvor Mehlum (2002)
Credibility and Reputation in PeacemakingJournal of Peace Research, 39
Hugh Neary (1997)
A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflictPublic Choice, 93
A. Ortmann (1996)
Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol. 1, Playing FairSouthern Economic Journal, 62
S. Skaperdas (1991)
Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property RightsThe American Economic Review, 82
J. Azam, A. Mesnard (2003)
Civil War and the Social ContractPublic Choice, 115
J. Hirshleifer (1995)
Anarchy and its BreakdownJournal of Political Economy, 103
Aron, cemoglu (2004)
WHY DID THE WEST EXTEND THE FRANCHISE ? DEMOCRACY , INEQUALITY , AND GROWTH IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE *
J. Azam, J. Laffont (2003)
Contracting for aidJournal of Development Economics, 70
Herschel Grossman (1991)
A General Equilibrium Model of InsurrectionsThe American Economic Review, 81
J. Herbst (2000)
Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in AfricaJournal of African Economies, 9
F. Bourguignon, T. Verdier (2000)
Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growthJournal of Development Economics, 62
K. Binmore (1984)
Game theory and the social contract
O. Olsson, H. Fors (2004)
Congo: The Prize of PredationJournal of Peace Research, 41
J. Esteban, Debraj Ray (1999)
Conflict and DistributionJournal of Economic Theory, 87
Herschel Grossman, Minseong Kim (1995)
Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to PropertyJournal of Political Economy, 103
J. Lonsdale (1992)
Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The political economy of agrarian development in KenyaAfrican Affairs, 91
Michael Bratton, Nicholas Walle (1997)
Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective
J. Svensson (2000)
When is foreign aid policy credible : aid dependence and conditionalityJournal of Development Economics, 61
R. Bates (2000)
Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A ReappraisalThe American Economic Review, 90
J. Azam (2002)
Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional GroupsJournal of Conflict Resolution, 46
T. Kuran (1989)
Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolutionPublic Choice, 61
(2001)
Agreements in the shadow of conflict, mimeo. Paper presented at the summer school on Polarization and Conflict, San Sebastian, July
(1999)
Aid, Taxation and Development
J. Azam, Anke Hoeffler (2002)
Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?Journal of Peace Research, 39
J. Fearon (2006)
Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict
Herschel Grossman (1994)
Production, Appropriation, and Land ReformThe American Economic Review, 84
S. Noh (1999)
A general equilibrium model of two group conflict with endogenous intra-group sharing rulesPublic Choice, 98
A. Horowitz (1993)
Time Paths of Land Reform: A Theoretical Model of Reform DynamicsThe American Economic Review, 83
Yvonne Durham, J. Hirshleifer, V. Smith (2008)
The Paradox of Power
J. Azam (2001)
The Redistributive State and Conflicts in AfricaJournal of Peace Research, 38
J. Laffont, D. Martimort (2001)
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
J. Esteban, Debraj Ray (1994)
On the Measurement of PolarizationEconometrica, 62
Catherine Boone (2003)
Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice
Michael Bratton, Nicholas Walle (1997)
Democratic Experiments in Africa: Index
C. Perrow (1966)
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS. By Mancur Olson, Jr. Rev. ed. New York: Schocken Books, 1971. 184 pp. $2.45Social Forces, 52
J. Azam (1995)
How to pay for the peace? A theoretical framework with references to African countriesPublic Choice, 83
F. Schaffer (1998)
Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture
J. Azam (2001)
Looting and Conflict between Ethno-Regional Groups : Lessons for State Formation in Africa
J. Azam, J. Berthelemy, Stéphane Calipel (1996)
Risque politique et croissance en AfriqueRevue économique, 47
S. Murshed, S. Sen (1995)
Aid Conditionality and Military Expenditure Reduction in Developing Countries: Models of Asymmetric InformationThe Economic Journal, 105
A typical pattern of wealth redistribution seems to prevail, in some African countries, between rich and poor ethno-regional groups. A contract-theoretic model is presented for shedding some light on this phenomenon. The government promises a transfer to its potential opponent in return for not engaging in a civil war. The latter may break out because of the imperfect credibility of the government's commitment. This increases the cost of the required transfer of wealth, and may make it unfeasible. The model determines whether a military regime or a redistributive state prevails in a peaceful equilibrium. This depends on two parameters: (i) the relative fighting efficiency and (ii) the relative productivity of the two groups. The social cost of the different regimes is then compared, and their implications for aid policy are discussed.
Journal of African Economies – Oxford University Press
Published: Mar 1, 2006
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.