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The Faretta Principle: Self-Representation versus the Right to Counsel

The Faretta Principle: Self-Representation versus the Right to Counsel AGENDA V.B.I Th e Faretta Principle: Self-Representation versus th e Right to Counsel Paul Marcus* The United States Constitution makes provision for criminal de­ fendants to be represented by counsel. In the federal jurisdiction this principle was vigorously applied, even to indigent persons, very early in the Twentieth Century. The United States Supreme Court, however, was reluctant to impose this requirement on the states ex­ cept in cases of unusual circumstances where the absence of coun­ sel would have affected the basic fairness of the trial. Finally, in a landmark decision by the Supreme Court, it was held that the right to counsel applies in both federal and state cases. For the past twenty years, federal and state judges have been concerned with the application of this right to counsel: the kinds of persons who are to benefit from it, the types of cases in which counsel is required, and the nature of proceedings other than trial to which the right applies. In recent years, however, an emerging right has developed, the right of the defendant to represent himself at trial. This right was mandated by the Supreme Court in 1975 an d has led to considerable confusion in http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Comparative Law Oxford University Press

The Faretta Principle: Self-Representation versus the Right to Counsel

Marcus, Paul
American Journal of Comparative Law , Volume 30 (suppl_1) – Dec 1, 1982
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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© 1982 The American Association for the Comparative Study of Law, Inc.
ISSN
0002-919X
eISSN
2326-9197
DOI
10.1093/ajcl/30.suppl1.551
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AGENDA V.B.I Th e Faretta Principle: Self-Representation versus th e Right to Counsel Paul Marcus* The United States Constitution makes provision for criminal de­ fendants to be represented by counsel. In the federal jurisdiction this principle was vigorously applied, even to indigent persons, very early in the Twentieth Century. The United States Supreme Court, however, was reluctant to impose this requirement on the states ex­ cept in cases of unusual circumstances where the absence of coun­ sel would have affected the basic fairness of the trial. Finally, in a landmark decision by the Supreme Court, it was held that the right to counsel applies in both federal and state cases. For the past twenty years, federal and state judges have been concerned with the application of this right to counsel: the kinds of persons who are to benefit from it, the types of cases in which counsel is required, and the nature of proceedings other than trial to which the right applies. In recent years, however, an emerging right has developed, the right of the defendant to represent himself at trial. This right was mandated by the Supreme Court in 1975 an d has led to considerable confusion in

Journal

American Journal of Comparative Law – Oxford University Press

Published: Dec 1, 1982

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