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The Constitutional Problem of the Argentine Republic

The Constitutional Problem of the Argentine Republic 34 0 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW federalism of the Weimar Republic was emaciated with one stroke by the 1919 financial reform of Matthias Erzberger. The federalism of the Basic Law, how­ ever, was widely assumed to be the artificial creation of the Western Allies, especially the French who meant to keep their overbearing neighbor weak by "constitutional engineering." The postponement of the final settlement of the vertical distribution of tax revenues under these circumstances appeared to be a carefully planned setting for another Erzberger reform. Because of the peculiar structure of German federalism a drastic change of the financial relationship between Federation and Lander would have resulted in the de facto collapse of the new German federalism. As we have seen, the tenacity of the Bundesrat, the one pillar of German federalism, in its defense of Lander interests kept the other pillar, the financial autonomy of the Lander, so well intact that there is no reason today to doubt that federalism in Germany is here to stay. PETER H. MERKL* 83 wh y German federalism turned out to be considerably stronger than constitutional experts predicted, cannot be explained in a few words. But among the reasons we http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Comparative Law Oxford University Press

The Constitutional Problem of the Argentine Republic

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© 1958 by The American Association for the Comparative Study of Law, Inc.
ISSN
0002-919X
eISSN
2326-9197
DOI
10.2307/837524
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

34 0 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW federalism of the Weimar Republic was emaciated with one stroke by the 1919 financial reform of Matthias Erzberger. The federalism of the Basic Law, how­ ever, was widely assumed to be the artificial creation of the Western Allies, especially the French who meant to keep their overbearing neighbor weak by "constitutional engineering." The postponement of the final settlement of the vertical distribution of tax revenues under these circumstances appeared to be a carefully planned setting for another Erzberger reform. Because of the peculiar structure of German federalism a drastic change of the financial relationship between Federation and Lander would have resulted in the de facto collapse of the new German federalism. As we have seen, the tenacity of the Bundesrat, the one pillar of German federalism, in its defense of Lander interests kept the other pillar, the financial autonomy of the Lander, so well intact that there is no reason today to doubt that federalism in Germany is here to stay. PETER H. MERKL* 83 wh y German federalism turned out to be considerably stronger than constitutional experts predicted, cannot be explained in a few words. But among the reasons we

Journal

American Journal of Comparative Law – Oxford University Press

Published: May 1, 1957

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