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Some Considerations Regarding Adornment, the Gender “Binary,” and Gender Expression

Some Considerations Regarding Adornment, the Gender “Binary,” and Gender Expression I.Introduction Stephen Davies’s Adornment lays an admirable foundation upon which much fruitful philosophical discussion about the topic of adornment can—and likely, will—be built. And while I find its main argument to be compelling, the book’s discussions of issues on the periphery of that argument are incomplete. This is not so much a fault of the book as it is a consequence of the fact that, realistically, one can address only a finite number of topics within a finite number of words. With that in mind, I use these words to pick up one of those peripheral issues: the relation between adornment, the so-called gender “binary,” and gender expression. To begin, I will briefly recap the relevant components of Davies’s view of adornment. I then address three issues: the role of adornment in the acceptance of non-binary gender identities; the question of whether apparent adornment practices done for the sake of such acceptance still qualify as genuine adornment practices; and finally, the normative force of the considerations raised by the first two issues, given an imperative to resist gender-based oppression. I follow what I take to be the norm of distinguishing gender from sex, with the former being a socially constructed set of phenomena—encompassing at least the independently variable notions of gender identity and gender expression—separable from considerations of the latter.1 (For present purposes, I take no stance on whether sex is also socially constructed.)2 I use the term cisgender to refer to those whose gender identity corresponds (entirely and exclusively) to their gender assigned at birth and the term transgender to refer to everyone else. I take the gender identities man and woman (and corresponding identities such as boy and girl) as the binary gender identities and all other gender identities—genderqueer, agender, bigender, among others—as non-binary gender identities.3 A consequence of my understanding of these notions is that almost all non-binary persons are transgender persons. I assume neither that this taxonomy is the correct gender taxonomy nor that it is robust enough to capture the preferred self-description of all persons. I ask those who adopt a different taxonomy to charitably interpret the claims made here within the framework of this discussion, and, where differences inevitably arise, to remain open to more-or-less meaning-preserving translations into their preferred framework. II.ANALYZING ADORNMENT According to Davies (2020), humans are the adorning species. I would add that we are also the gendering species, and that these two claims bear upon each other in interesting ways. I return to those points soon, but first, let us focus on Davies’s understanding of what adornment is. According to Davies, “to adorn something is (a) to intend to make it aesthetically special (b) by making it (more) beautiful or sublime, (c) to succeed in this to some degree, and (d) to receive audience uptake of the attempt and of the success; or is (e) to follow a conventionalized, socially accepted practice (f) that originated in (1)-type adornment. (2020, 21) This analysis is not of the product of adornment, but of the process, act, or practice. So, in more colloquial language, we adorn something when we intend to add to its aesthetic appeal, succeed at least somewhat in doing so, and have both that intention and that success noticed. As kinds of activities meeting these criteria become widespread and typical, other instances of those kinds done for other purposes receive status as adorning acts, by courtesy. I find Davies’s characterization of adornment more-or-less compelling, with emphasis on the more. With this brief recap complete, let us proceed to the relation between adornment, gender identity, and gender-based oppression. III.ADORNMENT, CISNORMATIVITY, AND TRANSPHOBIA While it might be easy (for some) to project the exclusive, exhaustive gender binary widely assumed and enforced in Westernized cultures today onto all cultures and all times past, this projection is erroneous: it simply is not the case that every culture throughout history has taken all human persons to divide neatly and immutably into the exclusive and exhaustive categories man and woman.4 Much the same as racialized categories, gender categories have shown a sort of cultural and temporal plasticity.5 This projection, however erroneous, is indeed widespread, leading to consistent cultural messaging of cisnormativity: that is, messaging that the default way of being human involves a “match” between binary gender identity and gender assigned at birth, and that any other way of being is in some way deviant, delusional, defective, or deficient. Such messaging provides the scaffolding for transphobia, whether implicit or explicit. Some transphobia—such as the insistence on denying another person’s gender identity or the upholding of a status quo according to which trans persons can be fired or lose their homes, among other injustices and injuries, simply for being trans persons—is externalized transphobia, insofar as it manifests most typically in other-regarding behavior and policy. Other transphobia is internalized transphobia, in which a trans person, often as a result of habitual exposure to cisnormativity and externalized transphobia, adopts transphobic attitudes toward themselves. Connections between cisnormativity and transphobia, on the one hand, and adornment practices, on the other, might be obvious. Regardless, I discuss a few such connections here if only to bring them into sharper focus. Davies mentions many instances of gendered clothing practices (my term, not his), noting that “[a]cross many societies and over many times, women’s decorations aim to accentuate their physical beauty and appearance of youthfulness, while men’s, by comparison, are more concerned with displaying social status, achievements, and wealth” (2020, 81). Indeed, throughout Adornment, when topics related to sex or gender arise, Davies focuses discussion on “sex-based” differences in adornment practices, largely interpreted and explained through the lens of evolutionary psychology (see particularly Chapter 5: “Differences between Men and Women”). And though Davies briefly acknowledges “these days of gender fluidity and variety of family relationships” (80), the complex interplay between sex and gender across times and cultures is at best hinted at throughout the book. To be clear: Davies acknowledges that the accounts of evolutionary psychologists “can look conservative and sexist” (80), and his method throughout is intended to be descriptive of evolutionary psychological research rather than prescriptive of any views on how we should view sex, gender, and any relations between the two. But we should note that such views are not simply potentially conservative and sexist, but also transphobic in virtue of being cisnormative. Let me emphasize that I attribute no cisnormative motive to Davies here, who has clarified in personal correspondence that he is following the reports and tendencies of evolutionary psychologists and refrains from making claims about gender due to the fact that his expertise lies elsewhere. This, I take it, is an admirable approach. It is not inconsistent with that approach, though, to point out that those reports and tendencies of evolutionary psychologists are often at least implicitly cisnormative, just as Davies points out that they might also be “conservative and sexist.” I am no expert on evolutionary psychology, though I do couple my experience as a non-binary trans person with some background in social ontology. Moving forward, I limit my focus to claims about non-binary persons, for two reasons. First, it is what I am most comfortable and confident speaking about, given my own identity and experience. And second, for a non-binary person, there is no such thing as “passing:” whereas a person might attempt to follow certain social norms so as to be consistently read as a man or as a woman without highlighting their identity as trans, the norms governing being consistently read as non-binary without highlighting trans identity are likely essentially ill defined. This puts persons who are read as non-binary (whether or not they identify as such) at particular risk, since such a reading can highlight them (even if erroneously) as trans persons. Given the oppressed nature of trans persons as a group, this very act of categorization can indeed lead to harm.6 How can adornment practices aid in eroding cisnormativity and both externalized and internalized transphobia? One means of gender-affirming therapy involves bringing gender presentation, including adorning acts, into better harmony with a person’s gender identity. The donning (or avoidance) of skirts, ties, makeup, various hairstyles, piercings, jewelry, tattoos, and other forms of adornment can substantially decrease both gender dysphoria and body dysmorphia. A glance at the Solace app, designed to offer guidance through gender-affirming transition processes, reveals adornment-related benchmarks such as adopting hairstyles, getting piercings, and so forth, and a read of various memoirs of non-binary persons—such as Maia Kobabe’s (2019),Gender Queer: A Memoir and Jacob Tobia’s (2018)Sissy: A Coming-of-Gender Story—will find much space devoted to discussion of the potentially therapeutic effects of adornment practices. The American Medical Association recognizes “grooming and dressing” in accordance with one’s gender identity as among the aspects of social transition that is “for many transgender individuals, … a critically important part of medically necessary treatment” (American Medical Association n.d.). Adornment practices appear, then, to play at least one part in self-acceptance and the erosion of internalized transphobia. What about externalized transphobia? Psychologists, social scientists, and philosophers have long discussed what has been called the mere-exposure effect, according to which familiarity with an object or phenomenon tends to lead to an increase in positive attitudes (or decrease in negative attitudes) toward said object or phenomenon. By publicly and routinely engaging in gender nonconforming adornment practices—or what in queer spaces is sometimes referred to as genderfucking, a term originating in Christopher Lonc’s article, “Genderfuck and Its Delights,” in a 1974 issue of Gay Sunshine magazine—one might reasonably predict that mere exposure to such practices (and, hence, the persons practicing them) by those antecedently disposed toward cisnormative or transphobic attitudes might find those attitudes gradually chipped away and replaced with more positive sentiments—or at least less negative ones. This is, of course, empirical conjecture, and would need to be confirmed through psychological and social scientific study. But a wealth of anecdata suggest that the claim holds true. If so, we now see at least potential ways in which gender nonconforming adornment practices might help reduce both externalized and internalized transphobia and can thereby contribute to the goal of making the world safer for non-binary persons (and by extension, binary trans persons; by further extension, all persons).7 IV.ADORNMENT AND ACTIVISM Suppose Adrian, a non-binary person who to their chagrin is resigned to being read as a man, engages in self-decoration practices typically associated (in their cultural context) with women. Indeed, Adrian is genderfucking: they have no intentions of “passing,” nor do they pay any mind to whether their practices make their appearance any more beautiful or sublime. Instead, their primary—indeed, sole—intention is to publicly challenge entrenched norms regarding the correlation of specific adornment practices with stipulated poles on a purported gender binary, as a means toward contributing to the goal of making their culture safer for trans and gender-nonconforming persons. As such, Adrian’s self-decoration practices fail to satisfy condition (1) of Davies’s analysis of adornment. If their practices are to qualify as adornment practices, then, they must satisfy condition (2). But do they? It depends on how we describe the adornment practice in question. If we characterize Adrian simply as wearing skirts, feminine-coded makeup, feminine-coded jewelry, and so forth, then it is clear that condition (2) is met, as such practices clearly originate in (1)-type adornment. If we characterize them instead as wearing skirts, and so forth, while consistently and knowingly being read as a man, then condition (2) is not met, as this is a not a conventionalized, socially accepted practice (at least in Adrian’s cultural context). Settling between these competing characterizations requires us to ask: are the practices in question conventionally gendered, and thereby best described in a manner that references the agent? Given the supposition that Adrian has a reason to engage in such practices in the first place, the answer seems to be yes. But if that is right, then condition (2) is not met, and Adrian’s self-decoration fails to qualify as genuine adornment. We might accept this consequence: Adrian is not adorning, but their practices aim to shift what will come to count as adornment. Alternatively, we might offer a slight modification to Davies’s analysis, replacing condition (2) with: (e) to follow or contribute to the intended institution of a conventionalized, socially accepted practice (f) that originated in or shares a salient causal-historical connection with (1)-type adornment. This move retains the intuition that Adrian is engaged not just in activism-orientation self-decoration, but genuine adornment. I share this intuition, so I am more inclined toward accepting this modification. That inclination is, of course, short of an argument, and my counterparts not similarly inclined would likely be just fine with the first suggestion, especially given the ease with which Adrian’s practices would indeed qualify as genuine adornment if only they coupled their extant intentions with some version of the special-making intention. A further question: should we really qualify Adrian’s practices as activism? Or are they more akin to slacktivism: the sort of (merely) performative posturing that allows the performer to (erroneously) feel, morally, as if they have meaningfully contributed to a cause, when really their action is an inadequate stand-in for genuine effort (i.e. merely sharing an article on social media to “raise awareness,” or the brief trend of wearing a safety pin after the 2016 U.S. election to demonstrate status as an “ally”)? I would suggest that an act qualifies as activism, rather than mere slacktivism, to the degree that it stands to make or contribute to a meaningful outcome, and the agent has some “skin in the game,” in the sense that the act carries some sort of tangible cost or risk. Unlike the social media case, Adrian’s actions are likely observed by many outside of their own informational network, and hence many without shared social and political views. The aforementioned mere exposure, then, though still relatively minor, is likely more impactful than merely sharing an article. And, though displaying a safety pin might have led to compromises in personal safety in some ideologically extreme climates, the risks that come with Adrian’s practices are quite plausibly higher. I suggest, then, that they do count as (a still perhaps quite modest) form of activism rather than mere slacktivism.8 V.NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS Carol Hay (2011) has argued, on Kantian grounds, that members of oppressed groups (qua members of those groups) have a moral obligation to resist their own oppression. If adornment practices (or near-adornment practices) like those discussed so far can (modestly) aid in the resistance of oppression against certain groups of persons, should we conclude that such persons have a moral obligation to take up those practices? Henry Pratt (2014) has suggested that those who grow facial hair maybe ought to sport unconventional styles (Pratt’s word is “ugly”) to erode patriarchal norms. Given the view that anyone, regardless of gender, can be affected by patriarchal oppression, should we conclude that the pogonotrophically-capable among us carry special moral obligations for reasons similar to those for which Hay argues? Do analogous claims apply to Adrian, leaving them morally culpable were they to abandon their practices? Even granting Hay’s claim, we can (as she indeed does) acknowledge that the fulfillment of the moral obligation to resist one’s own oppression is multiply realizable: in Kantian terms, it is an imperfect duty (2011, 29). As long as one is doing something, one is not morally culpable for not doing everything all the time. What remains, though, is that someone like Adrian, even if not morally required to engage in such practices, has at least some pro tanto moral reason to do so. I take it that this pro tanto moral reason remains even if we (as I do) reject Hay’s Kantian starting points: if one is on the fence about certain practices but engaging in them can help themselves and others face less oppression, then this reason—though capable of being over ridden—can and should be morally motivating. And I submit, that reason is stronger for the more (relatively) privileged among the oppressed group: in the case of non-binary persons, I have in mind mostly those who are white, not disabled, financially secure, and fortunate enough to find support from friends, family, and community. If Adrian meets such a description, their reason in favor of the aforementioned activism is stronger than that of their peers who meet other descriptions, even if Adrian nonetheless remains morally free to abstain from such practices entirely. As for the task of determining the relative strength of the moral reasons had by comparatively privileged cisgender persons to engage in such acts of “genderfucking”: I leave that as an exercise for the reader.9 Footnotes 1 On gender identity, see Jenkins (2018). 2 For discussion, see Mikkola (2016, section 3). 3 See Dembroff (2020) for further discussion on such gender identities. 4 Cf. Dembroff (2020, n1). 5 See, inter alia, Haslanger (2000). 6 See discussion of the natures of such harms in general, Jenkins (2020). 7 In Dembroff’s (2020: 18) terminology, such adornment practices might qualify as disruptive of dominant gender ideology. 8 For a powerful discussion of what might be taken as the inherently political aspects of non-binary identities, see Dembroff (2018). 9 For helpful feedback, thanks to Sam Cowling, Elizabeth Scarborough, the participants of this symposium, and the audience at the Author-Meets-Critics panel on Adornment at the 2020 American Society for Aesthetics meeting. References American Medical Association . N.d . “Advocating for the LGBTQ Community.” AMA . https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/population-care/advocating-lgbtq-community. Davies , Stephen . 2020 . Adornment: What Self-Decoration Tells Us about Who We Are . London : Bloomsbury Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Dembroff , Robin . 2018 . “Why Be Non-binary?” Aeon¸ edited by Sally Davies. www.aeon.co/essays/nonbinary-identity-is-a-radical-stance-against-gender-segregation. ———. 2020 . “Beyond Binary: Genderqueer as Critical Gender Kind.” Philosophers’ Imprint 20 ( 9 ): 1 – 23 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Haslanger , Sally . 2000 . “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” Nous 34 : 31 – 55 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Hay , Carol . 2011 . “The Obligation to Resist Oppression.” Journal of Social Philosophy 42 : 21 – 45 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Jenkins , Katharine . 2018 . “Toward an Account of Gender Identity.” Ergo 5 : 713 – 44 . https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0005.027/--toward-an-account-of-gender-identity. Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat ———. 2020 . “Ontic Injustice.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 : 188 – 205 . Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kobabe , Maia . 2019 . Gender Queer: A Memoir . St. Louis, MO : Lion’s Forge. Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Lonc , Christopher . 1974 . “Genderfuck and Its Delights.” Gay Sunshine 21 ( spring ): 4 – 16 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Mikkola , Mari . 2016 . “Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta . https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/feminism-gender/. Pratt , Henry . 2014 . “The Philosophy of Facial Hair.” Aesthetics for Birds . www.aestheticsforbirds.com/2014/03/07/the-philosophy-of-facial-hair-by-henry-pratt/. Tobia , Jacob . 2018 . Sissy: A Coming-of-Gender Story . New York : G.P. Putnan’s Sons . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC © The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Society for Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism Oxford University Press

Some Considerations Regarding Adornment, the Gender “Binary,” and Gender Expression

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , Volume 79 (4): 5 – Sep 27, 2021

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Oxford University Press
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© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Society for Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
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0021-8529
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DOI
10.1093/jaac/kpab051
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Abstract

I.Introduction Stephen Davies’s Adornment lays an admirable foundation upon which much fruitful philosophical discussion about the topic of adornment can—and likely, will—be built. And while I find its main argument to be compelling, the book’s discussions of issues on the periphery of that argument are incomplete. This is not so much a fault of the book as it is a consequence of the fact that, realistically, one can address only a finite number of topics within a finite number of words. With that in mind, I use these words to pick up one of those peripheral issues: the relation between adornment, the so-called gender “binary,” and gender expression. To begin, I will briefly recap the relevant components of Davies’s view of adornment. I then address three issues: the role of adornment in the acceptance of non-binary gender identities; the question of whether apparent adornment practices done for the sake of such acceptance still qualify as genuine adornment practices; and finally, the normative force of the considerations raised by the first two issues, given an imperative to resist gender-based oppression. I follow what I take to be the norm of distinguishing gender from sex, with the former being a socially constructed set of phenomena—encompassing at least the independently variable notions of gender identity and gender expression—separable from considerations of the latter.1 (For present purposes, I take no stance on whether sex is also socially constructed.)2 I use the term cisgender to refer to those whose gender identity corresponds (entirely and exclusively) to their gender assigned at birth and the term transgender to refer to everyone else. I take the gender identities man and woman (and corresponding identities such as boy and girl) as the binary gender identities and all other gender identities—genderqueer, agender, bigender, among others—as non-binary gender identities.3 A consequence of my understanding of these notions is that almost all non-binary persons are transgender persons. I assume neither that this taxonomy is the correct gender taxonomy nor that it is robust enough to capture the preferred self-description of all persons. I ask those who adopt a different taxonomy to charitably interpret the claims made here within the framework of this discussion, and, where differences inevitably arise, to remain open to more-or-less meaning-preserving translations into their preferred framework. II.ANALYZING ADORNMENT According to Davies (2020), humans are the adorning species. I would add that we are also the gendering species, and that these two claims bear upon each other in interesting ways. I return to those points soon, but first, let us focus on Davies’s understanding of what adornment is. According to Davies, “to adorn something is (a) to intend to make it aesthetically special (b) by making it (more) beautiful or sublime, (c) to succeed in this to some degree, and (d) to receive audience uptake of the attempt and of the success; or is (e) to follow a conventionalized, socially accepted practice (f) that originated in (1)-type adornment. (2020, 21) This analysis is not of the product of adornment, but of the process, act, or practice. So, in more colloquial language, we adorn something when we intend to add to its aesthetic appeal, succeed at least somewhat in doing so, and have both that intention and that success noticed. As kinds of activities meeting these criteria become widespread and typical, other instances of those kinds done for other purposes receive status as adorning acts, by courtesy. I find Davies’s characterization of adornment more-or-less compelling, with emphasis on the more. With this brief recap complete, let us proceed to the relation between adornment, gender identity, and gender-based oppression. III.ADORNMENT, CISNORMATIVITY, AND TRANSPHOBIA While it might be easy (for some) to project the exclusive, exhaustive gender binary widely assumed and enforced in Westernized cultures today onto all cultures and all times past, this projection is erroneous: it simply is not the case that every culture throughout history has taken all human persons to divide neatly and immutably into the exclusive and exhaustive categories man and woman.4 Much the same as racialized categories, gender categories have shown a sort of cultural and temporal plasticity.5 This projection, however erroneous, is indeed widespread, leading to consistent cultural messaging of cisnormativity: that is, messaging that the default way of being human involves a “match” between binary gender identity and gender assigned at birth, and that any other way of being is in some way deviant, delusional, defective, or deficient. Such messaging provides the scaffolding for transphobia, whether implicit or explicit. Some transphobia—such as the insistence on denying another person’s gender identity or the upholding of a status quo according to which trans persons can be fired or lose their homes, among other injustices and injuries, simply for being trans persons—is externalized transphobia, insofar as it manifests most typically in other-regarding behavior and policy. Other transphobia is internalized transphobia, in which a trans person, often as a result of habitual exposure to cisnormativity and externalized transphobia, adopts transphobic attitudes toward themselves. Connections between cisnormativity and transphobia, on the one hand, and adornment practices, on the other, might be obvious. Regardless, I discuss a few such connections here if only to bring them into sharper focus. Davies mentions many instances of gendered clothing practices (my term, not his), noting that “[a]cross many societies and over many times, women’s decorations aim to accentuate their physical beauty and appearance of youthfulness, while men’s, by comparison, are more concerned with displaying social status, achievements, and wealth” (2020, 81). Indeed, throughout Adornment, when topics related to sex or gender arise, Davies focuses discussion on “sex-based” differences in adornment practices, largely interpreted and explained through the lens of evolutionary psychology (see particularly Chapter 5: “Differences between Men and Women”). And though Davies briefly acknowledges “these days of gender fluidity and variety of family relationships” (80), the complex interplay between sex and gender across times and cultures is at best hinted at throughout the book. To be clear: Davies acknowledges that the accounts of evolutionary psychologists “can look conservative and sexist” (80), and his method throughout is intended to be descriptive of evolutionary psychological research rather than prescriptive of any views on how we should view sex, gender, and any relations between the two. But we should note that such views are not simply potentially conservative and sexist, but also transphobic in virtue of being cisnormative. Let me emphasize that I attribute no cisnormative motive to Davies here, who has clarified in personal correspondence that he is following the reports and tendencies of evolutionary psychologists and refrains from making claims about gender due to the fact that his expertise lies elsewhere. This, I take it, is an admirable approach. It is not inconsistent with that approach, though, to point out that those reports and tendencies of evolutionary psychologists are often at least implicitly cisnormative, just as Davies points out that they might also be “conservative and sexist.” I am no expert on evolutionary psychology, though I do couple my experience as a non-binary trans person with some background in social ontology. Moving forward, I limit my focus to claims about non-binary persons, for two reasons. First, it is what I am most comfortable and confident speaking about, given my own identity and experience. And second, for a non-binary person, there is no such thing as “passing:” whereas a person might attempt to follow certain social norms so as to be consistently read as a man or as a woman without highlighting their identity as trans, the norms governing being consistently read as non-binary without highlighting trans identity are likely essentially ill defined. This puts persons who are read as non-binary (whether or not they identify as such) at particular risk, since such a reading can highlight them (even if erroneously) as trans persons. Given the oppressed nature of trans persons as a group, this very act of categorization can indeed lead to harm.6 How can adornment practices aid in eroding cisnormativity and both externalized and internalized transphobia? One means of gender-affirming therapy involves bringing gender presentation, including adorning acts, into better harmony with a person’s gender identity. The donning (or avoidance) of skirts, ties, makeup, various hairstyles, piercings, jewelry, tattoos, and other forms of adornment can substantially decrease both gender dysphoria and body dysmorphia. A glance at the Solace app, designed to offer guidance through gender-affirming transition processes, reveals adornment-related benchmarks such as adopting hairstyles, getting piercings, and so forth, and a read of various memoirs of non-binary persons—such as Maia Kobabe’s (2019),Gender Queer: A Memoir and Jacob Tobia’s (2018)Sissy: A Coming-of-Gender Story—will find much space devoted to discussion of the potentially therapeutic effects of adornment practices. The American Medical Association recognizes “grooming and dressing” in accordance with one’s gender identity as among the aspects of social transition that is “for many transgender individuals, … a critically important part of medically necessary treatment” (American Medical Association n.d.). Adornment practices appear, then, to play at least one part in self-acceptance and the erosion of internalized transphobia. What about externalized transphobia? Psychologists, social scientists, and philosophers have long discussed what has been called the mere-exposure effect, according to which familiarity with an object or phenomenon tends to lead to an increase in positive attitudes (or decrease in negative attitudes) toward said object or phenomenon. By publicly and routinely engaging in gender nonconforming adornment practices—or what in queer spaces is sometimes referred to as genderfucking, a term originating in Christopher Lonc’s article, “Genderfuck and Its Delights,” in a 1974 issue of Gay Sunshine magazine—one might reasonably predict that mere exposure to such practices (and, hence, the persons practicing them) by those antecedently disposed toward cisnormative or transphobic attitudes might find those attitudes gradually chipped away and replaced with more positive sentiments—or at least less negative ones. This is, of course, empirical conjecture, and would need to be confirmed through psychological and social scientific study. But a wealth of anecdata suggest that the claim holds true. If so, we now see at least potential ways in which gender nonconforming adornment practices might help reduce both externalized and internalized transphobia and can thereby contribute to the goal of making the world safer for non-binary persons (and by extension, binary trans persons; by further extension, all persons).7 IV.ADORNMENT AND ACTIVISM Suppose Adrian, a non-binary person who to their chagrin is resigned to being read as a man, engages in self-decoration practices typically associated (in their cultural context) with women. Indeed, Adrian is genderfucking: they have no intentions of “passing,” nor do they pay any mind to whether their practices make their appearance any more beautiful or sublime. Instead, their primary—indeed, sole—intention is to publicly challenge entrenched norms regarding the correlation of specific adornment practices with stipulated poles on a purported gender binary, as a means toward contributing to the goal of making their culture safer for trans and gender-nonconforming persons. As such, Adrian’s self-decoration practices fail to satisfy condition (1) of Davies’s analysis of adornment. If their practices are to qualify as adornment practices, then, they must satisfy condition (2). But do they? It depends on how we describe the adornment practice in question. If we characterize Adrian simply as wearing skirts, feminine-coded makeup, feminine-coded jewelry, and so forth, then it is clear that condition (2) is met, as such practices clearly originate in (1)-type adornment. If we characterize them instead as wearing skirts, and so forth, while consistently and knowingly being read as a man, then condition (2) is not met, as this is a not a conventionalized, socially accepted practice (at least in Adrian’s cultural context). Settling between these competing characterizations requires us to ask: are the practices in question conventionally gendered, and thereby best described in a manner that references the agent? Given the supposition that Adrian has a reason to engage in such practices in the first place, the answer seems to be yes. But if that is right, then condition (2) is not met, and Adrian’s self-decoration fails to qualify as genuine adornment. We might accept this consequence: Adrian is not adorning, but their practices aim to shift what will come to count as adornment. Alternatively, we might offer a slight modification to Davies’s analysis, replacing condition (2) with: (e) to follow or contribute to the intended institution of a conventionalized, socially accepted practice (f) that originated in or shares a salient causal-historical connection with (1)-type adornment. This move retains the intuition that Adrian is engaged not just in activism-orientation self-decoration, but genuine adornment. I share this intuition, so I am more inclined toward accepting this modification. That inclination is, of course, short of an argument, and my counterparts not similarly inclined would likely be just fine with the first suggestion, especially given the ease with which Adrian’s practices would indeed qualify as genuine adornment if only they coupled their extant intentions with some version of the special-making intention. A further question: should we really qualify Adrian’s practices as activism? Or are they more akin to slacktivism: the sort of (merely) performative posturing that allows the performer to (erroneously) feel, morally, as if they have meaningfully contributed to a cause, when really their action is an inadequate stand-in for genuine effort (i.e. merely sharing an article on social media to “raise awareness,” or the brief trend of wearing a safety pin after the 2016 U.S. election to demonstrate status as an “ally”)? I would suggest that an act qualifies as activism, rather than mere slacktivism, to the degree that it stands to make or contribute to a meaningful outcome, and the agent has some “skin in the game,” in the sense that the act carries some sort of tangible cost or risk. Unlike the social media case, Adrian’s actions are likely observed by many outside of their own informational network, and hence many without shared social and political views. The aforementioned mere exposure, then, though still relatively minor, is likely more impactful than merely sharing an article. And, though displaying a safety pin might have led to compromises in personal safety in some ideologically extreme climates, the risks that come with Adrian’s practices are quite plausibly higher. I suggest, then, that they do count as (a still perhaps quite modest) form of activism rather than mere slacktivism.8 V.NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS Carol Hay (2011) has argued, on Kantian grounds, that members of oppressed groups (qua members of those groups) have a moral obligation to resist their own oppression. If adornment practices (or near-adornment practices) like those discussed so far can (modestly) aid in the resistance of oppression against certain groups of persons, should we conclude that such persons have a moral obligation to take up those practices? Henry Pratt (2014) has suggested that those who grow facial hair maybe ought to sport unconventional styles (Pratt’s word is “ugly”) to erode patriarchal norms. Given the view that anyone, regardless of gender, can be affected by patriarchal oppression, should we conclude that the pogonotrophically-capable among us carry special moral obligations for reasons similar to those for which Hay argues? Do analogous claims apply to Adrian, leaving them morally culpable were they to abandon their practices? Even granting Hay’s claim, we can (as she indeed does) acknowledge that the fulfillment of the moral obligation to resist one’s own oppression is multiply realizable: in Kantian terms, it is an imperfect duty (2011, 29). As long as one is doing something, one is not morally culpable for not doing everything all the time. What remains, though, is that someone like Adrian, even if not morally required to engage in such practices, has at least some pro tanto moral reason to do so. I take it that this pro tanto moral reason remains even if we (as I do) reject Hay’s Kantian starting points: if one is on the fence about certain practices but engaging in them can help themselves and others face less oppression, then this reason—though capable of being over ridden—can and should be morally motivating. And I submit, that reason is stronger for the more (relatively) privileged among the oppressed group: in the case of non-binary persons, I have in mind mostly those who are white, not disabled, financially secure, and fortunate enough to find support from friends, family, and community. If Adrian meets such a description, their reason in favor of the aforementioned activism is stronger than that of their peers who meet other descriptions, even if Adrian nonetheless remains morally free to abstain from such practices entirely. As for the task of determining the relative strength of the moral reasons had by comparatively privileged cisgender persons to engage in such acts of “genderfucking”: I leave that as an exercise for the reader.9 Footnotes 1 On gender identity, see Jenkins (2018). 2 For discussion, see Mikkola (2016, section 3). 3 See Dembroff (2020) for further discussion on such gender identities. 4 Cf. Dembroff (2020, n1). 5 See, inter alia, Haslanger (2000). 6 See discussion of the natures of such harms in general, Jenkins (2020). 7 In Dembroff’s (2020: 18) terminology, such adornment practices might qualify as disruptive of dominant gender ideology. 8 For a powerful discussion of what might be taken as the inherently political aspects of non-binary identities, see Dembroff (2018). 9 For helpful feedback, thanks to Sam Cowling, Elizabeth Scarborough, the participants of this symposium, and the audience at the Author-Meets-Critics panel on Adornment at the 2020 American Society for Aesthetics meeting. References American Medical Association . N.d . “Advocating for the LGBTQ Community.” AMA . https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/population-care/advocating-lgbtq-community. Davies , Stephen . 2020 . Adornment: What Self-Decoration Tells Us about Who We Are . London : Bloomsbury Press . 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Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat ———. 2020 . “Ontic Injustice.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 : 188 – 205 . Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kobabe , Maia . 2019 . Gender Queer: A Memoir . St. Louis, MO : Lion’s Forge. Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Lonc , Christopher . 1974 . “Genderfuck and Its Delights.” Gay Sunshine 21 ( spring ): 4 – 16 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Mikkola , Mari . 2016 . “Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta . https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/feminism-gender/. Pratt , Henry . 2014 . “The Philosophy of Facial Hair.” Aesthetics for Birds . www.aestheticsforbirds.com/2014/03/07/the-philosophy-of-facial-hair-by-henry-pratt/. Tobia , Jacob . 2018 . Sissy: A Coming-of-Gender Story . New York : G.P. Putnan’s Sons . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC © The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Society for Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)

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The Journal of Aesthetics and Art CriticismOxford University Press

Published: Sep 27, 2021

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