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Collective Action, Heterogeneous Loyalties and Path Dependence: Micro-evidence from Senegal

Collective Action, Heterogeneous Loyalties and Path Dependence: Micro-evidence from Senegal In Senegal, we encountered a situation in which a minority group of migrant fishermen had completely different sets of expectations regarding a collective action depending on the location where they operated. In one village expectations were pessimistic, while in the other village they were optimistic. Understanding this contrast and its implications provides the main justification for the paper. To be able to account for the contrast between the two areas, pessimistic expectations in the first area have to be traced back to a preceding conflict that could never be settled satisfactorily. A perverse path-dependent process had thus been set in motion that could not be changed by a simple act of will of a determined leadership. To demonstrate the links between expectations and actions that fit with the story told, we propose a simple model of collective action with asymmetric information. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of African Economies Oxford University Press

Collective Action, Heterogeneous Loyalties and Path Dependence: Micro-evidence from Senegal

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References (14)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
Journal of African Economies, Vol. 13 No. 3 © Centre for the Study of African Economies 2004; all rights reserved
ISSN
0963-8024
eISSN
1464-3723
DOI
10.1093/jae/ejh023
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In Senegal, we encountered a situation in which a minority group of migrant fishermen had completely different sets of expectations regarding a collective action depending on the location where they operated. In one village expectations were pessimistic, while in the other village they were optimistic. Understanding this contrast and its implications provides the main justification for the paper. To be able to account for the contrast between the two areas, pessimistic expectations in the first area have to be traced back to a preceding conflict that could never be settled satisfactorily. A perverse path-dependent process had thus been set in motion that could not be changed by a simple act of will of a determined leadership. To demonstrate the links between expectations and actions that fit with the story told, we propose a simple model of collective action with asymmetric information.

Journal

Journal of African Economies – Oxford University Press

Published: Sep 1, 2004

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