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Celebrating with a damp squib: China’s public competition enforcement

Celebrating with a damp squib: China’s public competition enforcement AbstractIn recent years, public competition enforcement in China has attracted worldwide attention as the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agencies (AMEAs) have become increasingly active in applying the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) to well-known domestic as well as foreign conglomerates. News about high-profile probes and enormous fines imposed by the AMEAs more commonly makes the headlines. Nonetheless, whilst intensified enforcement raises public awareness of the AML and expectations of the prospect of competition enforcement, it reveals at the same time a myriad of unsolved problems concerning this fiendishly complex, and in ways unsound, competition system: it has from the very beginning suffered from major defects involving ineffective institutional design, lack of transparency and consistency in decision-making, and all too frequent political intervention. This article analyses these problems by examining recent cases concluded by the AMEAs. It argues that whilst problems within China’s competition system are not entirely insurmountable, major external obstacles are much more formidable and can be overcome only if and when meaningful political reforms are achieved. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Oxford University Press

Celebrating with a damp squib: China’s public competition enforcement

Kuang, Lei
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement , Volume 4 (2) – Oct 1, 2016
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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
ISSN
2050-0688
eISSN
2050-0696
DOI
10.1093/jaenfo/jnw002
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractIn recent years, public competition enforcement in China has attracted worldwide attention as the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agencies (AMEAs) have become increasingly active in applying the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) to well-known domestic as well as foreign conglomerates. News about high-profile probes and enormous fines imposed by the AMEAs more commonly makes the headlines. Nonetheless, whilst intensified enforcement raises public awareness of the AML and expectations of the prospect of competition enforcement, it reveals at the same time a myriad of unsolved problems concerning this fiendishly complex, and in ways unsound, competition system: it has from the very beginning suffered from major defects involving ineffective institutional design, lack of transparency and consistency in decision-making, and all too frequent political intervention. This article analyses these problems by examining recent cases concluded by the AMEAs. It argues that whilst problems within China’s competition system are not entirely insurmountable, major external obstacles are much more formidable and can be overcome only if and when meaningful political reforms are achieved.

Journal

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement – Oxford University Press

Published: Oct 1, 2016

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