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AbstractThere is a growing literature in industrial organization on the use of empirical screens to detect cartels. I discuss several methodological issues that have emerged from this literature. I explain why addressing these issues is important in gaining a better understanding of the power and limitations of empirical screens and for extending the retrospective application of empirical screens to dynamic, real-time monitoring of the market. I then highlight the intersections and discuss lessons and experiences from other literatures that are helpful in the design and use of empirical screens for both screening and monitoring. Future research topics are suggested.
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement – Oxford University Press
Published: Oct 1, 2017
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