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Does Evaluation Change Teacher Effort and Performance? Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Policy of Retesting Students

Does Evaluation Change Teacher Effort and Performance? Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Policy... We document measurable, lasting gains in student achievement caused by a change in teachers' evaluation incentives. A short-lived rule created a discontinuity in teachers' incentives when allocating effort across their assigned students: students who failed an initial end-of-year test were retested a few weeks later, and then only the higher of the two scores was used when calculating the teacher's evaluation score. One year later, long after the discontinuity in incentives had ended, retested students scored 0.03σ higher than nonretested students. Otherwise identical students were treated differently by teachers because of evaluation incentives, despite arguably equal returns to teacher effort. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Economics and Statistics MIT Press

Does Evaluation Change Teacher Effort and Performance? Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Policy of Retesting Students

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Publisher
MIT Press
Copyright
© 2020 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ISSN
0034-6535
eISSN
1530-9142
DOI
10.1162/rest_a_00962
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We document measurable, lasting gains in student achievement caused by a change in teachers' evaluation incentives. A short-lived rule created a discontinuity in teachers' incentives when allocating effort across their assigned students: students who failed an initial end-of-year test were retested a few weeks later, and then only the higher of the two scores was used when calculating the teacher's evaluation score. One year later, long after the discontinuity in incentives had ended, retested students scored 0.03σ higher than nonretested students. Otherwise identical students were treated differently by teachers because of evaluation incentives, despite arguably equal returns to teacher effort.

Journal

The Review of Economics and StatisticsMIT Press

Published: May 9, 2022

References