Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms

Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms on m unrelated machines, to minimize some optimization goal. Nisan and Ronen [Nisan, N., A. Ronen. 2001. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games Econom. Behav. 35 166196] consider the specific goal of makespan minimization, and show a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m. This large gap inspired many attempts that yielded positive results for several special cases, but very partial success for the general case: the lower bound was slightly increased to 2.61 by Christodoulou et al. [Christodoulou, G., E. Koutsoupias, A. Kovcs. 2010. Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines. ACM Trans. Algorithms (TALG) 6(2) 118] and Koutsoupias and Vidali [Koutsoupias, E., A. Vidali. 2007. A lower bound of 1phi for truthful scheduling mechanisms. Proc. 32nd Internat. Sympos. Math. Foundations Comput. Sci. (MFCS)], while the best upper bound remains unchanged. In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. Moreover, our proof yields similar optimal bounds for two other optimization goals: the sum of completion times and the lp norm of the schedule. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Mathematics of Operations Research INFORMS

Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms

15 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/informs/optimal-lower-bounds-for-anonymous-scheduling-mechanisms-AOdqxGydjt

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
INFORMS
Copyright
Copyright © INFORMS
Subject
Research Article
ISSN
0364-765X
eISSN
1526-5471
DOI
10.1287/moor.1110.0534
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms on m unrelated machines, to minimize some optimization goal. Nisan and Ronen [Nisan, N., A. Ronen. 2001. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games Econom. Behav. 35 166196] consider the specific goal of makespan minimization, and show a lower bound of 2, and an upper bound of m. This large gap inspired many attempts that yielded positive results for several special cases, but very partial success for the general case: the lower bound was slightly increased to 2.61 by Christodoulou et al. [Christodoulou, G., E. Koutsoupias, A. Kovcs. 2010. Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines. ACM Trans. Algorithms (TALG) 6(2) 118] and Koutsoupias and Vidali [Koutsoupias, E., A. Vidali. 2007. A lower bound of 1phi for truthful scheduling mechanisms. Proc. 32nd Internat. Sympos. Math. Foundations Comput. Sci. (MFCS)], while the best upper bound remains unchanged. In this paper we show the optimal lower bound on truthful anonymous mechanisms: no such mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m. Moreover, our proof yields similar optimal bounds for two other optimization goals: the sum of completion times and the lp norm of the schedule.

Journal

Mathematics of Operations ResearchINFORMS

Published: May 29, 2012

Keywords: Keywords : anonymous ; mechanism ; scheduling ; truthfulness

References