Study on the concession and damping equilibrium of duopoly strategic output based on bounded rationality and knowledge
Study on the concession and damping equilibrium of duopoly strategic output based on bounded...
Fang, Zhigeng ; Liu, Sifeng ; Qiu, Robin G. ; Shi, Hongxing ; Shi, Aiqing Ruan
2008-01-01 00:00:00
The fatal weakness of the classical Cournot oligopoly model and current output-decision-making models is the supposition that player always pursues the maximum of present interest. This paper establishes some new hypotheses, including goal supposition, time-order assumption, bounded rationality and finite knowledge hypothesis, and constructs a generic model for realistic decision-making situations. The model should better fit into real strategic decision-making process between the leader and follower oligopolies (i.e. companies or players). Moreover, the arithmetic method, natures and characteristics of output decision-making are well studied in this research. This research gives and proves ten important propositions and four relevant deductions. The conceptions of damping loss and total damping cost of a completely dominated marketplace by the leader oligopoly are proposed; relevant algorithms and examples are also provided.
http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.pngInternational Journal of Services Operations and InformaticsInderscience Publishershttp://www.deepdyve.com/lp/inderscience-publishers/study-on-the-concession-and-damping-equilibrium-of-duopoly-strategic-ZM7kPDKwzq
Study on the concession and damping equilibrium of duopoly strategic output based on bounded rationality and knowledge
The fatal weakness of the classical Cournot oligopoly model and current output-decision-making models is the supposition that player always pursues the maximum of present interest. This paper establishes some new hypotheses, including goal supposition, time-order assumption, bounded rationality and finite knowledge hypothesis, and constructs a generic model for realistic decision-making situations. The model should better fit into real strategic decision-making process between the leader and follower oligopolies (i.e. companies or players). Moreover, the arithmetic method, natures and characteristics of output decision-making are well studied in this research. This research gives and proves ten important propositions and four relevant deductions. The conceptions of damping loss and total damping cost of a completely dominated marketplace by the leader oligopoly are proposed; relevant algorithms and examples are also provided.
Journal
International Journal of Services Operations and Informatics
– Inderscience Publishers
To get new article updates from a journal on your personalized homepage, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.