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Using a large sample of US community banks, we study how social capital affects bank managers' opportunistic reporting behaviour. We argue that high social capital reduces information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders and increases the cost of opportunistic reporting for managers. Supporting this argument, we find that social capital is negatively associated with discretionary loan loss provisions. We further find that the negative relation between social capital and opportunistic reporting behaviour is weaker when in banks subject to stronger regulations, which suggests that strong regulations act as a substitute to high social capital in constraining banks' opportunistic reporting behaviour.
International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation – Inderscience Publishers
Published: Jan 1, 2021
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