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Profit as a signal of product quality and customer service: performance evaluation for plant managers

Profit as a signal of product quality and customer service: performance evaluation for plant... Plant managers generally have no direct marketing responsibilities but they have control over product quality and customer service. This paper hypothesises that many firms evaluate these managers on profit because sales, a component of profit, convey information on a plant manager's performance on product quality and customer service. Several predictions are developed from the hypothesis and tested in this study. The chance that a plant manager is evaluated on cost vs profit is predicted to decrease with the sensitivity and precision of sales as an indicator of product quality and customer service. In addition, the chance that a plant manager is evaluated on cost vs profit may be associated with the extent to which the manager is also evaluated on specific measures of product quality and customer service. Empirical results are generally consistent with these predictions. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation Inderscience Publishers

Profit as a signal of product quality and customer service: performance evaluation for plant managers

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Publisher
Inderscience Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. All rights reserved
ISSN
1740-8008
eISSN
1740-8016
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Plant managers generally have no direct marketing responsibilities but they have control over product quality and customer service. This paper hypothesises that many firms evaluate these managers on profit because sales, a component of profit, convey information on a plant manager's performance on product quality and customer service. Several predictions are developed from the hypothesis and tested in this study. The chance that a plant manager is evaluated on cost vs profit is predicted to decrease with the sensitivity and precision of sales as an indicator of product quality and customer service. In addition, the chance that a plant manager is evaluated on cost vs profit may be associated with the extent to which the manager is also evaluated on specific measures of product quality and customer service. Empirical results are generally consistent with these predictions.

Journal

International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance EvaluationInderscience Publishers

Published: Jan 1, 2007

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