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Every node in a wireless ad hoc network is both end host (it generates its own data and routing traffic) and infrastructure (it forwards traffic for others), but rational nodes have no incentive to cooperatively forward traffic for others, since this kind of forwarding is not costless. In this article, we use game theory to analyse cooperative mechanisms and derive optimal criteria in forwarding. Distinguished from previous works, we take the consideration of realistic scenarios such as noise, non-simultaneously, non-perfect measurement and different strategies by the nodes.
International Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive Communications Systems – Inderscience Publishers
Published: Jan 1, 2008
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