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One-round key exchange in the standard model

One-round key exchange in the standard model We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the Random Oracle Model. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Applied Cryptography Inderscience Publishers

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Publisher
Inderscience Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. All rights reserved
ISSN
1753-0563
eISSN
1753-0571
DOI
10.1504/IJACT.2009.023466
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the Random Oracle Model.

Journal

International Journal of Applied CryptographyInderscience Publishers

Published: Jan 1, 2009

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