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- Publisher
- Inderscience Publishers
- Copyright
- Copyright © Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. All rights reserved
- ISSN
- 1740-7494
- eISSN
- 1740-7508
- DOI
- 10.1504/EG.2012.044777
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This paper describes Scantegrity, an electronic voting system developed by Chaum et al. (2008b), and it analyses Scantegrity’s ability to satisfy the goals of privacy and verifiability. The paper describes a programmatic attack on Scantegrity and presents findings in the form of program output for a corrupted hypothetical election. The attack takes advantage of the inherent vulnerability of electronic voting systems due to the tension between the goals of privacy and verifiability. It exposes a security weakness in electronic voting systems, and it establishes the need to control code compilation and provide physical security for that compiled code throughout the election process.
Journal
Electronic Government, an International Journal – Inderscience Publishers
Published: Jan 1, 2012