Optimal Pricing Model of Environmental Quality Index Futures from the Perspective of Green Finance
Optimal Pricing Model of Environmental Quality Index Futures from the Perspective of Green Finance
Che, Junwen;Zhou, Shenghe;Shan, Rui;Jia, Hui;Liu, Zheng
2022-08-28 00:00:00
Hindawi International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems Volume 2022, Article ID 6951040, 8 pages https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/6951040 Research Article Optimal Pricing Model of Environmental Quality Index Futures from the Perspective of Green Finance 1 2 1 1 1 Junwen Che , Shenghe Zhou , Rui Shan , Hui Jia , and Zheng Liu Yantai Nanshan University, Longkou, Shandong 265713, China ShandongNanshan Aluminum Co, LTD., Longkou, Shandong 265713, China Correspondence should be addressed to Rui Shan; 3100502016@caa.edu.cn Received 14 July 2022; Revised 29 July 2022; Accepted 3 August 2022; Published 28 August 2022 Academic Editor: Nagamalai Vasimalai Copyright © 2022 Junwen Che et al. *is is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. In order to establish the optimal price of low-carbon products and set the optimal target carbon emissions in the production cycle so as to maximize profits, this paper proposes the optimal pricing model of environmental quality index futures from the perspective of green finance. *is paper mainly studies the optimal pricing and carbon emission strategy of low-carbon products of a single enterprise under the carbon trading system based on the quota system. When enterprises join the carbon trading system, how to optimally determine their target carbon emissions in the production cycle and the optimal price of their low- carbon products in order to maximize their own profits, based on the carbon emission quotas freely allocated by the government in the face of exogenous carbon trading prices and different consumer preferences for low-carbon products in the market, is discussed in detail. *e experimental results show that the low marginal cost of emission reduction will urge enterprises to implement low-emission strategies as much as possible, and the marginal cost of a specific size will enable enterprises to implement low-carbon policies with low emissions, and the optimal emissions will decline with the increase of carbon prices. However, from the perspective of 50–300 carbon trading prices, the profits generated are less than those of the minimum emission strategy, and the difference between the two is generally one order of magnitude. *erefore, if the internal conditions permit and the external carbon trading price is reasonable, enterprises should reduce carbon emissions as much as possible. *e properties obtained from the model analysis and the numerical conclusions given in the example part reflect the relationship between the enterprise product pricing, the marginal cost of emission reduction, and the target emission decision-making and draw some valuable information for the enterprise and the government decision-making. the EU Emission Rights Trading System have been gradually 1. Introduction established. Driven by the government’s policy of low- International carbon futures trading originated from the carbon economic transformation and the promotion of spot trading of carbon emission rights. In 2003, the Chicago relevant financial institutions, the carbon spot trading Climate Exchange (CCX) was established. Based on “quota market has developed rapidly, and the trading volume is and trade,” it became the world’s first legally binding rising day by day. greenhouse gas emission registration, voluntary emission In April 2005, the European Climate Exchange launched reduction, and trading platform based on international rules the first EU carbon emission quota (EUA) futures and [1, 2]. In 2005, the EU established the EU Emissions Trading operated on the electronic futures trading platform of the System (EUETS), which has become the largest total carbon London International Petroleum Exchange (IPE). *e emission control and trading system in the world. Since Chicago Climate Exchange, the European Climate Ex- then, the European Climate Exchange (ECX), the French change, and the European energy exchange (EEX) have electricity exchange, the BlueNext trading market, the Eu- successively launched certified emission reduction (CER) ropean energy exchange (EEX), the Italian electricity ex- futures contracts. Once the carbon futures contract was change (IPEX), and the UK emission rights exchange under launched, it was sought after by many investors, and the 2 International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems established carbon emission allocation quota and cus- trading volume increased rapidly. At present, the main carbon futures products in the global carbon finance market tomers with different low-carbon preferences in the market so as to maximize profits. Enterprises need to include the European Climate Exchange carbon finance contract (ECXCFI), emission index futures (EUAFutures), balance the following issues: reducing emissions will gain certified emission reduction futures (CERFutures), and the carbon trading benefits and will positively affect the Chicago Climate Exchange carbon trading financial futures market demand for products due to better low-carbon (CCXCFIFutures) [3]. Figure 1 shows the organizational performance, but at this time, enterprises will bear higher structure of the green industry fund. emission reduction input costs. On the contrary, if the enterprise relaxes the control on emission reduction, the 2. Literature Review cost will be relatively reduced, but on the one hand, it may not get the carbon trading income. On the other hand, it In response to this research problem, Lee et al. took the will have an adverse impact on product sales due to poor carbon emission trading pilot as the background, considered environmental performance and a negative corporate that when there was dual pressure of emission reduction image [10]. In this paper, carbon emissions are directly policy and low-carbon demand, they introduced the manu- taken as decision variables. *e main reasons for this facturer’s carbon emission per unit product decision vari- assumption are (1) it can clearly reflect the relationship ables, and analyzed the manufacturer’s optimal pricing and between enterprise emissions, the trading market, the optimal emissions by constructing the manufacturer’s sim- carbon quota, and the government’s low-carbon policy; plified decision model [4]. Wu et al. studied the optimal (2) as an indicator or task, emissions have a very intuitive pricing and carbon emission strategy of low-carbon products guiding significance in the actual production process. We for a single enterprise under the carbon trading system based think this assumption is also reasonable from the per- on the quota system. In the carbon trading environment, the spective of enterprise production because carbon emis- government allocates a certain carbon emission quota to sions mainly come from energy consumption. Enterprises enterprises for free. Facing the carbon trading price given by can change the energy input structure or use efficiency to the carbon trading market and the different preferences of reduce carbon emissions under the condition of ensuring consumers on the low-carbon degree of products in the a certain output. For example, some agricultural product product market, it provides solutions on how to optimally production enterprises’ CDM projects change the power determine the target carbon emissions within the production access from thermal power to wind power or biogas power cycle of enterprises and the optimal price of low-carbon generation, which will not affect the final production. products produced so as to maximize their own profits [5]. Another example is the energy-saving projects related to CSS et al. pointed out in their research on the establishment of cement production. an emission rights market in China that carbon taxation, a Pigou mean, and carbon emission rights trading, a Coase mean, are based on internalizing the external effects of en- 3. Research Methods vironmental problems and combining policy intervention 3.1. Symbol Description. *e symbols used in this article are with market mechanisms to affect enterprises’ emission and explained one by one: pollution control behavior. However, carbon tax mostly relies on government intervention, while carbon emission rights p: Low carbon product market pricing, as a decision trading focuses on using market mechanisms to solve envi- variable; ronmental problems [6]. Pan et al. pointed out that the carbon e *e total carbon emission in the production cycle of tax is levied on the carbon content of energy consumption the enterprise, which is a decision variable; products, which is conducive to the realization of carbon D(p, e ): *e market demand of the final product, emission reduction. However, the carbon tax will have an c which is the function of the above two decision vari- impact on the competitiveness, distribution, and environ- ables, and the demand will decrease with the increase of ment of enterprises’ products, so some enterprises are re- price or carbon emission; luctant to adopt it [7]. Yu et al. found that if the marginal emission reduction cost (MAC) and marginal loss and other e : Minimum possible carbon emission, i.e., the min- cost and benefit functions of enterprises can be clearly de- imum emission that the enterprise can achieve within fined, carbon trading and carbon tax can achieve the optimal its production cycle with all efforts; goal of carbon emission reduction through appropriate e : Maximum carbon emission refers to the total pricing [8]. Yang et al. found that when other conditions carbon emission generated during the production cycle remain unchanged, the optimal environmental economic of an enterprise without any emission reduction means can be selected by comparing the size of the marginal technology; management cost and marginal transaction cost. When the p : *e market price of general products, an exogenous degree of marketization is low, the carbon tax means are more variable, is the market-accepted price of similar but appropriate [9]. nonlow-carbon products; *e problem we need to solve is how to set the optimal c : Marginal production cost without emission re- low-carbon product price and set the optimal target 0 duction technology input; carbon emissions in the production cycle in the face of the International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems 3 CCB International Item A Joint Administration investment contribution CCB urban investment Green environmental Item B environmental protection Equity protection Investment Management industry fund Co., Ltd. (fund manager) Urban Investment Other items Figure 1: Organizational structure of the green industry fund. c (e ): Low carbon input cost, set as the convex in- (2) Considering the government subsidy to the market d c creasing function of the enterprise’s target carbon rather than the low-carbon subsidy to enterprises emissions; because the government policy orientation in this paper focuses on the market rather than adminis- β: Emission reduction coefficient; trative means, and a corresponding part of the profits e: *e carbon emission limit for specific enterprises of enterprises will come from carbon trading rather shall be allocated by the government free of charge; than the subsidy amount. ε: Carbon trading price; *e subsidy to the market is to stimulate consumption δ: Low carbon preference of consumers; and improve citizens’ awareness of environmental protection t: Government subsidy coefficient for low-carbon [11]. products; M: *e total market capacity of the same type of low- carbon products and general products of the enterprise. 3.3. Product Demand. Suppose that consumers’ cognition of low-carbon products (or environmental satisfaction) in the market obeys the uniform distribution on [δ, δ]. δ means 3.2. Enterprise Decision. After the carbon emission quota is that for consumers who will buy any low-carbon products, δ known, the enterprise must make the optimal target carbon is a customer who has no low-carbon awareness and is only emission and product pricing decisions before the start of its willing to buy general products. Set the government subsidy production cycle to maximize its profits after the production amount for consumers to purchase low-carbon products as cycle. *e objective function is as follows: t(e − e ), which indicates that the low-carbon degree is m c based on the maximum carbon emission of enterprises. *e maxΠ � D p, e p − c − c e + ε