Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
In shifting from central planning to market allocation of resources, a number of Chinese government organs were converted into enterprise corporations, hybrid governance structures which were supposed to attain the best of both market incentives and hierarchical coordination. This paper examines specific cases of enterprise corporations in light of the tradeoffs between markets and hierarchies predicted by transaction cost economics. It analyzes the problems which arose in the attempt to replicate the highpowered incentives of markets within hierarchies.
The International Journal of Organizational Analysis – Emerald Publishing
Published: Mar 1, 1993
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.