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In the context of increasing consolidation in the banking industry, this research examined one of the motives for bank acquisitions and the kinds of acquisitions made by banking firms. The effect of ownership concentration was tested on the absolute level of bank acquisitions and the average degree of geographicmarket overlap of these acquisitions. In a sample of 156 banking firms, banks featuring dispersed ownership were found to acquire other banks with less marketoverlap than did banking firms with concentrated ownership. However, ownership concentration was not a significant predictor of the absolute level of merger activity. Implications of these differences in acquisition strategies are explored.
The International Journal of Organizational Analysis – Emerald Publishing
Published: Feb 1, 1999
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