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- Publisher
- Emerald Publishing
- Copyright
- Copyright © Emerald Group Publishing Limited
- ISSN
- 1753-8254
- DOI
- 10.1108/IGDR-09-2012-0040
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to present a theoretical underpinning for the fact that empirical studies have found an inverted-U curve relationship between emigration and per capita income, based on credit restrictions. The implications for tax policy are also analyzed. Design/methodology/approach – Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model, the authors characterize how the presence of an “inverted U-curve” relationship between emigration and per capita income will influence the optimal tax and expenditure policy in a country where agents have the option to move abroad. Findings – Among the results it is shown that if age-dependent taxes are available, the presence of an inverted-U curve provides an incentive to tax young labor harder, but old labor less hard, than otherwise. Originality/value – This migration model fits the empirical facts of migration better than most of the migration models previously used in the optimal taxation literature.
Journal
Indian Growth and Development Review – Emerald Publishing
Published: Nov 4, 2014