Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Stata Journal, 4
Management Science, 44
Academy of Management Review, 23
Strategic Management Journal, 36
Academy of Management Journal, 51
Journal of International Business Studies, 43
Journal of Federalism, 25
Organization Science, 23
Business Ethics Quarterly, 4
Academy of Management Review, 37
The Journal of Marketing, 52
Academy of Management Journal, 50
Business and Politics, 11
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108
European Journal of Comparative Economics, 6
Economics Letters, 80
Management International Review, 50
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98
World Politics, 39
Journal of Public Economics, 93
World Development, 131
Strategic Management Journal, 35
American Economic Review, 103
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28
Academy of Management Journal, 49
Journal of International Business Studies, 44
Strategic Management Journal, 32
Strategic Management Journal, 34
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29
Journal of Development Economics, 83
Academy of Management Journal, 47
Journal of Business Ethics, 90
American Political Science Review, 97
Journal of Economic Literature, 45
Strategic Management Journal, 23
Organization Science, 15
Journal of Consumer Research, 20
Organization Science, 26
Strategic Management Journal, 38
Journal of International Business Studies, 41
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122
Academy of Management Journal, 35
Administrative Science Quarterly, 50
Strategic Management Journal, 34
Journal of Management Studies, 45
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 48
Strategic Management Journal, 40
Organization Science, 17
Journal of Management Studies, 27
Strategic Management Journal, 28
Strategic Management Journal, 28
Journal of Management, 17
Management Science, 53
The American Economic Review, 100
Journal of Management, 45
Strategic Management Journal, 30
Journal of Management, 39
Academy of Management Journal, 38
Strategic Management Journal, 30
Journal of International Business Studies, 43
Strategic Management Journal, 36
Strategic Management Journal, 37
Econometrica, 47
In fragile institutional environments, firms often have no choice but bribery as the means to access the services monopolized by the government. Corrupt government officials whose resources are valuable to many different firms can easily find other firms willing to offer bribes. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how this imbalanced interdependence exposes the bribing firm to the hazard of opportunism from the bribed officials.Design/methodology/approachThis study draws on World Business Environment Survey (WBES) data and the instrumental variable (IV) Probit estimator with Heckman correction for the potential selection bias.FindingsThe authors find that the more firms depend on bribery to acquire governmental resources, the severer the level of opportunism they encounter from the government officials. In addition, the authors find that although the presence of a legal alternative to bribery reduces the level of a corrupt government official's opportunism that a bribing firm experiences, the more firms depend on bribery despite the presence of a legal alternative, the higher the level of the corrupt official's opportunism that the firm will experience. Finally, the authors find that establishing a relational contract with government officials reduces the hazard of opportunism.Originality/valueThe study contributes to the resource dependence literature by finding that a greater imbalance in the interdependence between two parties in bribery exposes the more dependent party to a larger hazard of opportunism. The finding that an ineffective alternative to a current resource provider would not strengthen but weaken a resource seeker's bargaining power expands the literature. The authors also contribute to the corruption research by showing the significant strategic, not legal, risk to bribing firms of engaging in bribery, which to date has not been sufficiently discussed.
Journal of Strategy and Management – Emerald Publishing
Published: Feb 4, 2022
Keywords: Bribery; Imbalanced interdependence; Legal alternative; Close informal relationship; Opportunism
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.