Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Trust and control through contracting have been juxtaposed in many studies addressing interorganizational collaboration and knowledge exchange. In this study, the authors move from the opposite ends of a continuum between trust as an attitude and control exercised through formal contracts toward the center of the continuum where trust and contracting start to show similar features. The authors ask how trust in its analytical form and control gained through establishing informal protection for knowledge assets affect the innovation and market performance of firms engaged in research and development (R&D) alliances.Design/methodology/approachThe authors examine the existing literature and conduct a quantitative empirical study to answer the research question.FindingsThe authors find, first, that controlling an organization’s own knowledge assets in R&D alliances with informal means of protection can be more effective than a strategy of controlling the alliance through formal contracts. Second, the authors find that an analytical audit of partner trustworthiness, and especially partner capabilities and goodwill can be more effective than trust as an attitude.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings support softening the sharp distinction between trust and control and provide evidence on the relevance of highlighting the firm point of view in knowledge management in R&D alliance governance.Originality/valueThe study adds to the existing understanding of trust and control in R&D alliance governance. Specifically, the authors turn the focus from interorganizational governance to intra-organizational knowledge management measures, and particularly toward how a focal actor can take an analytical approach to evaluate partner trustworthiness and use informal control in protecting its own knowledge assets. Consequently, this study also provides a plausible explanation for the contradictory findings in studies that examine the relationship between trust and control. The study indicates that depending on the specific nature of trust and control, they can be either a complement or a supplement factors: the extreme forms of trust and control are notably different from those forms that share similar features.
VINE Journal of Information and Knowledge Management Systems – Emerald Publishing
Published: Apr 7, 2020
Keywords: Innovation; Informal control; Research and development; Knowledge governance; Analytical trust; Knowledge protection mechanisms
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.