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Judicial Review and Democracy: A Normative Discourse on the (Novel) Ethiopian Approach to Constitutional Review

Judicial Review and Democracy: A Normative Discourse on the (Novel) Ethiopian Approach to... YONATAN TESFAYE FESSHA* The Ethiopian Constitution, in an “original stroke”, provides the power to “interpret”1 the Constitution to the House of Federation (the House), which is referred to by some writers as the “Upper House” or “Second Chamber” of the bicameral parliament. The Constitution also establishes the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (the Council), a body composed of members of the judiciary, legal experts appointed by the House of Peoples’ Representatives and three persons designated by the House from among its members, to examine constitutional issues and submit its recommendations to the House for a final decision. This is, of course, very different from a number of other more well-known legal systems which vest the power of constitutional review either in general courts or in constitutional courts set up exclusively for constitutional matters. The formal way through which issues of constitutional interpretation take place is via the Council. Issues of constitutional interpretation are referred to the Council by a court or “the interested party”2 to a dispute. The Council, after examining the constitutional issue, can either remand the case to the competent court after it has found no need for constitutional interpretation, or submit its findings on constitutional interpretation http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png African Journal of International and Comparative Law Edinburgh University Press

Judicial Review and Democracy: A Normative Discourse on the (Novel) Ethiopian Approach to Constitutional Review

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Publisher
Edinburgh University Press
Copyright
© Edinburgh University Press
ISSN
0954-8890
eISSN
1755-1609
DOI
10.3366/ajicl.2006.14.1.53
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

YONATAN TESFAYE FESSHA* The Ethiopian Constitution, in an “original stroke”, provides the power to “interpret”1 the Constitution to the House of Federation (the House), which is referred to by some writers as the “Upper House” or “Second Chamber” of the bicameral parliament. The Constitution also establishes the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (the Council), a body composed of members of the judiciary, legal experts appointed by the House of Peoples’ Representatives and three persons designated by the House from among its members, to examine constitutional issues and submit its recommendations to the House for a final decision. This is, of course, very different from a number of other more well-known legal systems which vest the power of constitutional review either in general courts or in constitutional courts set up exclusively for constitutional matters. The formal way through which issues of constitutional interpretation take place is via the Council. Issues of constitutional interpretation are referred to the Council by a court or “the interested party”2 to a dispute. The Council, after examining the constitutional issue, can either remand the case to the competent court after it has found no need for constitutional interpretation, or submit its findings on constitutional interpretation

Journal

African Journal of International and Comparative Law – Edinburgh University Press

Published: Mar 1, 2006

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