Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/edinburgh-university-press/hupol-psis-doxa-and-epist-m-in-aristotle-JefC1vyVjR
References (10)
-
Whitney Schwab (2016)
Understanding Epistēmē in Plato’s Republic -
Jessica Moss, Whitney Schwab (2019)
The Birth of BeliefJournal of the History of Philosophy, 57
-
B. Williams (1973)
Problems of the Self: Deciding to believe -
C. Reeve (2012)
Action, Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle -
T. Gendler (2008)
Alief and BeliefContemporary Epistemology
-
Gail Fine (1978)
Knowledge and Belief in Republic V, 60
-
K. Vogt (2012)
Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato -
M. Burnyeat (2012)
Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy: Aristotle on understanding knowledge -
Jessica Moss (2021)
Plato's Epistemology -
James Byrne, Aristotle, J. Warrington (1949)
Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics
- Publisher
- Edinburgh University Press
- Copyright
- Copyright © Edinburgh University Press
- ISSN
- 2516-1156
- eISSN
- 2516-1164
- DOI
- 10.3366/anph.2021.0051
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In Aristotle's views on cognition a series of terms – hupolêpsis, doxa, and epistêmê – play key roles. But it has not been noticed that each of these comes in two kinds – one unqualified (haplôs) and the other qualified. When these and their interrelations are properly explored, a deeply systematic picture of cognition emerges, in which doxa is best understood as ‘belief’, hupolêpsis as ‘supposition’, and epistêmê (‘scientific knowledge’) as a sort of belief, so that – contrary to orthodoxy – we can have belief and knowledge of the same things at the same time. Many of these conclusions are shown to mark a continuity with Plato, in that neither thinker, it is argued, holds a so-called ‘two-worlds’ picture of cognition.
Journal
Ancient Philosophy Today: DIALOGOI – Edinburgh University Press
Published: Oct 1, 2021