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PHILOSOPHICAL SELF-DENIAL: Wittgenstein and the Fear of Public Language

PHILOSOPHICAL SELF-DENIAL: Wittgenstein and the Fear of Public Language Page 464 PHILOSOPHICAL SELF-DENIAL Wittgenstein and the Fear of Public Language Rei “Throughout his life Wittgenstein was convinced that he could not make himself understood”— so a friend recalls.1 Wittgenstein’s confidence in the stability and public character of language coexisted, it would seem, with a dreadful expectation that he would himself be unintelligible. Commentators who relate Wittgenstein’s psychology or biography to his philosophy often do so by setting them in opposition: by writing his polemic against private language, it is suggested, Wittgenstein fought off a personal susceptibility to myths of romantic solitude. But the assumption of antagonism may not be apt: hard-core belief in the public nature of language and a terror of isolation may well go together. The more public language is, the more awful failures of communication must be. When one can no longer imagine that an utterance retains a meaning independent of its reception, an ineffective utterance matters more. Without an ideal standard, we need only to be generally, not completely, competent; but at the same time, we need only to be generally incompetent to become linguistic pariahs. And for the very reason that one’s intelligibility is never perfect or finally destroyed, each exchange counts. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Common Knowledge Duke University Press

PHILOSOPHICAL SELF-DENIAL: Wittgenstein and the Fear of Public Language

Common Knowledge , Volume 8 (3) – Oct 1, 2002

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References (17)

Publisher
Duke University Press
Copyright
Copyright 2002 by Duke University Press
ISSN
0961-754X
eISSN
1538-4578
DOI
10.1215/0961754X-8-3-464
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Page 464 PHILOSOPHICAL SELF-DENIAL Wittgenstein and the Fear of Public Language Rei “Throughout his life Wittgenstein was convinced that he could not make himself understood”— so a friend recalls.1 Wittgenstein’s confidence in the stability and public character of language coexisted, it would seem, with a dreadful expectation that he would himself be unintelligible. Commentators who relate Wittgenstein’s psychology or biography to his philosophy often do so by setting them in opposition: by writing his polemic against private language, it is suggested, Wittgenstein fought off a personal susceptibility to myths of romantic solitude. But the assumption of antagonism may not be apt: hard-core belief in the public nature of language and a terror of isolation may well go together. The more public language is, the more awful failures of communication must be. When one can no longer imagine that an utterance retains a meaning independent of its reception, an ineffective utterance matters more. Without an ideal standard, we need only to be generally, not completely, competent; but at the same time, we need only to be generally incompetent to become linguistic pariahs. And for the very reason that one’s intelligibility is never perfect or finally destroyed, each exchange counts.

Journal

Common KnowledgeDuke University Press

Published: Oct 1, 2002

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