Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
F. Hayek (2016)
The Meaning of CompetitionEcon Journal Watch, 13
M. Anufriev, Jasmina Arifovic, J. Ledyard, V. Panchenko (2010)
UvA-DARE ( Digital Academic Repository ) Efficiency of Continuous Double Auctions under Individual Evolutionary Learning with Full or Limited Information
A. Kirman (1989)
The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic-Theory - the Emperor Has No ClothesThe Economic Journal, 99
V. Smith (1965)
Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian HypothesisJournal of Political Economy, 73
S. Rizvi (1997)
Responses to Arbitrariness in Contemporary EconomicsHistory of Political Economy, 29
C. Shannon (1948)
A mathematical theory of communicationBell Syst. Tech. J., 27
C. Holt (1995)
5. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research
W. Hildenbrand (1983)
On the "Law of Demand."Econometrica, 51
Anufriev (2013)
539Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 23
F. Hayek (1978)
Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1: Rules and Order
H. Sonnenschein (1973)
Do Walras' identity and continuity characterize the class of community excess demand functions?Journal of Economic Theory, 6
V. Smith (2007)
Experimental Economics : Induced Value Theory
Steven Gjerstad, J. Dickhaut (2001)
Price Formation in Double Auctions
1871] 1888). The Theory of Political Economy London: Macmillan
DW Ramapo (2008)
The use of knowledge about societyJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 67
Elena Asparouhova, P. Bossaerts, J. Ledyard (2020)
Price Formation in Multiple, Simultaneous Continuous Double Auctions, with Implications for Asset PricingERN: Other Microeconomics: Production
(1849)
De l’influence des péages sur l’utilité des voies de communication
1815] 1821b). Catéchisme d'économie politique
(1920)
Principles of Economics (8 ed.)
Adam Smith's Theory of Value: A Mathematical Statement of his Market Price Discovery Process. ESI Working Papers
T. Cason, D. Friedman (1996)
Price formation in double auction marketsJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 20
D. Friedman (1991)
A simple testable model of double auction marketsJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 15
H. Sonnenschein (1972)
Market Excess Demand FunctionsEconometrica, 40
Sabiou Inoua, V. Smith (2021)
Classical Theory of Competitive Market Price Formation
(1980)
Individualism and economic order: University of Chicago Press Hildenbrand, W
J. Gloeckner (2016)
The Double Auction Market Institutions Theories And Evidence
Léon Walras (1976)
Éléments d'économie politique pure, ou, Théorie de la richesse sociale
Théories mathématiques de la richesse sociale par Léon Walras et Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses par Augustin Cournot
C. Plott (1982)
Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economies
D. Saari (2000)
Mathematical structure of voting paradoxesEconomic Theory, 15
(2000)
Daal, Trans.)
(2013)
The Stability of General Equilibrium—What Do We Know and Why Is It Important?
O. Lange (1936)
On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part TwoThe Review of Economic Studies, 4
Joseph Dorfman, J. Mill, V. Bladen, John Robson (1911)
Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, 2 Vols.Political Science Quarterly, 82
M. Wolfson (2000)
Secret origins of modern microeconomics: Dupuit and the engineersJournal of The History of The Behavioral Sciences, 36
R. Mantel (1974)
On the characterization of aggregate excess demandJournal of Economic Theory, 7
J. Dupuit
De la mesure de l'utilité des travaux publics
(1883)
Théorie des Richesses
Wayne Shafer, H. Sonnenschein (1993)
Market demand and excess demand functionsHandbook of Mathematical Economics, 2
Jean-Michel Grandmont (1987)
Distributions of Preferences and the 'Law of Demand.'Econometrica, 55
H. Sonnenschein (1973)
The Utility Hypothesis and Market Demand TheoryEconomic Inquiry, 11
J. Say (2002)
Traité d'économie politique, ou, Simple exposition de la manière dont se forment, se distribuent et se consomment les richesses
V. Smith (1991)
Papers in Experimental Economics: An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior
(2019)
Revealed Preferences and General
Mikhail Anufriev, Jasmina Arifovic, John Ledyard, Valentyn Panchenko (2013)
Efficiency of Continuous Double Auctions under Individual Evolutionary Learning with Full or Limited InformationJournal of Evolutionary Economics, 23
S. Rizvi (2006)
The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Results after Thirty YearsHistory of Political Economy, 38
W. Trockel (1984)
Market Demand: An Analysis of Large Economies with Non-Convex Preferences
Glenn-Marie Lange, James Cust, Diego Herrera, Esther Naikal (1999)
The wealth of nations
G. Ryle (1946)
I.—Knowing How and Knowing that: The Presidential Address, 46
(1948)
Individualism and economic order, 92, 98
1888] 1891). The Positive Theory of Capital. London: Macmillan and Co
G. Debreu (1974)
Excess demand functionsJournal of Mathematical Economics, 1
F. Hayek (1937)
Economics and knowledgeEconomica, 4
Youssef Tawk, C. Botteron, A. Jovanovic, P. Farine (2012)
Analysis of Galileo E5 and E5ab code trackingGPS Solutions, 16
A. Lerner (1934)
Economic Theory and Socialist EconomyThe Review of Economic Studies, 2
(2009)
The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State
(1926)
Elements of Pure Economics. English translation by W
A. Cournot (1898)
Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of WealthForerunners of Realizable Values Accounting in Financial Reporting
V. Smith, Arlington Williams (2000)
The boundaries of competitive price theory: convergence, expectations, and transaction costs
Sean Crockett, D. Friedman, Ryan Oprea (2021)
NATURALLY OCCURRING PREFERENCES AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM: A LABORATORY STUDYInternational Economic Review
Neoclassical price theory was founded on axioms of price-taking behavior and the law of one price in a market, axioms inconsistent with a theory of endogenous price discovery in markets. Classical economists including Adam Smith narrated a price discovery process based on buyer and seller reservation values and their motivation to buy low and sell high; the classical sketch of price formation offers a quite fruitful foundation for a modern theory of price discovery, supplied below. Market experiments, based on private distributed reservation values and using rules governing open-outcry double auctions, converged endogenously, in three to four periods of repeat interaction, to an efficient outcome. These observations contradicted the widely believed thought and taught necessity for perfect information, large numbers, and price-taking behavior. However, these results were consistent with the old classical conception of price formation emerging from the collective interaction of the traders. Aggregation and price discovery constitute essential functions of classical markets. We explore the divergence of neoclassical scholars from this classical tradition. Revealingly, in describing the microdynamics of market price formation, prominent neoclassical utilitarians such as Marshall, with his description of a “corn-market in a county town,” and Böhm-Bawerk with his farmers’ horse market, reverted to this classical reservation-value framework.
History of Political Economy – Duke University Press
Published: Feb 1, 2022
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.