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Zelinski on Mysticism and Morality

Zelinski on Mysticism and Morality William J. Wainwright I would like to begin by raising two general questions. The first concerns the status of the virtues that Daniel Zelinski attributes to monistic mystics. There are really two questions here. (1) Are the humility, say, or compassion, valorized by Dogen or Eckhart genuine instances of humility or compassion or are they borderline cases, or even counterfeits, of these dispositions? (2) If they are genuine instances of humility or compassion are they virtues, that is, excellences, fine or noble things? (Cf. Plato who argues in the Protagoras that courage as popularly understood, namely, a disposition to face dangers that others are afraid to face, isn’t itself a virtue because it isn’t always a fine or noble thing.) For an example of the sort of problem I have in mind consider nonattachment. Nonattachment is associated with a “God’s eye” morality which abstracts from my situatedness, my personal projects and personal relationships, counting these as no more (though perhaps no less) important than the projects and personal relationships “of a man far beyond the seas” whom I have “never set eyes on”. A similar attitude is enjoined both by the Christian love commandment and by classical utilitarianism. Nonattachment http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Archiv für Religionsgeschichte de Gruyter

Zelinski on Mysticism and Morality

Archiv für Religionsgeschichte , Volume 9 (1): 10 – Dec 18, 2007

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
©2012 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co.
ISSN
1868-8888
eISSN
1868-8888
DOI
10.1515/9783110198737.1.73
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

William J. Wainwright I would like to begin by raising two general questions. The first concerns the status of the virtues that Daniel Zelinski attributes to monistic mystics. There are really two questions here. (1) Are the humility, say, or compassion, valorized by Dogen or Eckhart genuine instances of humility or compassion or are they borderline cases, or even counterfeits, of these dispositions? (2) If they are genuine instances of humility or compassion are they virtues, that is, excellences, fine or noble things? (Cf. Plato who argues in the Protagoras that courage as popularly understood, namely, a disposition to face dangers that others are afraid to face, isn’t itself a virtue because it isn’t always a fine or noble thing.) For an example of the sort of problem I have in mind consider nonattachment. Nonattachment is associated with a “God’s eye” morality which abstracts from my situatedness, my personal projects and personal relationships, counting these as no more (though perhaps no less) important than the projects and personal relationships “of a man far beyond the seas” whom I have “never set eyes on”. A similar attitude is enjoined both by the Christian love commandment and by classical utilitarianism. Nonattachment

Journal

Archiv für Religionsgeschichtede Gruyter

Published: Dec 18, 2007

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