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(1965)
Theorienstrukturen und Theoriendynamik Neue Wege der Wissenschaftsphilosophie
(1965)
Prisoner's DilelTTl1a. A Study in Conflict and Cooperation
G. Tullock (1967)
The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility TheoremQuarterly Journal of Economics, 81
E. Schlicht (1974)
Die Theorie der kollektiven Entscheidung und der individualistische AnsatzMunich Reprints in Economics
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The Foundation of Mathematics and Othe
Copyright (r) 2003 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (r) Lurius und Lucius Verlags gesellschaft mbH Julian Nida
Critiques des postulats et axiomes de l'ecole americaine, in: Econo-metrica 21
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A Theory of Sodal Action
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CoHective Choke and Sodal Welfare Rationalclown s: Eine Kritik der behavioristischen Grun diagen der Wirtschaftstheorie
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Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics and the Theory of Fairness
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Neue Vertragstheorie. Zur rationalen Rekonstruktion politisch-ethischer Grundprinzipien
Elisha Pazner, D. Schmeidler (1978)
Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic EquityQuarterly Journal of Economics, 92
R. Tuomela, Kaarlo Miller (1985)
We-Intentions and Social ActionAnalyse & Kritik, 7
Elisha Pazner, D. Schmeidler (1974)
A Difficulty in the Concept of FairnessThe Review of Economic Studies, 41
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Equity, Envy and Effidency Journal of Economic Theory
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Repaidng P["oafs of Arrow's General Theorem and Enlarging the Scope of the Theorem
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Meaning and Necessity (1. Auf!
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Public Bads and Sodo-Moral Reasoning: The Case of the New Social Movements in Germany Eine individualistische Theorie sozialen Handeins. Zu Raimo Tuomelas 'A Theory of Social Action
E. Rowland (1946)
Theory of Games and Economic BehaviorNature, 157
G. Shafer, M. Allais, O. Hagen (1982)
Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox.Journal of the American Statistical Association, 79
C. d'Aspremont, L. Gevers (1977)
Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective ChoiceThe Review of Economic Studies, 44
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Social Choice and Individual Values
Abstract During the last two decades social choice theory has become an established branch of the social sciences. But in spite of its contributions on a high level of precision by logical and mathematical means the theory is still vague regarding the interpretation of its basic concepts. In this article I try to cope with that problem by distinguishing three different areas of application of social choice theory. The concept of ‘we-intention’ in the sense of Tuomela is examined in this context.
Analyse & Kritik – de Gruyter
Published: May 1, 1986
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