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Trump vs. China? Tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Revisited

Trump vs. China? Tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Revisited AbstractThis study challenges the common belief that the ‘Trump tariffs’ are protectionist or a deliberate attack on China, the USA’s economic rival. By focusing specifically on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and equating its use to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, this study instead demonstrates how the U.S. administration is actively repurposing protectionist laws to function as unilateral enforcement tools. Thus, this study argues that the tariffs enacted on steel and aluminium in 2018 under the guise of national security are not meant to protect the domestic market or to hurt the Chinese, but rather to ‘protect’ the ability of U.S. businesses to make profits abroad. By contrasting the justification for the tariffs to factual application, China is not identified as a target but rather as a convenient fig leaf. The article goes into further detail to demonstrate how the U.S. (ab)uses these tariffs during negotiations with South Korea, Japan, and other nations and finds multiple examples of how others have been affected significantly more than China. Here, the article describes how U.S. officials have mastered the art of simultaneously creating leverage, exchanging it for concessions, and keeping it. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies de Gruyter

Trump vs. China? Tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Revisited

Hanada, Eric
Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 12 (1): 45 – Dec 1, 2020
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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2020 Eric Hanada, published by Sciendo
ISSN
2521-7038
eISSN
2521-7038
DOI
10.2478/vjeas-2020-0008
Publisher site
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Abstract

AbstractThis study challenges the common belief that the ‘Trump tariffs’ are protectionist or a deliberate attack on China, the USA’s economic rival. By focusing specifically on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and equating its use to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, this study instead demonstrates how the U.S. administration is actively repurposing protectionist laws to function as unilateral enforcement tools. Thus, this study argues that the tariffs enacted on steel and aluminium in 2018 under the guise of national security are not meant to protect the domestic market or to hurt the Chinese, but rather to ‘protect’ the ability of U.S. businesses to make profits abroad. By contrasting the justification for the tariffs to factual application, China is not identified as a target but rather as a convenient fig leaf. The article goes into further detail to demonstrate how the U.S. (ab)uses these tariffs during negotiations with South Korea, Japan, and other nations and finds multiple examples of how others have been affected significantly more than China. Here, the article describes how U.S. officials have mastered the art of simultaneously creating leverage, exchanging it for concessions, and keeping it.

Journal

Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies – de Gruyter

Published: Dec 1, 2020

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