Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

‘True dignity’ and ‘respect-worthiness’

‘True dignity’ and ‘respect-worthiness’ AbstractIn the Groundwork, Kant seems to make two paradoxical claims about the source of human dignity. First, he claims that if “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (Kant, 1998, p. 36), it is because “humanity is… dignity, insofar it is capable of morality” (Kant, 1998, p. 42). Second, he claims that although “autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (Kant, 1998, p. 43), the human being can only have “dignity… insofar he fulfils all his duties” (Kant, 1998, p. 46). This paper argues that neither claim is repugnant because Kant seeks to advance two kinds of dignity. Kant intends to elucidate that the human being possesses a basic ‘entitled dignity’ in virtue of his capacity for morality, but that he needs to become a moral being in order for him to realise his ‘true dignity’. This paper claims that the formal condition under which a person can be worthy of respect is identical with the condition of realising his ‘true dignity’. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Human Affairs de Gruyter

‘True dignity’ and ‘respect-worthiness’

Fasoro, Sunday Adeniyi
Human Affairs , Volume 29 (2): 17 – Apr 1, 2019
Download PDF
17 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/de-gruyter/true-dignity-and-respect-worthiness-iCu5RxiL56

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2019 Institute for Research in Social Communication, Slovak Academy of Sciences
ISSN
1337-401X
eISSN
1337-401X
DOI
10.1515/humaff-2019-0017
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractIn the Groundwork, Kant seems to make two paradoxical claims about the source of human dignity. First, he claims that if “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (Kant, 1998, p. 36), it is because “humanity is… dignity, insofar it is capable of morality” (Kant, 1998, p. 42). Second, he claims that although “autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (Kant, 1998, p. 43), the human being can only have “dignity… insofar he fulfils all his duties” (Kant, 1998, p. 46). This paper argues that neither claim is repugnant because Kant seeks to advance two kinds of dignity. Kant intends to elucidate that the human being possesses a basic ‘entitled dignity’ in virtue of his capacity for morality, but that he needs to become a moral being in order for him to realise his ‘true dignity’. This paper claims that the formal condition under which a person can be worthy of respect is identical with the condition of realising his ‘true dignity’.

Journal

Human Affairs – de Gruyter

Published: Apr 1, 2019

Keywords: entitled dignity; true dignity; respect-worthiness; morality; good will; humanity

References

  • Kant’s moral and political cosmopolitanism
  • Kant after virtue