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The Legitimacy of Groups: Toward a We-Reasoning View

The Legitimacy of Groups: Toward a We-Reasoning View AbstractIn liberal political philosophy, a prevalent view holds that groups are typically voluntary associations. Members of voluntary associations can accept, revise or reject group practices as a matter of choice. In this article, I challenge this view. Appealing to the concept of joint commitment developed in philosophy of social science, I argue that individuals who jointly commit their wills to a goal or a belief form a ‘We’-group. Members of ‘We’-groups are under an obligation to defer to ‘Our’ will embodied in ‘Our’ norms as a matter of course. I further show the ubiquity of We-groups. This joint commitment account of group authority raises a much-overlooked question of group legitimacy: Do members have good reasons to obey norms of their group? I show that state-centric views of legitimacy are inapt to answer it. A group-centric view, revived from the old communitarian literature, is defended. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Analyse & Kritik de Gruyter

The Legitimacy of Groups: Toward a We-Reasoning View

Analyse & Kritik , Volume 42 (2): 26 – Nov 1, 2020

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2020 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
ISSN
0171-5860
DOI
10.1515/auk-2020-0014
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractIn liberal political philosophy, a prevalent view holds that groups are typically voluntary associations. Members of voluntary associations can accept, revise or reject group practices as a matter of choice. In this article, I challenge this view. Appealing to the concept of joint commitment developed in philosophy of social science, I argue that individuals who jointly commit their wills to a goal or a belief form a ‘We’-group. Members of ‘We’-groups are under an obligation to defer to ‘Our’ will embodied in ‘Our’ norms as a matter of course. I further show the ubiquity of We-groups. This joint commitment account of group authority raises a much-overlooked question of group legitimacy: Do members have good reasons to obey norms of their group? I show that state-centric views of legitimacy are inapt to answer it. A group-centric view, revived from the old communitarian literature, is defended.

Journal

Analyse & Kritikde Gruyter

Published: Nov 1, 2020

Keywords: groups; joint commitment; social norms; legitimacy; group identity; We-reasoning

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