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The Issue of the “Thing Itself” in Psychiatric Phenomenology and Existential Analysis

The Issue of the “Thing Itself” in Psychiatric Phenomenology and Existential Analysis AbstractPsychiatric phenomenology emerged from the willingness to spread Husserl’s program of going back to the things themselves into the psychiatric field. However, what this initial will then became is not very clear. We show that if this will to go back to the things themselves really enabled to bring phenomenology and psychiatry together (especially by the Swiss psychiatrist L. Binswanger), the thing to whom we have to go back changed over time: first conceived as the experience lived by people with a psychiatric disorder, it was then conceived as the psychiatric disorder itself. We show that both of these ideas are inadequate. Our thesis is that psychiatric phenomenology has to be considered as belonging to the hermeneutical field (as defined by Ricoeur and Gadamer). We show that this hypothesis leads to a more insightful understanding of what is psychiatric phenomenology and what status we should concede to it. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phainomenon de Gruyter

The Issue of the “Thing Itself” in Psychiatric Phenomenology and Existential Analysis

Phainomenon , Volume 28 (1): 16 – Oct 1, 2018

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References (5)

Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2018 Camille Abettan, published by Sciendo
eISSN
2183-0142
DOI
10.2478/phainomenon-2018-0007
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractPsychiatric phenomenology emerged from the willingness to spread Husserl’s program of going back to the things themselves into the psychiatric field. However, what this initial will then became is not very clear. We show that if this will to go back to the things themselves really enabled to bring phenomenology and psychiatry together (especially by the Swiss psychiatrist L. Binswanger), the thing to whom we have to go back changed over time: first conceived as the experience lived by people with a psychiatric disorder, it was then conceived as the psychiatric disorder itself. We show that both of these ideas are inadequate. Our thesis is that psychiatric phenomenology has to be considered as belonging to the hermeneutical field (as defined by Ricoeur and Gadamer). We show that this hypothesis leads to a more insightful understanding of what is psychiatric phenomenology and what status we should concede to it.

Journal

Phainomenonde Gruyter

Published: Oct 1, 2018

Keywords: Daseinsanalyse; existential analysis; psychiatric phenomenology; Ludwig Binswanger

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