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The dignity approach to human rights and the impaired autonomy objection

The dignity approach to human rights and the impaired autonomy objection AbstractThere is little need to argue for the importance of human rights (HRs) in our world. If one looks at the role they play today, it is hard to deny that their impact has increased beyond anything the drafters of the 1948 Universal Declaration could have hoped or imagined. However, even though human rights today have a far greater impact on politics than in the past, the philosophical reflection that surrounds them has had a less fortunate history. It is doubtful whether we are today in a better position than we were in 1948 to answer any of the philosophical questions surrounding them, including, and perhaps most crucially, the question about their foundation. Why are human rights standards—of whatever sort—that we should adopt, or even just take seriously? The first two parts of this paper summarize my recent work on the above question (Caranti, 2017) and the third takes it a step further. I will 1) show why the main orientations in the contemporary philosophy of human rights all fail to yield a satisfactory foundation, 2) sketch an alternative foundation that exploits Kant’s account of human dignity in a rather critical way; and 3) address one major objection my approach is bound to attract (and in a certain form has already attracted). Since my foundation suggests that we have dignity (and as a consequence human rights) because we are autonomous, that is, capable of moral behavior, some scholars have argued that I am bound to the counterintuitive conclusion that people with a temporary or permanent lack of rational capacity, which would cause a condition of “impaired autonomy,” are not entitled to the protection of human rights. While this objection does nothing but reformulate in the language of human rights an old, classical objection to Kant’s ethics, replying to it requires mobilizing new intellectual resources. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Human Affairs de Gruyter

The dignity approach to human rights and the impaired autonomy objection

Caranti, Luigi
Human Affairs , Volume 29 (3): 13 – Jul 1, 2019
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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2019 Institute for Research in Social Communication, Slovak Academy of Sciences
ISSN
1337-401X
eISSN
1337-401X
DOI
10.1515/humaff-2019-0023
Publisher site
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Abstract

AbstractThere is little need to argue for the importance of human rights (HRs) in our world. If one looks at the role they play today, it is hard to deny that their impact has increased beyond anything the drafters of the 1948 Universal Declaration could have hoped or imagined. However, even though human rights today have a far greater impact on politics than in the past, the philosophical reflection that surrounds them has had a less fortunate history. It is doubtful whether we are today in a better position than we were in 1948 to answer any of the philosophical questions surrounding them, including, and perhaps most crucially, the question about their foundation. Why are human rights standards—of whatever sort—that we should adopt, or even just take seriously? The first two parts of this paper summarize my recent work on the above question (Caranti, 2017) and the third takes it a step further. I will 1) show why the main orientations in the contemporary philosophy of human rights all fail to yield a satisfactory foundation, 2) sketch an alternative foundation that exploits Kant’s account of human dignity in a rather critical way; and 3) address one major objection my approach is bound to attract (and in a certain form has already attracted). Since my foundation suggests that we have dignity (and as a consequence human rights) because we are autonomous, that is, capable of moral behavior, some scholars have argued that I am bound to the counterintuitive conclusion that people with a temporary or permanent lack of rational capacity, which would cause a condition of “impaired autonomy,” are not entitled to the protection of human rights. While this objection does nothing but reformulate in the language of human rights an old, classical objection to Kant’s ethics, replying to it requires mobilizing new intellectual resources.

Journal

Human Affairs – de Gruyter

Published: Jul 1, 2019

Keywords: human rights; dignity; autonomy; Immanuel Kant

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