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Testing Obama's Withdrawal Timeline Hypothesis in Afghanistan

Testing Obama's Withdrawal Timeline Hypothesis in Afghanistan The Obama Administration argued that a publicly announced withdrawal timeline would help further U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives in Afghanistan by incentivizing better behavior from the Karzai government and the Afghan people. In this article, I test the “Obama timeline hypothesis” to determine whether it is likely to produce the positive change that the Administration claims. By utilizing a mix of consistent historical predictors, deductive logic based on contemporary COIN theory, and currently available evidence, I conclude that the withdrawal timeline has not produced, and likely will not produce, these results and that, on the whole, it has likely engendered perverse incentives that run contrary to America’s COIN objectives. More broadly, the Afghan case should make U.S. policymakers deeply skeptical of assertions that withdrawal timelines can serve as an effective policy tool for changing the behaviors of key regional actors. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Forum de Gruyter

Testing Obama's Withdrawal Timeline Hypothesis in Afghanistan

The Forum , Volume 9 (2): 1 – Jul 13, 2011

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References (81)

Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
ISSN
1540-8884
eISSN
1540-8884
DOI
10.2202/1540-8884.1435
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The Obama Administration argued that a publicly announced withdrawal timeline would help further U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives in Afghanistan by incentivizing better behavior from the Karzai government and the Afghan people. In this article, I test the “Obama timeline hypothesis” to determine whether it is likely to produce the positive change that the Administration claims. By utilizing a mix of consistent historical predictors, deductive logic based on contemporary COIN theory, and currently available evidence, I conclude that the withdrawal timeline has not produced, and likely will not produce, these results and that, on the whole, it has likely engendered perverse incentives that run contrary to America’s COIN objectives. More broadly, the Afghan case should make U.S. policymakers deeply skeptical of assertions that withdrawal timelines can serve as an effective policy tool for changing the behaviors of key regional actors.

Journal

The Forumde Gruyter

Published: Jul 13, 2011

Keywords: Afghanistan; counterinsurgency; withdrawal; timeline; Obama

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