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Terrence W. Deacon Shannon - Boltzmann — Darwin: Redefining information (Part II) A scientifically adequate theory of semiotic processes must ulti- mately be founded on a theory of information that can unify the physical, biological, cognitive, and computational uses of the con- cept. Unfortunately, no such unification exists, and more impor- tantly, the causal status of informational content remains ambi- guous as a result. Lacking this grounding, semiotic theories have tended to be predominantly phenomenological taxonomies rather than dynamical explanations of the representational processes of natural systems. This paper argues that the problem of informa- tion that prevents the development of a scientific semiotic theory is the necessity of analyzing it as a negative relationship: defined with respect to absence. This is cryptically implicit in concepts of design and function in biology, acknowledged in psychological and philosophical accounts of intentionality and content, and is explicidy formulated in the mathematical theory of communica- tion (aka "information theory"). Beginning from the base estab- lished by Claude Shannon, which otherwise ignores issues of con- tent, reference, and evaluation, this two part essay explores its re- lationship to two other higher-order theories that are also explicit- ly based on an analysis of absence:
Cognitive Semiotics – de Gruyter
Published: Mar 1, 2008
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