Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Regulatory Competition, Extraterritorial Powers and Harmonization : The Case of the European Union

Regulatory Competition, Extraterritorial Powers and Harmonization : The Case of the European Union Florin Aftalion0 1. Introduction Traditionally, regulation is approached either from a normative point of view -- when should regulations be applied and what is the optimum amount of regulation -- or from a positive point of view -- how can the regulator's behavior be explained. Recently, an additional problem has arisen. It is related to situations where a federal regulatory authority is superimposed on local or regional authorities. Since a given producer can b e regulated either by a central or by a regional authority, the question is whether it is preferable to have a centrally imposed unique (harmonized) regulation or to give regulated entities the choice between following a central or various regional regulations (regulatory competition). This question has been posed, for instance, in a recently published set of essays 1 . In light of the liberalization of financial services initiated by the Uruguay Round, their authors have tried to "determine what the degree to which a future financial services regime must be harmonized, with common rules governing all participants". The European Union poses a somewhat different problem. Fifteen European countries have agreed to create an integrated internal market. While they have kept their sovereignty to a http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines de Gruyter

Regulatory Competition, Extraterritorial Powers and Harmonization : The Case of the European Union

Loading next page...
 
/lp/de-gruyter/regulatory-competition-extraterritorial-powers-and-harmonization-the-Y9sY40f25C
Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the
ISSN
2194-5799
eISSN
2153-1552
DOI
10.1515/jeeh-1999-0104
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Florin Aftalion0 1. Introduction Traditionally, regulation is approached either from a normative point of view -- when should regulations be applied and what is the optimum amount of regulation -- or from a positive point of view -- how can the regulator's behavior be explained. Recently, an additional problem has arisen. It is related to situations where a federal regulatory authority is superimposed on local or regional authorities. Since a given producer can b e regulated either by a central or by a regional authority, the question is whether it is preferable to have a centrally imposed unique (harmonized) regulation or to give regulated entities the choice between following a central or various regional regulations (regulatory competition). This question has been posed, for instance, in a recently published set of essays 1 . In light of the liberalization of financial services initiated by the Uruguay Round, their authors have tried to "determine what the degree to which a future financial services regime must be harmonized, with common rules governing all participants". The European Union poses a somewhat different problem. Fifteen European countries have agreed to create an integrated internal market. While they have kept their sovereignty to a

Journal

Journal des Économistes et des Études Humainesde Gruyter

Published: Mar 1, 1999

References