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/lp/de-gruyter/reconsidering-the-essential-nature-and-indestructibility-of-the-soul-7MxPIezyRw
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- Publisher
- de Gruyter
- Copyright
- © 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
- ISSN
- 2196-5110
- eISSN
- 2196-5110
- DOI
- 10.1515/rhiz-2023-0004
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
AbstractThis paper offers a fresh examination of a salient distinction located at the beginning of the Affinity Argument between the composite (τὸ σύνθετον) and the incomposite (τὸ ἀσύνθετον). I offer reasons for why Plato may have intended for us to assume that the soul is an incomposite unity in its essential nature. I then substantiate this claim by reviving an ancient interpretation to the Affinity Argument according to which the soul is of the same metaphysical kind as the Forms. I thus suggest that the argument may be seen as supporting the basic indestructibility cum immortality of all souls.
Journal
Rhizomata – de Gruyter
Published: Aug 30, 2023
Keywords: Composition; Psychology; Metaphysics; Mereology; Neoplatonism