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RECHERCHE DE RENTE : JEU DE GUERRE ET GUERRE D'ENJEUX - * Thierry Sebagh0 "Les lions et les loups cooperent dans la bataille mais s'entre-tuent apres la victoire." "Les colombes, bien qu'elles perdent de la simple existence des faucons, retirent un gain du combat entre les faucons. 1. Introduction La recherche de rente et la guerre ont en commun de proceder d'une situation conflictuelle oü la seule possibilite d'ameliorer son bien-etre repose sur une redistribution des richesses et des revenus naturels. En fait, tout se passerait comme si la production ne pouvait plus etre augmentee. Ii ne s'agit done pas d'une amelioration paretienne mais d'un repositionnement sur la frontiere de Pareto qui est recherche. En fait, bien plus qu'un simple conflit, la recherche de rente debouche sur un retour ä l'etat de nature decrit par Hobbes. Si l'on definit l'etat de nature comme la "guerre de tous contre tous", la democratic constitue une forme degeneree de l'etat initial hobbesien. Dans une democratic la recherche de coalitions majoritaires pousse chaque membre d'une alliance ä chercher, ä la marge, de nouveaux allies, eux-memes tentant de se coaliser avec d'autres interets speciaux afin de battre la coalition en place 2 .
Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines – de Gruyter
Published: Jun 1, 1995
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