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RATIONAL IGNORANCE IN POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND LAW

RATIONAL IGNORANCE IN POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND LAW Peter H. Aranson* Over three decades ago, in An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs introduced the notion of "rational ignorance". While many of this seminal work's other contributions have found a central place in the subsequent development of public choice, rational ignorance largely has been overlooked'. But in the last few years, I increasingly have invoked this concept in my own research and writing, to explain several derivative phenomena in politics generally, and in political economy, science policy, and constitutional law in particular. Here I explore the notion of rational ignorance by reviewing some of its many applications. I first define the concept and demonstrate the reasoning that led to its discovery. Next, I show that rational ignorance may exist in both political and market relations, but that its consequences differ substantially in these two institutional environments. Third, I describe some applications of the concept, derived from my own research on rent-seeking, science policy, and constitutional law. Finally, I offer some closing reflections on this troublesome feature of democratic politics as it affects popular democratic control of politicians. Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at "L'Universite d'Ete de la Nouvelle Economie", University of Aix-en-Provence, August 1987, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines de Gruyter

RATIONAL IGNORANCE IN POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND LAW

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References (75)

Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the
ISSN
2194-5799
eISSN
2153-1552
DOI
10.1515/jeeh-1990-0102
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Peter H. Aranson* Over three decades ago, in An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs introduced the notion of "rational ignorance". While many of this seminal work's other contributions have found a central place in the subsequent development of public choice, rational ignorance largely has been overlooked'. But in the last few years, I increasingly have invoked this concept in my own research and writing, to explain several derivative phenomena in politics generally, and in political economy, science policy, and constitutional law in particular. Here I explore the notion of rational ignorance by reviewing some of its many applications. I first define the concept and demonstrate the reasoning that led to its discovery. Next, I show that rational ignorance may exist in both political and market relations, but that its consequences differ substantially in these two institutional environments. Third, I describe some applications of the concept, derived from my own research on rent-seeking, science policy, and constitutional law. Finally, I offer some closing reflections on this troublesome feature of democratic politics as it affects popular democratic control of politicians. Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at "L'Universite d'Ete de la Nouvelle Economie", University of Aix-en-Provence, August 1987,

Journal

Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines – de Gruyter

Published: Jan 1, 1990

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