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References (5)
-
(1997)
at 199-200 -
Moderate relativism is what Annas and Barnes have in mind when they talk about relativism: see ibid -
(2005)
In a similar vein, Spinelli claims that at PH I 139 «il ragionamento sestano non appare del tutto lineare e logicamente cogente» (E. SPINELLI, I dieci tropi scettici, in ID -
The Ten Modes of Aenesidemus, cit -
The Modes of Scepticism, cit
- Publisher
- de Gruyter
- Copyright
- © 2018 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
- ISSN
- 0392-7342
- eISSN
- 2037-7177
- DOI
- 10.1515/elen-2015-360104
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
AbstractThis paper argues that Sextus Empiricus’s Pyrrhonism is a form of relativism markedly different from the positions typically referred to by this term. The scholars who have explored the relativistic elements found in Sextus’s texts have claimed that his outlook is not actually a form of relativism, or that those elements are inconsistent with his account of Pyrrhonism, or that he is confusing skepticism with relativism. The reason for these views is twofold: first, when employing the term “relativism” one hardly has in mind the sort of relativistic stance adopted by the Pyrrhonist; and second, those scholars have misinterpreted Sextus’s relativistic remarks. The purpose of this paper is to show that he adopts a phenomenological kind of relativism that is compatible with his account of Pyrrhonism.
Journal
Elenchos – de Gruyter
Published: Mar 1, 2015